COVER PHOTO CAPTION
CARACAS, VENEZUELA. SUPPORTERS OF PRESIDENT HUGO CHAVEZ CHEER DURING A RALLY, NOVEMBER 9, 2006.
PHOTO BY JACOB SILBERBERG A'02 (EPIIC'01, TILIP'02)

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THE POWER OF
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GENERATE SOCIAL CAPITAL?

TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING AND
ADVOCACY IN SYRIA

INFUSING A MORAL IMAGINATION
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Discourse provides an inclusive platform for reasoned discussion and prescriptive analysis of issues of both international and domestic concern, while also including poetry, fiction, art and photography to illuminate the human condition. Its emphasis is on exploring a diversity of thought and perspectives from students, scholars, and practitioners. The purpose of *Discourse* is to provide an open forum for discussion of contemporary dilemmas, not as a vehicle with any specific political or intellectual agenda. The perspectives represented are solely those of the authors.

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EDITOR'S LETTER

Dear readers,

This issue's theme of revolution, social movements and change emerged after an incredible number of submissions were received. The subjects of papers were varied, intriguing and incredibly relevant to current events, making our task as Co-Editors in Chief inexplicably challenging and rewarding at the same time. This issue is a testament to some of the awe-inspiring work and difficult situations with which Tufts students are currently engaged.

We begin by looking at the very demographics of the generations that have created and continue to create change in an interview with Matt Bai, columnist for the New York Times. South Asian and Middle Eastern relations form the crux of the next articles in Discourse, all of which look at Western interventions in the rest of the world as they exist now, each author with his or her own perspective on how things need to evolve in these regions. Included in this is Elizabeth Herman's article on the ever-changing perceptions of historical events learned from textbooks in South Asia, with a clear focus on the depiction of 9/11 in these books.

Chloé Rousseau then goes on to explore the nexus between revolutions and the creation of social capital from a distinctly scientific approach, followed by Amb Jonathan Moore's clarion call for recognizing critical gaps in US and international policies. The theme of the rich-poor gap is then echoed in Nithyaa Venkataramani's work on food security in Guatemala, with specific attention paid to a community that BUILD has been involved with over several years.

This is followed by a fictional look at Mexican immigration to America, in terms of difference, isolation and community, in Josephine Herman's piece "Between Western and 1-94, Cermak and 16th". Then, [EXPOSURE]'s Nicholas Dynan, through his vivid photographs, looks at one family navigating Houston, Texas' changing Third Ward as wealth migrates from the city center.

We then delve into the impact of government-regulated migration in China in the synopsis of a research paper by three students from Peking University, who have worked in partnership with members from the Institute for Global Leadership over the last three years.

We conclude with two poems that echo the cycles of disruption and quiet.

Ultimately, we see that things are continuously changing, and while some fissures begin to mend, others cleave deeper. Revolutions have always impacted society and they manifest themselves in innumerable ways: from things we take for granted like textbooks and NGOs, to immigration, and even to violent conflict. It is the challenge to our generation to affect this change and mold it in the best way possible.

This issue would have been impossible without the impeccable dedication of the Discourse staff, the support of Heather Barry and Sherman Teichman at the Institute for Global Leadership, Tufts Community Union Senate, de.MO, and Giorgio Baravalle.

Hena Kapadia and Cody Valdes
Co-Editors in Chief

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THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF A REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION

INTERVIEW WITH
MATT BAI A'90

CODY VALDES

Matt Bai writes the "Political Times" column for the *New York Times* and is a frequent contributor for the *New York Times Magazine*, where he covered both the 2004 and 2008 presidential campaigns. Bai often explores issues of generational change in American politics and society. His seminal cover stories in the magazine include the 2008 cover essay "Is Obama the End of Black Politics?" and a 2004 profile of John Kerry titled "Kerry's Undeclared War." His work was honored in both the 2005 and 2006 editions of *The Best American Political Writing*. Bai is a graduate of Tufts and was a member of the 1989-90 Education for Public Inquiry and International Citizenship (EPIIC) colloquium on "The Militarization of the Third World." He is also a graduate of the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism, where the faculty awarded him the prestigious Pulitzer Traveling Fellowship. A native of Trumbull, Connecticut, he now lives with his wife and two children in Washington.

