

Public Diplomacy War by Other Means

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I would like to thank all the individuals who were willing to be interviewed for this paper: Dr. Nicholas Cull, Professor and Director, Masters in Public Diplomacy Program, University of Southern California (USC); Colonel (Ret.) Daniel Devlin, Special Advisor for Public Diplomacy, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Office of Secretary of Defense; Alberto Fernandez, Director, Office of Press and Public Diplomacy, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, US State Department; Joshua Fouts, Director, Center on Public Diplomacy, USC; Bruce Gregory, Director, Public Diplomacy Institute, George Washington University; William Kiehl, Executive Director, Public Diplomacy Council; Judith Milestone, former Senior Vice President, CNN and Commissioner, US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World; Alina Romanowski, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, US State Department; Ambassador William Rugh, former US Ambassador to Yemen and the UAE; Daniel Smith, Executive Assistant, Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy.

I would also like to thank officials at the General Accountability Office and the Middle Eastern Partnership Initiative who were interviewed on a background basis and asked not to be identified.

Finally, I would like to thank Brigadier General Russell Howard, director of the Jebson Center for Counter Terrorism Studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, for providing me with direction and help, and Tufts University for providing the support, financial and otherwise, necessary for conducting this research.

INTRODUCTION

For a few weeks in July 2005, the global war on terrorism (GWOT) was unofficially and temporarily called the “the global struggle against violent extremism.”¹ Although the complex phrasing never caught on in the media and general public, its repeated use in Washington underscored the necessity of a political strategy to complement the military campaign. Endorsed by both the civil and military establishments, this more nuanced understanding of the conflict implied that economic, political, and diplomatic efforts were integral parts of the solution to both an armed and ideological problem. However intended, the change in language did not result in a fundamental shift in policy. Consequently, the current bi-partisan consensus among

leading foreign policy theoreticians and practitioners appears to be that the United States, in failing to integrate non-traditional and traditional instruments of statecraft, is losing the war on terror.²

WHAT'S IN A NAME ?

The targets of traditional diplomacy are the governments of states. Public diplomacy, by contrast, seeks to engage foreign publics. The end goals of public diplomacy are to inform and influence audiences abroad, build mutual dialogue and long-term relationships, and present an unbiased representation of the country's policies and society. Public diplomacy can foster more favorable attitudes overseas, and even promote values while inspiring debate over ideologies. By taking foreign opinion into account, public diplomacy does not abandon a country's objectives or values. Rather, the strategic logic is to facilitate a country's policies by cultivating more welcoming environments abroad. As with other instruments of statecraft, the ends of public diplomacy are centered on a country's interests. The means, however, can often serve both the state's goals and the needs of societies overseas. Components of public diplomacy can be found in programs as diverse as educational and cultural exchanges and scholarships, post-disaster relief efforts, language training programs, and radio and television broadcasts.

Although casually dismissed as propaganda, true public diplomacy rests on fundamental honesty and integrity. According to Joseph Nye, author of *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, propaganda is:

counterproductive as public diplomacy. Nor is public diplomacy merely public relations. Conveying information and selling a positive image is part of it, but public diplomacy also involves building long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies.³

While theoretically originating from the interests of a state, public diplomacy is much more altruistic in practice than most other policy tools. Arguably the ultimate ambitions of public diplomacy are the prevention of war and the reduction of hostilities in overseas environments where a country is involved militarily. In the latter case, public diplomacy can be seen as a continuation of war by other, more peaceful, means.

The means by which public diplomacy operates and the end goals towards which it strives are long-term. Success is often hard to measure because relationships take years to cultivate and can be set back or even destroyed with only a few negative words. Not surprisingly, while the strategic logic

behind public diplomacy might make sense to theorists, it is not appealing to result-driven practitioners. Policy-makers, being in office for a limited time, frequently look for short-term solutions. Moreover, domestic constituencies do not lobby on behalf of overt ideological and informational activities in which they have little at stake. Consequently, the legacy of public diplomacy is characterized by a lack of funding and resources, as well as few sustained efforts. Nevertheless, in light of the GWOT and recent developments in the international political system, public diplomacy has become necessary in historically unprecedented ways that merit a renewed, systematic, and unrelenting campaign.

