Jordan's Entry into the 1967 Arab-Israeli War:
A Study in Omnibalancing

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INTRODUCTION

The 1967 Arab-Israeli War showcases the comprehensive usefulness of the theories that make up neorealism. Alliance formation, security-seeking states, balancing, bandwagoning, and buckpassing are all present, and the initial Israeli attack on Egypt is often cited as the paradigmatic example of preemption. However, the traditional realist school of thought falls short on one significant issue: Jordan's participation in the war. While some scholars explain Jordan's involvement as a tragic case of a failed attempt at reconciling an unfavorable balance of power, such an argument is flawed due to the lack of an overwhelming Israeli threat against Jordan. This paper argues instead that the Hashemite monarchy was faced by a more pernicious internal threat, and that its alliance-forming behavior at the outset of the war is explained to a greater degree by Steven R. David's theory of omnibalancing.[1] Not only did Jordan harbor a large population of Palestinian refugees who were susceptible to the sway of Arab nationalism, but these communities had an increasing influence on Jordanian foreign policy as they drew resources from other states. Due to these threats, Jordan's entry in the 1967 War was mainly a function of the Hashemite monarchy's attempt to hedge against the potentially disastrous consequences of remaining neutral.

THEORY

Stephen M. Walt's balance of threat theory lies at the heart of much of the body of modern international relations scholarship and forms the basis of many offshoot theories, including Steven R. David's omnibalancing.[2] Walt holds that the primary influences on state behavior come from the structure and anarchic nature of the system, and that the primary threats states face are external. He argues that states seek alliances to ameliorate the threats they perceive from aggressors, and that balancing and bandwagoning are the two ways to form such alliances.[3] His balance of threat theory is an elaboration on Kenneth Waltz's balance of power theory.[4] Walt tested his

ideas on the analyses of the Arab world during the 1967 War, and although he successfully explained a good deal of the alliances formed during that period, he remains inconclusive on King Hussein's true motives for "bandwagoning" with Egypt.[5] Other contemporary scholars such as Dr. Laurie Brand, director of the School for International Relations at the University of Southern California College of Letters Arts and Science, suggest that Walt's work does not constitute a significant addition to existing realist theory on alliance formation, and that he offers only sparse insight into the motives behind the numerous alignment shifts in the Arab world during the tumultuous 1960s.[6] These scholars are increasingly turning toward a more comprehensive interpretation of the forces behind foreign policy decision-making.

The concept of omnibalancing was first conceived by Steven R. David in 1991 as a refinement of Walt's balance of power theory. He holds that traditional neo-realism does not adequately explain the formation of "third world" alignments, because it does not take into account all threats to a state's survival. Specifically, he argues that third world leaders will balance against all significant threats to their regimes, including domestic ones. David offers three specific "repairs" to balance of power theory, which explain how states counter internal threats. First, states will align with secondary adversaries in order to focus their efforts on primary threats. Second, states that seem to be bandwagoning may actually be acting to appease external aggressors in order to focus on more urgent domestic threats. Finally, he modifies the presumption of the rational state actor by positing that third world leaders will sometimes act against the interest of the state in order to preserve their regime.[7] He explains that in the developing world, "the leader of the state rather than the state itself should be taken as the level of analysis." Each of these aspects of omnibalancing will be relevant to the discussion of Jordanian alliance formation before the 1967 War, although some will prove more salient and thus warrant a greater focus.

Michael Barnett and Jack Levy made an important revision to omnibalancing just six months after David's work was released.[8] They emphasize the importance of a state's economy in foreign policy decisions and alliance formation, in addition to considerations of the regime's security. The economic factor should be taken into account in any analyses of the war. However, for the sake of clarity, this paper will focus specifically on political and military threats to Jordan during the 1967 War, putting aside economic considerations.