Cody Valdes conducted the interview. Cody Valdes is a student, writer, and social entrepreneur from Vancouver, Canada. As an Institute for Global Leadership EMPOWER Fellow and Synaptic Scholar at Tufts University, he has conducted research internationally in over half a dozen countries. He has co-founded social initiatives currently underway in Rwanda, Kenya, and the Israeli-Gaza border. Most recently, he was co-founder of Sisi ni Amani, a project that is developing SMS-based conflict response mechanisms in violence-prone communities in Kenya in preparation for its 2012 elections. As an Institute Synaptic Scholar, he is presently completing his undergraduate degree in Political Science and International Relations, where his primary interests include next-generation technologies, the affairs of nations, elite state-capture, the cognitive sciences, and social philosophy.

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Cody Valdez
Thank you for joining us today, we're honored and excited to speak with you. This volume of *Discourse* is examining revolution in all its forms – social, political, cultural – and what you are now exploring in your own research on the Baby Boomer generation (defined as those born between 1946 and 1964) and the legacy it has bequeathed to our world seems to imply that we are in the midst of a sort of generational revolution. If you look at certain definitions of revolution, we see that they demand an overthrow or replacement of incumbent regimes, and to think that we're now cycling though a new generation of leaders, you could almost classify this as a political and social regime change along generational lines.

Matt Bai
Well you know its funny, I don't think of it as revolution. I think of revolution as requiring a catalyst and intent, whereas I think the generational process is the kind of process that happens whether you want it or not, and most often people don't. There are moments where it probably turns revolutionary, and I think that was probably true in the 1960s, and certainly at other points in our history. But I think now the changeover is actually much more mundane than that and, perhaps to our detriment, too slow, and could probably use some catalyst and intent.

As it is, we're beginning to see the inevitable results of a generation aging and a new generation coming into its own in terms of its economic and demographic decision-making power. I would argue that a faster transition would be more beneficial, but I think this president is the vanguard of that change. Much like John F. Kennedy, I don't think he sees himself in that regard; I don't think he sets out first and foremost, or even second or third or fourth, to be a generational leader. I don't think that's what was on his mind and I don't think it was on Kennedy's mind. But, it is what he is by virtue of being the first one of a certain generation to reach that platform. Regardless of what President Obama does or doesn't do, it presages a new era in American politics and I don't think we've been very sharp about embracing that transition, and I don't think we've caught up to that reality.

CV
So what is the legacy that the boomer generation has left us, in your mind?

MB
Well it's pretty dismal. When I talk about this, I get gasps, but I find that when you explain it, even the boomers in the audience are nodding their heads in agreement. You have to first separate out what type of legacy you mean, because it's terribly unfair and misleading, and not terribly persuasive, to argue that the boomers have done nothing of value. That's simply not true. In fact, Barack Obama would not be President of the United States at any age were it not for the social progress that exists as a result of what we loosely call the boomer generation.

The first thing I think you need to do is look at the term "boomer," because I think it is very flawed. There is a generally accepted academic definition of that which starts at 1946 and ends at 1964, and by that precise definition, Obama is a boomer, but culturally he really is not. So boomer isn't really the best term — I prefer the term 60's Generation, because what we're really talking about are people whose world views were forged in the 1960s. So you could be born in 1944, but be deeply affected and defined by events of the 1960s. Or like Gary Hart, who I'll talk about, who was born in 1936 and was obviously a member of the 60's generation. But you can, like Obama, be born at the tail end of the boom, and all of your experiences can be post-60s in nature and therefore very different.

Obama really is of the generation shaped in the aftermath of Watergate and during the Reagan years, like mine. You know I was at Tufts during the late 1980s, at the tail end of the Reagan era and the beginning of the first Bush era, so this is obviously a different generational sensibility. So, "boomer" is a term I'll only use because it's facile, but it's not precise.