US PUBLIC DIPLOMACY POST 9/11

Historically, public diplomacy efforts have been coordinated by the United States Information Agency (USIA). Established in 1953, the USIA was tasked with leading America's battle of ideas with the Soviet Union and the ideological struggle with international communism. Its programs ranged from radio broadcasting, (through which the legendary *Voice of America* provided millions of listeners behind the Iron Curtain with international news) to educational and cultural exchanges, principally the Fulbright Scholarship Program.⁴ After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, public diplomacy's importance to the US government vanished, its budget was slashed, and its overseas operations were closed. In 1999, Congress officially abolished the USIA. The agency's broadcasting efforts were transferred to the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), while information operations and exchange programs were integrated into the State Department's Bureau of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

Public diplomacy was in effect largely forgotten until 9/11. The atrocious acts that occurred on that day reminded the world that ideas, perceptions, and attitudes still mattered. Nevertheless the continued lack of appreciation for and recognition of public diplomacy's strategic importance resulted in structural and institutional problems in the State Department and on the interagency level, such as budget and personnel constraints (especially in field offices overseas), and programmatic mistakes in operations overseas. The following subsections identify these problems and, based on extensive primary research, offer appropriate policy prescriptions and recommendations on how to reform the public diplomacy apparatus across agencies, within the diplomatic establishment, and in posts abroad.

THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM

On 9/11, non-state actors with a transnational ideology destroyed the United States' perception of its island-like security. Some public diplomacy experts, such as Bruce Gregory, the director of the Public Diplomacy Institute at George Washington University, hoped that the "globalization of threat and opportunities would create an environment where public diplomacy will be viewed as strategically important on a more sustained basis."⁵ Thus far this has not been the case. Today, within the State Department, across federal

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agencies, and in local posts overseas, public diplomacy is still seen as an afterthought because the strategic importance of communications is not recognized or appreciated. This is public diplomacy's fundamental problem and it leads to other setbacks, such as its lack of resources and separation from policy.

The key to reinvigorating the public diplomacy campaign lies in executive leadership. So far, White House efforts to enhance public diplomacy's strategic importance have been neither sincere nor sustainable. In 2003, President Bush established the Office of Global Communications (OGC) with the purpose of advising the Executive Office and the heads of executive branches on the most effective means of communication for the US to promote its interests abroad. Unfortunately, the OGC, which replaced the Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee created the year before, quickly "evolved into a second tier organization"⁶ and "has not assumed its intended role in facilitating the strategic direction and coordination of US public diplomacy efforts."⁷

The President is the only one who can make sure that the United States communicates effectively, positively, and consistently with the world. The President's word is closely watched in the international arena, and it carries weight across agencies. Many experts feel that he is "the ultimate director of public diplomacy,"⁸ and it is absolutely "essential that the President himself make[s] clear America's commitment to reform its public diplomacy and make it a central element of US foreign policy."⁹ The first step to resurrecting public diplomacy begins at the White House. The President should issue a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) reestablishing the strategic importance of public diplomacy and reaffirm his commitment to strategic communications.¹⁰

STRUCTURAL CHANGES ON THE INTERAGENCY LEVEL

Intentionally or not, America's message is carried out by all government agencies. More specifically, public diplomacy activities are now operated in a wide range of government agencies (e.g., the State Department, DoD, USAID, and BBG) which communicate through media and person-to-person interaction. Conveying America's message in a consistent voice is essential and requires interagency coordination, which has been absent from US public diplomacy. The first two attempts at interagency coordination under the Bush administration were quickly terminated.¹¹ This has complicated the task of conveying messages, "achieving mutually reinforcing benefits," and has diminished the "overall efficiency and effectiveness of government-wide public diplomacy efforts."¹²

Karen Hughes, the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy is the official leader of US public diplomacy efforts.¹³ Daniel Smith, Undersecretary Hughes' executive assistant, states that his office does not look at public diplomacy as a turf battle with other departments, and that "the Undersecretary has succeeded in bringing the different agencies closer together and encouraged a lot of cooperation."¹⁴ Nevertheless, as Alberto Fernandez, the director of public diplomacy at the State Department's Near East Bureau, states, "While interagency coordination is better than ever before under Hughes, it is not institutionalized and will most likely be divorced at the end of her tenure."¹⁵ Because of her close relationship with the President, Hughes' voice has been taken seriously across the agencies. However, the position of undersecretary itself does not convey authority on the interagency level. It is therefore "critical that there is a structural environment which gives public diplomacy power."¹⁶