History: Jordan, the Palestinians, and the coming of the '67 War
Palestinians and the PLO in Jordan

During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Jordan (then Transjordan) took control of the West Bank, resulting in a tectonic shift in its demographics. Prior to the war, Jordan's population of "East Bankers" numbered roughly 400,000, and was primarily rural or Bedouin.[9] The annexation of the West Bank added nearly one million individuals, roughly half of whom were refugees from Israeli territory and who were used to living in more urban environments.[10] Many of the inhabitants of the West Bank migrated to the East Bank. However, a significant number stayed behind and began to call themselves Palestinians. These Palestinians of the West Bank were unhappy with the political superiority of the East Bank Jordanians. The emergence of distinct identities amongst the two populations, and the Palestinian desire for political independence, created lasting tensions between West Bank leaders and the government in Amman. The Jordanian government recognized the growing potential for conflict between East and West Bankers and initially sought to mollify the Palestinians through integration. Palestinians were encouraged to obtain Jordanian citizenship and were allowed to run for and hold elected office. A few were also selected for ministerial posts in the national government.[11]

Despite the Jordanian government's best efforts, discontent in the West Bank grew steadily with each passing year. Attempts to appease and integrate the Palestinian refugees lost steam as the East Bank population found distraction in the pan-Arab rhetoric of Egypt and Syria. From 1954 to 1964, the Jordanian government continued to deal with the Palestinians in a variety of ways, from conceding to their demands to stay out of the Baghdad Pact, to imprisoning radical nationalist opponents of the regime.[12] Perhaps the strongest and most persistent threat to the Monarchy during this time period was the intervention of fellow Arab states, which also played a key role in manipulating Palestinian public opinion.[13] A good example of this, though not overt, was the United Arab Republic's (UAR) dispatch of a consul to the West Bank in 1960. The stationing of a diplomat in the West Bank amounted to tacit recognition of a separate Palestinian state and posed a grave threat to Jordanian territorial integrity. King Hussein responded to the various interventions of neighboring states by tightening internal security and by moving away from Arab nationalism and closer to the United States.[14]

The period between 1964 and 1967 saw a third shift in Jordanian policy toward its Palestinian population. Since the 1948 war, the Jordanian

government had been careful to deal with the Palestinians as a segment of its own population rather than a separate nation and to negate Egyptian and Syrian rhetoric of a "Palestine Entity."[15] In August 1964, during the Second Arab Summit Conference, King Hussein reversed these policies almost entirely, supporting a motion to establish the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).[16] At its outset, the PLO vowed to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Jordan. King Hussein stated that "we were ready to give [the PLO] our unreserved support, with only one condition: the PLO had to cooperate with Jordan without a trace of friction."[17] Instead of harmony, the Hashemite government soon found the new group to be confrontational and insubordinate. While the Jordanians sought to deal with it as an ideological group, the PLO instead began to operationally seek territorial gains and broader public support by launching terrorist strikes into Israel and verbally attacking the Hashemite regime.[18] In 1966, the Jordanian government responded by arresting "200 subversive elements in Jordan" and banning the PLO from its country and territories.[19]

Jordan's Alliance Structure from 1964-67

In early 1964, Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser called an Arab summit to address Israel's diversion of the Jordan River for irrigation.[20] The result of the meeting was a plan to divert the sources of the river upstream of Israel and the creation of the United Arab Command (UAC) to coordinate the participating nations' armed forces. The Hashemite Kingdom joined the Arab alliance, but was unwilling to allow Saudi, Iraqi, or Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) troops on its soil. The benefits of Jordan's membership in the new organization were tested in November 1966 during Israel's retributive raid on the Jordanian town of el-Samu. While Jordan had expected to receive air support from Egypt as part of the UAC agreement, it merely obtained a series of verbal assaults from Syria, Egypt, and the PLO for allowing Israel to attack Palestine.[21] The "Samu Affair" sent Jordan's bilateral relations with Syria and Egypt into a nose dive and King Hussein was again largely isolated from the Arab community

On May 30, 1967, King Hussein made a striking change to his foreign policy. Even though by his own account "for a year [Egyptian-Jordanian] relations could not have been worse," Hussein decided to fly to Cairo on a moment's notice to align his nation firmly and inextricably with Nasser's.[22] The fateful meeting produced a mutual defense treaty which placed an Egyptian general in charge of Jordan's military and allowed Iraqi, Saudi, and Syrian troops to operate from Jordan's borders,[23] which essentially removed King Hussein from direct command and decision-making during the 1967 War.