The second thing is, I think you need to credit the 60's generation with a tremendous amount of success in terms of social change. You know they created great movements on both the left and the right, regardless of what one thinks of the ideology; a sort of Kennedy-McGovern-ite left and the Reagan-Goldwater right were tremendously powerful movements that got their starts in the 1960s and generally were led by members of that generation. In terms of social change, both of them can claim a great deal of credit, but particularly

I think the defining characteristic of the generation that's important here isn't self-absorption, it's outsider-ness. It's anti-establishmentism. You have two generations of leaders attached to the ideal that they represent a challenge to the status quo. They were both raised to believe that they were assaulting the establishment, and it became very difficult once in power to turn that impulse off.

the left. I think the movements towards racial rights, women's equality, and all manner of civil rights just completely redefined society, and that's a tremendous achievement.

They made contributions to the arts, to literature, music, television, movies – we have everything from "All in the Family" to *Apocalypse Now* – and all of it is sort of the post-Dylan era of art that really did re-imagine what art was. It's much more honest, it's much more political, and it's much more direct. Bruce Springsteen once said that Elvis freed our bodies and Dylan freed our minds, and I think there's a lot of truth to that — that the 60's generation freed a lot of people's minds, both socially and artistically, and that's no small achievement.

But politically, that progress simply did not translate. It would be very hard to make the case, and frankly, I have not heard anybody make it in all the time I've talked and written about this, that the boomer generation had a great deal of success in the political arena. I would track the beginning of the boomers' ascent in politics to 1984, when Gary Hart became the first member of that generation – and he was already one of the most famous members of that generation – to reach the sort of top level of national politics as a presidential contender. And I think it ends in 2008, when George W. Bush leaves office and gives way to a next generation leader fueled by a next generation of voters.

In between that period, if we bookend it 1984 to 2008, precious little was achieved, and not only was precious little achieved legislatively or in terms of modernizing the government, it was achieved against a backdrop of dizzying change. In my business, we have a tendency to exaggerate, so I would not say this is the worst generation in history or the only generation that didn't meet its challenge; that's crazy, and I think there are a lot of generations that didn't meet their challenge, otherwise we wouldn't have had a civil war or depression. Or a civil rights explosion as we did. You know, Hubert Humphrey stormed out of the Democratic Convention in 1948, and 20 years later they were still arguing over civil rights. So it would be hard to argue that the Eisenhower generation, if you want to call it

that, met its challenges either. But few times in our history has so much transformation been met with so little action, statesmanship, and progress in the political arena. That is the legacy of what we call the boomers.

CV

Well, one can look at the intellectual prism – or perhaps the prison – that the Cold War represented and its impact on the policies and decision making of our leaders as possibly the biggest missing piece for our understanding or our fulfillment of a legitimate and commendable foreign policy, and I wonder if that is a big part of how the boomers have gone about dictating the way that the world's going to run for the past 40 years.

MB

Well it is a big deal, and I agree with you, I think the Cold War figures into this in a very important way, but I think in a slightly different way. I think it's the end of the Cold War that's critically important when you talk about this generation, because they were forged in the Cold War and when it was over, they had very little concept of where to go next. One of my core arguments here is that it's very common and very facile to say that the boomers are the narcissists and the 'me generation' and they only cared about themselves, and that they're basically a crappy generation. That is the most common form of criticism of the 60's generation, and I'm sure that's what some people would hear me saying too. But I'm actually making a different argument. Yes, there was a good deal of narcissism, self absorption, and over-emoting that went on wihtin the 60's generation, and certainly a lot of moral self-righteousness. But there were also external factors going on that had very little to do with the character of the generation itself. And you have to divide these things out.

I think the defining characteristic of the generation that's important here isn't self-absorption, it's outsider-ness. It's anti-establishmentism. You have two generations of leaders attached to the ideal that they represent a challenge to the status quo. They were both raised to believe that they were assaulting the establishment, and it became very difficult once in power to turn that impulse off. They never really did what generations of political leaders did in America, which was to integrate themselves into the political system and then work it from the inside. As soon as they got into the system, they began tearing each other limb from limb. Because they were always taking it to the man, and they never quite could stop taking it to the man.

So there is a personality to the generation that's a factor, but there is all this external stuff. There was, as you mentioned, the end of the Cold War, which left a gaping vacuum in the political discourse of the country and in the policy framework of the country. That's one thing. There is a massive technological transformation that includes the birth of satellite television and 24 hour news. CNN launches some time in the 1980s and by the end of that decade, it's a staple of political coverage and really breaks into the mainstream during the Gulf War. So this insatiable appetite for news that can hold a viewer really changes our concept of what information is, and that's a wildly different phenomenon.