The only entity that carries considerable weight on the interagency level is the National Security Council (NSC). Thus, the aforementioned Presidential Directive must also cover the creation of a robust interagency coordinating structure at the NSC. As the Defense Science Board recommends that the President establish a permanent strategic communication structure at the NSC: a Strategic Communication Committee chaired by an appointed Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication.¹⁷ The members of the Committee would have rank equivalent to that of undersecretary and be chosen by various high ranking officials across the agencies. The Defense Board goes further:

Unlike previous coordinating mechanisms with nominal authority, this Strategic Communication Committee should have authority to assign

responsibilities and plan the work of departments and agencies in the areas of public diplomacy, public affairs, and military information operations; concur in strategic communication personnel choices; [and] shape strategic communication budget priorities.¹⁸

Such proposals for public diplomacy and strategic communication are necessary and are not overly ambitious or radical in comparison to recent revolutionary changes that have occurred on the institutional levels across US government agencies.¹⁹

In the absence of executive strategic direction in the context of communications, “agencies have developed their own roles and missions and coordinated their activities on an ad hoc basis.”²⁰ Agencies are struggling to define their roles. This is especially true of the Defense Department, which is currently developing a public diplomacy unit in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The office and its specific tasks have not been formally established. Colonel Daniel Devlin, Special Advisor for Public Diplomacy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, explains that this is “largely because terms such as strategic communications and information operations have not been precisely defined by the White House or National Security Council.”²¹ The White House should develop a national communications strategy and provide strategic and structural direction for the different agencies.

INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT

The logic, at least in rhetoric, of folding the USIA into the State Department was to bring policy and public diplomacy closer together, so that, in Edward Murrow’s words, public diplomacy is present at the “take-offs,” not just the “crash-landings.” Unfortunately, that has not happened. At the State Department, public diplomacy is not seen as an equal to traditional forms of policy.

To truly be effective in improving America’s image abroad, public diplomacy must be brought closer to policy. Policymaking should not be held hostage to foreign public opinion, but it would help immensely in communicating a positive message if attitudes and values overseas were taken into consideration when policies are being formulated. When public diplomacy is not taken into consideration, the US risks creating resentment abroad, as was done shortly after 9/11 when President Bush referred to the war on terror as “a crusade,” unnecessarily pouring salt on an old wound.

Rather than being used as a simple instrument for responding to criticism, public diplomacy can be an integral part of the foreign policy formulation

process. As such, it would “help define optimum foreign policies as well as explain how US policies fit the values and interests of other nations.”²² To achieve policy-public diplomacy integration, it is necessary to empower the role of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy within the State Department. The Defense Science Board recommends that the responsibility of this position be not simply to manage public diplomacy effort, but also to serve as policy advisor to the Secretary of State. More broadly, the Undersecretary should also be tasked with approving public diplomacy components within all major foreign policy directives.²³

LACK OF INSTITUTIONAL SUSTAINABILITY

The problem with US public diplomacy has been not only one of attention, but also attention span: institutions, structures, strategies, offices, and positions related to public diplomacy are constantly created and quickly disbanded or replaced. “We are attempting to build sustainable foundations,” contends Smith, Hughes’ executive assistant, “but it is hard not to be distracted by day-to-day policymaking, bureaucratic tug of war, and other urgent matters.”²⁴ Two positive developments have happened in this area: The creation of the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources, which assists the Undersecretary in developing a long-term, wide-ranging strategic vision for public diplomacy, and the appointment of dual-headed deputy assistant secretaries. Both moves are meant to bring more direct oversight and more authority over public affairs officers overseas, to the Undersecretary’s office.²⁵

With the exception of the aforementioned changes, public diplomacy institutions that have endured at the State Department have been largely non-existent over the last half decade. “While there are some positive developments,” says Fernandez, “nearly all changes are ad hoc and will most likely not outlast Undersecretary Hughes’ tenure.”²⁶ Reorganizing a department “is the least attractive thing to do when you are in office for a short time, but in public diplomacy’s current state, it is absolutely essential,” says William Kiehl, *Public Diplomacy Council’s* executive director.²⁷ Perhaps the most important change in the short-run, argues Dr. Joshua Fouts, director of USC’s *Center on Public Diplomacy*, is to “create a long-term vision and strategy for public diplomacy and construct enduring strategies.”²⁸ The Undersecretary should strive to develop a long-term strategy, which will only be sustained if enduring institutions are built within the State Department.