In studying Jordan's entry into the 1967 War, one must take into account all of the internal and external threats faced by King Hussein. Particularly important are assassinations and coup attempts because they represent a unique type of threat that is seen repeatedly in Jordan and the rest of the Arab world during the 1950s and 1960s. As Steven David points out, "Internal threats, so prevalent in the third world, are an ideal vehicle for advancing the interests of outside states... providing aid to or against insurgent groups on one hand, or backing or suppressing coups on the other hand, is a relatively inexpensive and efficient way of asserting one's power."[24] King Hussein's own life and the influences that shaped his decision-making process are also critical to understanding the actions of the Jordanian state. In analyzing these factors, it becomes clear that omnibalancing provides a persuasive explanation for King Hussein's entry into the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

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Assassination and Coup Attempts

On July 20, 1951, then-Prince Hussein had his first tragic lesson in the dangers of a discontented public. While the young prince and his grandfather King Abdullah were visiting the al-Aksa Mosque in Jerusalem, the King was assassinated. The assassin was a Palestinian and a tailor's apprentice, who had been paid by an Egyptian operative.[25] Public response to the assassination was mixed. As the French consul in Jerusalem said, "There are 600,000 Palestinians who are delighted with his death."[26] The account of this event occupies the first ten pages in King Hussein's first autobiography.

After recounting the shooting in his book, Hussein explains that, "[my grandfather], above all men, had the most profound influence on my life." Then, in perhaps a more important statement about the legacy of his grandfather, he says "So, too, had the manner of his death."[27] This event taught the Jordanian monarch-to-be that internal and external threats could be complexly intertwined, and that Palestinian unrest was a very real problem for any Jordanian government. From that point forward, Hussein would always be aware of the ramifications of his foreign policy decisions on

his personal safety.

As King of Jordan, Hussein was the target of close to a dozen assassination and coup attempts. Many, such as the three coup attempts between 1958 and 1960, were carried out by combined foreign and domestic actors. In each of these three attempts, pan-Arab nationalists sponsored by the United Arab Republic were foiled by Jordanian security services in the early stages of their plans.[28] In his first book of memoirs, King Hussein describes other assassination plots that had been hatched to take him out of power, including poisoning him and replacing his nose drops with acid. Each of these, he suspected, were backed by the Syrian government.[29]

External Threats

During the spring of 1967, Jordan faced a direct, but not imminent, threat from Israel[30] and indirect threats from terrorists sponsored by Syria and Egypt. King Hussein was convinced that Israel had territorial designs on the West Bank, but was powerless to stop such aggression and could not count on any other Arab states to come to his rescue.[31] While Egyptian and Syrian rhetoric had been nationalistic and threatening for the past two years, both were too preoccupied with their own conception of an Israeli threat to consider the invasion of Jordan. As Stephen David notes in his explanation of omnibalancing, "Most third world states simply lack the weapons and the logistical capability for long term, protracted conflict beyond their borders."[32]

Internal Threats

The Jordanian Monarchy has always claimed that it is sensitive to the desires of its Palestinian citizens and that it realizes their role in domestic stability. In a 1955 demonstration of Jordan's need to balance against internal threats, the young King Hussein abandoned his desire to join the Baghdad Pact because of the intense animosity it faced. By signing the pact he would have joined a pro-western alliance with Iraq and would have received economic and military aid from Great Britain, which he clearly desired.[33] Egyptian President Nasser supported King Hussein's decision in private, but then quickly turned and denounced the King in a barrage of negative propaganda. Jordanians responded to the claims that "Hussein is selling out to the British" by rioting and vandalizing major Jordanian cities. Many of the riots were organized by the Ba'ath party, a left wing opposition group.[34] Hussein, in turn, abandoned the Baghdad Pact and disbanded the Parliament that had supported it. This is a crystal clear example of the enormous power of the Jordanian street. By vehemently and violently opposing the treaty, the

Jordanian public posed a significant threat to the monarchy and effectively blocked the preferred alliance formation.