Then there's just the trivialization of the culture in general. There's sort of a celebrity mindset that takes hold in everything, from sports to Hollywood. This sort of erosion of private lives is probably most influenced by television and its permeation into culture which really affected politics too. So one can look at the character issues that defined the generation, but I also think that, if you want to look at this with complexity and fairness, you have to consider the external factors that had nothing to do with who we were talking about but at the time at which they were called to lead.

CV

I guess the point that you brought up earlier – that the boomer generation embodied this stick-it-to-the-man ideal – eventually led to the polarization in politics that we see today. And you can easily look to Obama and say this is a conciliatory politics, this is someone who has tried to reach out. To you, does that style of politics represent this entire generational shift in a nutshell?

MB

I think that's a part of it, because there's a lot of moral self-righteousness involved with the 60's generation that's now associated with our politics. There's a real ethos of

purity that runs through both the left and the right of that generation that came from the moments in which they were born politically, and it has defined our politics for the past 30 years or so – these notions of purity and self righteousness and the inevitable hypocrisy that flows from them. It created this notion of character that became a catch all term for everything you do in you personal life.

The other thing, if I can go back for a minute – the other external factor happening that's a part of this is the birth of a new media generation. Journalists were just reaching an age that gave them a lot of stature at the time of Watergate, and the taking down of a public figure became the principal goal that would enable them to get wealthy and famous. So yes, Obama represents an obvious departure from the past in this way, because he is unemotional, not self-righteous, he exudes a kind of intellectual flexibility, and he's made this theme very overt.

In his inauguration, he said, "As the scripture tells us, it's time to put away these kinds of childish things." And I understand that many of my colleagues think that he was talking about President Bush, but I can tell you that he wasn't, because I followed the man for a while and I understand where he's coming from. He was talking about both parties of a generation. We have come out of a long, childish period in our politics, and that's where his mind is. So he does represent a departure from that. And again, I think an important thing to remember is I don't think Obama is leading us in that direction.

I don't think he stepped up and said 'People, it's time for a generational change.' He reflects a generational change that is, and was, inevitable. He reflects the mindset of my generation frankly – I'm 41, and I think that for those of us who grew up and came of age in the Reagan years – we really tired of that politic culture, and we really tired of the self-righteousness and were exhausted with the lack of progress and the entrenched arguments that seemed to have less and less relevance to our lives. It's one of the reasons there are so many independents in this country.

The fastest growing block of voters continues to be independents, and there's a constant argument about what this means, but I think it means that voters don't want to be affiliated with a dogmatic, self-righteous mindset; they want to be humans and they want to be free agents, and they may have ideology but they don't have this sort of Armageddonish attitude toward politics and policy. I think Obama, more than sort of defining that change, simply reflects it; if it wasn't him, it was going to be somebody else. We would inevitably see a generational change, and he happened to kick in the door.

CV
Then I suppose that's a fairly optimistic view of where politics is headed, because you could almost look at the dogmatic tendency of our outgoing leaders and call it human nature, not only to define oneself in opposition to the other and to emerge with two polarized parties which dominate our politics, but as a result of that to create a deficit of foreign policy and domestic policy emanating from our government.

MB
Well you can't really argue that, because it wasn't really that way before. I mean, we've gone through different periods of our politics, and for large parts of our history, there existed a cooperative effort among politicians of both or all parties to try to reach workable solutions, to try to adapt to the government of that time. In fact, I would argue that the history of American politics is really the history of creative and courageous leaders demanding that their government adapt to changed realities of the moment. We have been not just the strongest country in the world and freest country in the world, we have been the most creative and flexible country in the world, and that is the reason that our economy was able to change completely from an agrarian economy to an industrial economy that dominated the world. It's the reason that we were able to change from a country that didn't graduate a large percentage of its population from high school to a country where virtually everyone went to high school and a large number graduated from college. We did it in a very short period of time, and we did it on the state level before we did it on the federal level because we are an incredibly dynamic political society. I don't think there's any credence to the notion that somehow the cultural entrenched warfare of the last 30 years was somehow inevitable or a product of human and political nature – it's been the product of a very distinct generation.