LACK OF FUNDING

Not seen as essential by the different agencies, policymakers, and Congressmen, public diplomacy has lacked the funding, resources, and personnel to carry out successful operations. The combined State Department and BBG public diplomacy budget is approximately \$1.2 billion, which falls under a thirtieth of the international affairs budget and is less than what the Defense Department spends in a single day (Fiscal Year 2006).²⁹ As the report by the US government-sponsored Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World puts it, rather bluntly: “In this time of

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peril, public diplomacy is absurdly and dangerously under-funded.”³⁰ The financial marginalization of public diplomacy has severely hampered efforts and contributed to further frustration. “At our Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, we have been asked to do more and have taken additional tasks,” says Fernandez, “but without any more resources or personnel. It is all done on purely personal will and energy.”³¹ A lack of funding inevitably causes a shortage of personnel.³²

As the CFR states, “The bottom line: US public diplomacy must be funded at significantly higher levels.”³³ The only way to raise appropriate funding is by building Congressional support for public diplomacy, which can be done by forming a Congressional committee structure devoted to public diplomacy. This will give the House and Senate “a sense of ownership over public diplomacy and an appreciation of public diplomacy’s linkages to foreign policy.”³⁴ The President’s voice is once again essential to convey to Congress that public diplomacy is a national security priority and to inspire Congressional support for increased funding.

Person-to-person activities, essential to public diplomacy, also suffer from a lack of resources. Public diplomacy efforts overseas are led by a variety of personnel including public affairs, cultural affairs, information, information resources, and regional English language officers.³⁵ Unfortunately, in the last few years, there has not been a significant increase in staff or funding in overseas operations. “Several hundred individuals overseas communicating with an audience of several hundred million is a joke,” claims Kiehl.

“Public diplomacy is often directed from Washington, but this does not work. Countries and societies are different. Personnel on the ground are more knowledgeable in this respect.”³⁶ Not only should greater resources be allocated to public diplomacy, but a significant portion of funding and personnel must go to regional field offices, rather than Washington-directed operations.

Most importantly, funding and personnel overseas have been lacking where they are most needed. In 2003, the budget and number of public diplomacy officers working in Europe and Eurasia were more than double that of the Near East and South Asia.³⁷ According to Fernandez, the “Global Repositioning Process,” part of transformational diplomacy’s effort to move resources to high-priority regions, has been “slow, painful, and insignificant. The Near East Bureau will be receiving a dozen personnel in the future, when the numbers should actually be upward of a hundred, if not more.”³⁸ From 2003 to 2006, staff numbers in South Asia and the Near East increased by three percent.³⁹ According to Ambassador William Rugh, who has served in Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries in the region, “In the context of the Middle East, personal contact should be at the top of the list.”⁴⁰ The funding that is allocated towards public diplomacy overseas should be divided wisely. It should go towards regions where representation is needed most, particularly in the Arab and Muslim world.

OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS FOR PROGRAMS OVERSEAS

After 9/11, the State Department launched three major campaigns designed to reach Muslim audiences, all of which have since been completely or partially terminated. The first was the Shared Values Initiative, led by Charlotte Beers, an advertising mogul who was the Undersecretary of Public Diplomacy from October 2001 to March 2003. Centered on a paid television campaign, it aimed to illustrate the daily lives of Muslim Americans and highlight common values and beliefs shared by Muslims and Americans. The television campaign aired during the winter of 2002-2003 and was subsequently suspended.⁴¹ In 2003, the State Department started the publication of Arabic-language, teen-targeted *Hi* magazine, which attempted to highlight American culture and lifestyles. The publication of the magazine ceased in 2005 and its electronic format is no longer available online in English or Arabic. The third campaign was an educational exchange initiative for Muslim youth, entitled Partnerships for Learning, which lasted from 2002 to 2005.