Beginning with the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, but especially since King Hussein's 1964 recognition of the PLO, Jordan had unwillingly served as a forward base for Syrian-financed Palestinian terrorist attacks on Israel. King Hussein had tried to stop the raids by appealing to fellow Arab leaders, and to his own National Assembly, arguing that "no organization should act outside the framework of the United Arab Command (UAC)."[35] Relations between Jordan and the PLO had fully broken down by June 1966, at which point Hussein ordered the arrest of 200 PLO "subversives" and demanded that the organization's Amman offices be closed. As then-Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, recalls, "They had begun to practice subversion on a grand scale. They were trying to divide the populations of the east and west banks of the Jordan."[36] Unfortunately for Jordan, the expulsion of the PLO was not enough to completely stop Palestinian terrorist raids into Israel from Jordanian territory. On November 11, 1966, the Syrian-sponsored militant group al-Fatah killed three Israeli soldiers with a landmine. Two days later, a detachment of Israeli troops struck back, decimating the town of el-Samu in the West Bank and killing 21 Palestinians.[37] Here, Jordan's failure to restrict an internal threat caused its embroilment in an unwanted conflict with Israel.

In the aftermath, West Bank refugees were furious with the Jordanian government for allowing the attack to go unpunished, and, unable to distinguish between the PLO and Fatah, cheered for the PLO leadership.[38] One author reports that West Bankers rioted and demanded Hussein's overthrow. Even US Under Secretary of State Nicholas de Katzenbach told an Israeli diplomat that "you pushed [Hussein] into a hell of a spot…and made life for him very difficult."[39] The border between the West Bank and Israel remained quiet for the following few months, but tensions continued to rise in Jordan as Syrian and Egyptian media denounced Hussein for his weakness and failure to respond to Israel's attack. Some even went as far as to call for the overthrow of Hussein as part of the supposed Palestinian liberation strategy.[40] The spring of 1967 saw no thawing of relations between Jordan and the other Arab powers, and public discontent with the Jordanian monarchy continued to mount.

Hussein's Choices and Rationale

King Hussein's most drastic foreign policy action during his rule was the decision to sign a mutual defense treaty with Egypt under the shadow of the impending 1967 War. It is the single most potent expression of his foreign

policy. It was a product of all the threats faced by his regime and reflected the path that he felt provided the best possible chance for his own survival. The choice came roughly ten days after Egypt expelled UN observers from Sinai, occupied it, and closed the Straits of Tiran, which led King Hussein to believe war was inevitable and added even more weight to the decision. According to Hussein's memoirs, he made the decision because he believed that Jordan would inevitably become embroiled in any conflict with Israel and because of a "moral" obligation to his fellow Arabs. He claims that even though his allies had humiliated him and caused significant domestic disruptions, he could not behave toward them

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as they had behaved toward him.[41]

Although this is Hussein's official explanation of his motives, most scholars reject it in favor of a more pragmatic explanation. It is difficult to believe that, even though he had spent the better part of his reign combating assassins sent by Syria and Egypt, he suddenly felt compelled to bind his nation's security to the UAC mutual security guarantee and was compelled by a newfound sense of pan-Arabism. A more realistic argument is that Jordan's alliance with Egypt was actually a form of hedging. If the Arabs won the war, Hussein could not afford to be left out. A victorious Egypt and Syria would be unbearably threatening, and Jordan's Palestinian population would not agree to live under a government that had not protected the Palestinians' most basic interests. On the other hand, if the Arabs lost, Hussein's delegation of command to an Egyptian general would leave him with a convenient scapegoat.[42] He also believed that while Israel wanted the West Bank, it did not desire to expand across the Jordan River. Furthermore, if Jordan had stayed out of a war that the other Arab states lost, Hussein's abstention could be blamed for the loss, creating a more precarious situation than if the UAC had won.[43]

Yet, a few interesting contradictions arise from the idea that Jordan entered the war to ensure its own security. First, it has been suggested that no rational statesman would turn his entire army and national defense over to a foreign commander. One scholar explains this choice by claiming that "there can be no doubt that this provision…was the prize that made Nasser

agree to readmit Hussein onto the team."[44] If Hussein's principal motive in allying with Egypt was to hedge against a popular uprising, the concern over placing his army in foreign hands must have been secondary. A second, similar anomaly involved Hussein's agreement to position Iraqi troops in the West Bank, which Jordan had long considered a *casus belli* for Israel.[45] Seemingly suicidal, this move actually simultaneously increased East Bank security by providing an additional layer of defense, while giving King Hussein another party to blame if the war was lost.