In changing the general outlook towards product and results, public

diplomacy campaigns could benefit from utilizing the key elements of typical public relations/advertising strategies conducted in the private sector: define program objectives, core messages, and target audience; develop detailed strategies and tactics to reach target audience; create and implement a detailed communication plan incorporating objectives, themes, target audience, and strategies; and monitor progress and adjust tactics.⁴² The Shared Values Initiative was highly successful in the only country where a post-campaign survey was conducted, Indonesia. The survey determined that, in the country with the world's largest Muslim population, 63 million Indonesians felt they had learned from the campaign that "Islam is not discriminated against" and is given equal treatment in the United States.⁴³

In addition to problems in Washington-directed programs, GAO officials who visited local posts in the Muslim and Arab world indicated that programs overseas lacked detailed, country-specific plans. There is never a "one-size fits all" solution. Cultures, ethnicities, socioeconomic conditions, and other circumstances are different across countries. Recently, the State Department began a pilot program aimed at developing country-level plans for 15 states that were designated by the government as being crucial in the battle of ideas. "The plan is to look at a specific country," says Fernandez, "and figure out what are the tools that are needed to accomplish the mission of supporting moderates and promoting tolerance. Overseas experts and professionals come up with suggestions and plans and then Washington, on the interagency level, marshals the resources needed to support what these countries need."⁴⁴ It remains to be seen whether these reports will be sufficiently detailed and effective. However, the fundamental idea behind this country-level pilot program is essential and should be further pursued.

Finally, a long-term vision must be kept in mind in public diplomacy programs. That programs do not endure is partially due to the expectation of quick results. Because public diplomacy cannot change minds overnight, a short-term view leads to frustration and makes officials more inclined to close operations. A long-term vision should be kept in the implementation of public diplomacy operations.

MEDIA AND THE CORPORATION FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is in charge of US international broadcasting operations and has a total budget of approximately \$600 million. In the Arab and Muslim world, it has established Radio Sawa (for Arabic speakers), Radio Farda (for Iranian audiences), and the Afghanistan Radio Network.⁴⁵ In February 2004, the BBG created al-

Hurra, an Arabic language television network. According to Ambassador Rugh, “these efforts have been a disaster, in terms of reaching appropriate audience sizes, and more importantly, in influencing attitudes.”⁴⁶ Most experts agree and many officials at the State Department admit that this has been the case. Media communication remains essential to public diplomacy, but concrete alternative approaches to successful communications have not been implemented.

The Council on Foreign Relations Taskforce on Public Diplomacy recommends the creation of a ‘Corporation for Public Diplomacy’ (CPD): an independent, not-for-profit, tax-exempt organization supported by the US government and private organizations, and modeled after the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB). It would be tasked with awarding grants to individual producers and channels with the aim of creating and disseminating US valued programming in the Arab and Muslim world.⁴⁷ However, while this idea should be seriously considered, there are reasons to believe that it might fail. During the Cold War, Soviet-bloc regimes were considered the enemy. The US government’s main challenge during the Cold War was to penetrate the Iron Curtain and reach the many Eastern Europeans sympathetic to the United States. The Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Free Liberty were viewed by audiences as credible alternatives to the news services of their dictatorial governments.

Today America finds itself in a competitive communication market in the Muslim and Arab world, where people are not sympathetic, and where regimes are often allies of the United States. American broadcasting efforts in the Muslim world, especially in Arab countries, will never have the reach of existing outlets such as al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya. Nor will they be viewed as credible in the short-run. CPD programs “are likely to gain even fewer viewers in the saturated Middle East satellite market than PBS does in the US market.”⁴⁸

An alternative approach to the CPD is to encourage Foreign Service Officers (FSOs), government representatives, and ambassadors to engage local and regional media, especially pan-Arab television. The State Department is currently working on establishing a regional public diplomacy hub in Dubai, which will be staffed with several “spokespersons whose full-time job will be to appear on regional media outlets, with a focus on television.”⁴⁹ This is an important development, but more needs to be done. Today, not enough American officials are able or willing to appear on pan-Arab media and ambassadors receive scant media skills training. FSOs, including public diplomacy-related officers, lack the language skills to connect with local media. Moreover, those who have sufficient language skills professionally

shy away from the task.

It is necessary that the State Department “recruit language-qualified personnel and train new and existing personnel in the relevant languages” and require “those with the necessary fluency to participate actively in public diplomacy activities regardless of job title.”⁵⁰ In the same vein, American television networks should be offered “tax incentives to US broadcasters to perform the public service of dubbing and then duplicating their news in Arabic.”⁵¹

TAPPING INTO THE PRIVATE SECTOR

While most reports argue for empowering the private sector in US public diplomacy, its role has not yet been clearly defined. Dr. Nicholas Cull, director of the Master’s in Public Diplomacy program at the University of Southern California, believes that cultural diplomacy⁵² should be led by a public-private partnership, as is the case with the United Kingdom’s British Council. “If initiatives are directed by the government, such efforts run the risk of being dismissed as simply propaganda,” says Dr. Cull.⁵³ Furthermore, the private sector has knowledge, expertise, and skills relating to public relations campaigns that will be extremely useful for this instrument.