During a speech in 1997, more than thirty years after the conflict ended, King Hussein spoke candidly about his decisions in 1967. He stated that "on that day I had to choose and show Jordan's commitment to defending the nation in the face of danger…had we decided to avoid entering the battle, the country would have faced an explosion at the *internal level* at the hands of the old school out-bidding."[46] This description of King Hussein's decision-making process prior to the 1967 War supports Steven David's theory of omnibalancing and makes logical sense when paired with Jordan's history of dire internal threats. The statement provides substantial support for omnibalancing's principal tenet that third world leaders balance against internal threats. Specifically, it is evidence of a state appeasing a secondary adversary (Egypt) in order to focus on a primary threat (PLO and internal instability). Finally, the accounts of Hussein's experience with coup and assassination attempts show that he had good reason to act in the interest of his own survival, even if that put the state at slightly higher risk. The Hashemite monarch aligned himself with Egypt to give his regime the best chance of survival, regardless of the outcome of the war.

Counterargument – Balance of Threat

Stephen M. Walt uses the Arab world's alliance formation prior to the 1967 War to illustrate his balance of threat theory. He claims that Jordan bandwagoned with Egypt, but does not go into further detail.[47] Under the text, a footnote asserts that "the available evidence is unclear as to why (and how seriously) Hussein sought to enter the war." He posits that inadvertent escalation on the part of the Jordanians may be at fault and reasserts that whatever the force behind its wartime behavior, Jordan's May 30, 1967 alliance with Egypt qualifies as bandwagoning. By examining his definition of bandwagoning, we can determine what exactly his claim implies and whether it is an accurate description of Jordan's behavior.

Walt argues that states will bandwagon to appease a dominant aggressor

or to align with a dominant power to share the spoils of war. The weaker the state, he claims, the more likely it is to ally itself with a stronger power by bandwagoning. He also identifies aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions as four other determinants in alliance-forming behavior. Walt further posits that states are more likely to bandwagon in the absence of reliable allies.[48] These claims about state behavior seem to apply loosely, but not comprehensively or convincingly, to Jordan's decision to align with Egypt. It is true that Jordan was a weak state in 1967 and that it was at an utter loss for allies. However, Jordan's alliance with Egypt does not satisfy either of the two primary conditions: Egypt was not a dominant aggressor vis-à-vis Jordan, nor did Jordan wish primarily to share in the spoils of an Israeli defeat.

Looking beyond Walt's review of Jordanian alliance formation, it may be possible to make some use of balance of threat theory. According to one account, Jordanian leaders reached out to the United States in an appeal for a guarantee of territorial integrity, but were rebuffed. Following this, King Hussein held a military parade of his two armored brigades in hopes of deterring Nasser from entering a war with Israel on behalf of Syria. However, when Egyptian President Nasser went ahead with his blockade of the Tiran straits, Hussein knew that he had no choice but to bandwagon with Egypt in the hope of gaining protection from Israel's large air force.[49] This series of events fits well under the rubric of balance of threat theory, because it shows Jordan's preference for balancing over bandwagoning and its extreme reluctance to align with an aggressive power.

However, on a broad scale, all balance of threat arguments are bound to fail because it is not clear that Jordan's alliance with Egypt was formed in response to an *external* threat. During the initial hours of the war, the Israeli government sent a message through a UN office to Hussein, effectively offering a separate peace.[50] Had Jordan truly felt threatened by Israel, such an offer would have essentially mollified that perception. Thus, the events' inability to satisfy the main tenet of Walt's balance of threat is, perhaps, the primary deficit in its power to explain the Jordanian monarchy's decision to ally with Egypt.

Conclusion

Despite the fact that Stephen Walt's balance of power theory is the basis and inspiration for Steven David's theory of omnibalancing, the two provide almost completely different analyses of King Hussein's rationale for entering

the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Omnibalancing accurately accounts for the intense threat posed by the PLO and the large Palestinian refugee population in Jordan and helps to explain why forming an alliance with Egypt was an effective survival tactic for King Hussein. It also brings into consideration the personal experience of King Hussein and his sensitivity to the potential threat posed by a discontented populace. Furthermore, omnibalancing explains why Hussein seemed to be bandwagoning with Egypt, when he was actually seeking to ameliorate the significant internal stresses on the regime. Finally, omnibalancing answers the main question that balance of threat theory does not: it explains why King Hussein would remain allied to Egypt and engaged in a potentially disastrous war even after the removal of the Israeli threat.

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1 Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignments" *World Politics*, vol. 43, no. 2. January 1991: 233-256.

2 Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

3 For a comprehensive definition and discussion of balancing and bandwagoning, please see: ibid. pp 17-21

4 Kenneth Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power," *Neorealism and its Critics,* Ed. Robert O. Keohane, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp 98-130.

5 Walt, 102 (footnote #179)

6 Laurie A. Bland, "Economics and Shifting Alliances: Jordan's Relations with Syria and Iraq, 1975-81," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol 26. (1994) pp 393-394.

7 David, "Explaining Third World Alignments", 235.

8 Michael Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73", *International Organization*, vol 45, no 3, (Summer 1991), 369-395.

9 Shaul Mishal, *West Bank/East Bank: The Palestinians in Jordan 1978-67,* (Westford, MA: Murray Printing Company, 1978), p.2.

10 His Majesty King Hussein I, *Uneasy Lies the Head*, (USA: Random House, 1962), p.124.

11 Mishal, *West Bank/East Bank: The Palestinians in Jordan 1978-67*. 8 and 28.

12 For the complete text of the Baghdad Pact, please visit: "Baghdad Pact." The Avalon Project at Yale Law School. Accessed online on 2 February 2007, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/baghdad.htm
For an excellent description of the decision making surrounding Jordan's eventual rejection of the Baghdad Pact, please see: Naseer Aruri, *Jordan: A Study in Political Development (1921-1965).* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972. pp 120-128. For examples of the Monarchy's decisive use of the security forces, see the dismissal of the Nabulsi government, Aruri, *Jordan: A Study in Political Development (1921-1965),* 135-145.

13 Evidence of this is copious, examples can be found in: Aruri, *Jordan: A Study in Political Development (1921-1965),* 135-150.

14 Aruri, *Jordan: A Study in Political Development (1921-1965),*163-186.

15 See text and footnote #32 of: Mishal, 65.

16 Mishal, *West Bank/East Bank: The Palestinians in Jordan 1978-67,* 65

17 His Majesty King Hussein I, *My War With Israel, (*New York: Cornwall Press inc., 1969), p15

18 Michael Oren, *Six Days of War,* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), p.24

19 Ibid*,* 25.

20 Ibid*,* 21

21 Hussein, *My War With Israel,* 28-29

22 Ibid, *My War With Israel,* 36

23 Roland Dallas, *King Hussein: A Life on the Edge,* (New York: Fromm International Ltd., 1999), pp111-112

24 David, "Explaining Third World Alignments," 241.

25 Hussein, *Uneasy Lies the Head,* 1-10

26 Ibid*,* 3

27 Ibid, 13.

28 Mishal, *West Bank/East Bank: The Palestinians in Jordan 1978-67,* 51.

29 Hussein, *Uneasy Lies the Head,* 246-259.

30 In his memoirs, King Hussein states that, "Israel directly threatened only Syria and Egypt," but in terms of aggregate power, offensive posturing, and proximity, I believe that Isreal did indeed pose a legitimate threat to Jordan," Hussein, *My War With Israel,* 35.

31 Oren, *Six Days of War,* 35-36.
32 David, "Explaining Third World Alighnments," 241.
33 Hussein, *Uneasy Lies the Head*, 101-113.
34 Ibid,111.
35 Uriel Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan 1955-1967,* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1989).
36 Hussein, *My War With Israel,* 21.
37 Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan 1955-1967,* 154.
38 Ibid*,* 155.
39 Oren, *Six Days of War,* 34.
40 Ibid,36.
41 Hussein, *My War With Israel*, 36.
42 Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan 1955-1967.*
43 Dallas, *King Hussein: A Life on the Edge,* 112-114. Also see Oren, *Six Days of War,* 127-8.
44 Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan 1955-1967.* 161.
45 Oren, *Six Days of War,* 158.
46 Dallas, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan 1955-1967,* 122.
47 Walt, *The Origins of Alliances,* 101-103.
48 Ibid, 20-31.
49 Oren, *Six Days of War,* 128-129.
50 Ibid, 158.