To tap into the wealth of resources available in the private sector, the Defense Science Board recommends that the President work with Congress to create legislation and funding for a Center for Strategic Communication, an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt private 501(c)(3) corporation modeled on federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs).⁵⁴ The Center’s activities would range from audience polling and the analysis of media influences on audiences to fostering cross-cultural exchanges. Aimed at advising civilian and military decision-makers, the Center would be made up of academics, experts, advertising specialists, and other private-sector professionals. The Center would be able to sub-contract to the commercial and academic sectors for products and programs, ranging from children’s TV series to interactive online games, blogs, and chat-rooms.⁵⁵

CONCLUSION

US public diplomacy since 9/11 has encountered structural and operational problems in the State Department, on the interagency level, and in local posts overseas. Interagency coordination has been largely absent and most institutions that were created have not endured. As an instrument of

statecraft, public Diplomacy has remained divorced from policy. Programs have been constrained by a lack of funding and long-term vision, and private-sector public relations methods have not been utilized.

This paper advocates, amongst other recommendations, that the President reemphasize the strategic importance of public diplomacy and reaffirm his commitment to strategic communications. A robust interagency coordinating structure at the NSC, country-level communication plans and a long-term strategic approach should be developed. More resources must be allocated towards public diplomacy and appropriated to overseas posts, especially in the Muslim and Arab world. Private-sector marketing techniques that could prove advantageous should be adopted. Foreign-service officers should be aptly trained and required to engage media in the Arab world. Finally, public diplomacy would benefit from the creation of a Center for Strategic Communication, which would provide information, analysis, mandated plans, and programs for the implementation of communications strategies.

Five years have passed since the 9/11 attacks. The US' disproportionate focus on hard power has played into the hands of its enemies. Transnational terrorism is a multi-dimensional problem that requires a multifaceted solution. The element that has remained missing in the US' response has been on the ideological field. To win the war on terror, the United States must seriously commit itself to communication, debate, and engagement with foreign publics.

1 The terminology was used throughout July 2005 by the Bush administration, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and senior military officials.

2 "The Terrorism Index," *Foreign Policy*, July-August, 2006.

3 Joseph Nye, "Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics," (New York: Public Affairs, 2004,) p 117.

4 At the pinnacle of public diplomacy's importance, the director of the USIA (most notably, Edward Murrow) served on the National Security Council. For a history of the USIA, see Dizard Jr., Wilson P. "Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the US Information Agency," (Lymme Rienner Publishers: 2004)

5 Interview with Bruce Gregory, 25 July 2006.

6 DSB, 2004, p. 25.

7 "Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy," (Washington, DC: 2005), General Accountability Office, p 11. The last update on the OGC website was made over a year ago, on 15 March 2005 under "Global Message of the Day." According to some sources, OGC's director and associate director both left last year. Kamen, Al. "Dear GAO: OGC Is DOA." *Washington Post*, 6 April 2005. pg A17.

8 "Changing Minds, Winning Peace," Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, (Washington, D.C.: 2003), p. 59.

9 "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating US Public Diplomacy," Council on Foreign Relations, (New York, NY : Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2003), p. 10.

10 Ibid. The recommendation made was the issuing a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD), a form of executive order carrying the weight of the President and the National Security Council.

11 The first attempt was in 2002 with the Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee and was terminated within several months. In 2004, the Muslim World Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee was created, but the committee's widely praised plan "was never implemented. Now that committee is being replaced by [Karen] Hughes's new group." Kaplan, David E. "Of Jihad networks and the war of ideas." *US News and World Report*. 22 May, 2006

12 GAO, 2005, p. 11.

13 A successful effort has been the creation of a "rapid response unit," which monitors news stories across the world and each morning distributes reports to administration officials, policymakers, ambassadors, and the military leadership so that can they can respond effectively, with consistent answers, to the day's most pressing questions from international reporters.

14 Interview with Daniel Smith, 31 July 2006.

- 15 Interview with Alberto Fernandez, 28 July 2006.
- 16 Interview with William Kiehl, 27 July 2006.
- 17 The position of Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications and Global Outreach was supposedly created in March of 2005. However, in interviews with experts and officials, most could not identify the person behind the position and referred to the position to as “meaningless.” A senior State public diplomacy official referred to it as “the invisible man, it has no relation to reality.”
- 18 DSB, 2004, p. 63.
- 19 Examples in the last few years include the creation of the Department of Homeland Security; Pentagon’s “transformation” of the military; and ongoing reforms of intelligence agencies.
- 20 GAO, 2005, p. 23.
- 21 Interview with Col (Ret.) Daniel Devlin, 25 July 2006.
- 22 CFR, p. 31.
- 23 DSB, 2004, p. 74.
- 24 Interview with Daniel Smith, 31 July 2006.
- 25 Public Affairs officers (PAOs) are in charge of public diplomacy operations at overseas posts. Prior to this change, PAOs reported only to the Ambassador, not the Undersecretary.
- 26 Interview with Alberto Fernandez, 28 July 2006.
- 27 Interview with William Kiehl, 27 July 2006.
- 28 Interview with Joshua Fouts, 11 July 2006.
- 29 Numbers taken from Defense Department’s “National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2006.” pg. 10.
- 30 “Changing Minds, Winning Peace.” Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World. (Washington, D.C.: 2003) p. 13. The group was led by Ambassador Edward Djerejian. It will be referred to as the “Djerejian Report” and referenced as “Djerejian.”
- 31 Interview with Alberto Fernandez, 28 July 2006. One example is Fernandez himself, who is a PD office director; fulfills the responsibilities of a deputy assistant secretary within NEA, although he does not hold that title; has recently taken on a range of Iran-related responsibilities; and is also involved in Arab media outreach.
- 32 In 2003, there were 619 public diplomacy Foreign Service Officers (FSO), compared to 1200 FSO personnel at the USIA in the 1960s. Numbers taken from “US Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges.” General Accountability Office. (Washington, D.C.: 2003.) p. 10 and “Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy,” p. 17, respectively.
- 33 CFR, p. 47.
- 34 Ibid, p. 48.
- 35 For a detailed description of these positions and programs in overseas posts, see: “US Public Diplomacy. State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges.” General Accountability Office. May, 2006. pp 49-53. For an account of public diplomacy resources and instruments in the context of the Arab world, see “American Encounters with Arabs.” pp 9-23.
- 36 Interview with William Kiehl, 27 July 2006.
- 37 GAO, 2003, p. 10.
- 38 Interview with Alberto Fernandez. 28 July 2006.
- 39 GAO, 2006, p. 10.
- 40 Interview with William Rugh, 17 July 2006.
- 41 The programs were refused to be shown in Lebanon, Egypt, and were withdrawn in Jordan.
- 42 GAO, 2006, p. 19.
- 43 Djerejian, p. 72. A recent book with original research that concludes that the Initiative was successful in reducing anti-Americanism is “Advertising’s War on Terrorism: The Story of the US State Department’s Shared Values Initiative” by Jami A. Fullerton and Alice G. Kendrick. (Marquette Books, 2006)
- 44 Interview, Alberto Fernandez, 28 July 2006.
- 45 Estimated costs for these three initiatives through fiscal year 2003 were about \$116 million, according to the GAO 2004 report, p. 7.
- 46 Interview with Amb. William Rugh, 17 July 2006.
- 47 More details are contained in the CFR report, pp. 37-39. This recommendation was endorsed by the Djerejian Report, p. 32.
- 48 Robert Satloff, “The Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror; Essays on US Public Diplomacy in the Middle East.” (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004.) p. 31.
- 49 GAO, 2006, p. 17.
- 50 Djerejian, p. 28.
- 51 Sasatloff, p. 31.
- 52 A subset of public diplomacy, it involves a wide-range of cultural programs, from exchange of performers and writers to overseas museum exhibitions. It aims to build a ‘foundation of trust’ between different cultures. For an excellent report, see “Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy.” Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, US Department of State. September 2005.
- 53 Interview with Dr. Nicholas Cull, 12 July 2006.
- 54 In interviews, this recommendation was endorsed by officials in State, Defense, and GAO, as well as public diplomacy specialists at various institutes.
- 55 For a detailed description of the Strategic Communications Center, see the 2004 DSB report, pp. 66-70.