CV
How much would you attribute the failures of the boomer generation to the reality that America has established itself, over the past three decades at least, as the sole global hegemon in the international community? Has this eroded the sense of urgency that America is embarking on a national project to improve itself and the way it interacts with the world? Is this a factor at all?

MB
Yes, that gets into something else. I think a lack of a framework for what we ought to be doing in the world has been damaging. We've been largely adrift in the post-Cold War era, which made us very susceptible to what happened after the attacks of 9/11/2001, which was to completely base our foreign policy on a single event, as horrific as it was, because we lacked a framework and we were in some perverse way grateful to have one. Not grateful for the event – I don't want to be misunderstood – but I think in some ways it was much more natural to attach ourselves to a framework that was imposed on us than it was to figure one out ourselves, and I think that does speak to the failure of a generation to be imaginative and to be thoughtful.

We spent much of the past 20 years chasing personal scandals and trying to find hypocrisy under every stone, with one side trying to be more pure than the other. We spent

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very few resources comparatively thinking about what the next 50 years of American life and global life was going to look like, and how you go about retooling society to meet those challenges. So to the extent that people feel there has been a failed foreign policy, I think there has been a failure to imagine a foreign policy. And you don't have to look very far to see where the creative resources of the generation went in politics: they went to things that were largely insular and not very consequential.

The book I'm writing is largely focused on Gary Hart, someone your generation doesn't know a lot about, but he's probably one of the most important Americans of his era to not be elected president. He was the first of his generation to come within inches of the presidential nomination. He was the visionary and the real political talent of his generation; he ran the McGovern campaign that shocked the Democratic Party and helped reform the party. He won a senate seat at 38, but he was quite the folk hero on the left. And his undoing in the space of a week in 1987 was, I think, the moment of detonation for a lot of what would follow in the politics of the 60's generation.

CV

And it must seem obvious that the one who is articulating this new mindset is Obama and his new movement. But how do you tread the fine line of not just labeling his opponents part of this old way of doing politics, but instead discerning which of his opponents are playing within the new rules of the game and opposing him thoughtfully from those who have simply assumed the old mantle of the boomer's political culture?

MB

Well, I don't think it's only his opponents, I think it's his friends. I think a lot of the difficulties of the President's first year can be attributed to his having to work with much older leaders in his own party. I described it once as Obama's trying to remodel the house but his in-laws are still living in the back bedroom, and so he has to come home every night and say, "Gee I really like that wall-length mirror in the living room, but do you think we could maybe mess with it a bit and start taking down a couple panels here and there?" He can't just tear the damn thing down. And I'm not saying he's radical in that regard, but I do think he's a modernizer. I do think he accepts the notion that we are wedded to old ideas on both sides of the political spectrum. I don't think there's any question he believes that. But you know, the average age of his committee chairmen in Congress, his Democratic committee chairmen when he came into office, was something like 69.7.

So I don't think it's only his opponents. I think in every respect, as anyone in the vanguard of a generation would, he's had to balance this tension between generational transition and the old way of doing business. This is going to change inevitably, and it's going to change without respect to ideology. That is, Obama might not agree to anything Eric Cantor might have to say, the Republican Whip in the House of Representatives, who is a different kind of Republican as well. As you get more and more leaders of that generation with different ideological viewpoints into the center of power, you'll begin to have a different kind of conversation.

The reason I'm optimistic about this shift is that I know my generation, and I think that I've met a whole slew of younger political leaders who simply think less dogmatically and with more complexity about the issues we're facing and don't accept decades-old policies and ideas as the only kind they can put forth. I think there is an understanding among the new generation, particularly those who are growing up with the internet even younger than myself, that government, whether it's left or right or however you define the change, absolutely has to modernize. My wife went the other day to the Maryland Motor Vehicle Department with scanned documents of the kind that the IRS accepts, but they refused to accept them because she didn't have the crinkled originals she was given years ago. We have an entire generation of Americans, more than one generation, that doesn't even have a filing cabinet at home because, like me, they're scanning every piece of paper that matters and using it for official purposes. But the Maryland Department of Motor Vehicles hasn't caught up to the technological realities. They're still only satisfied if you give them the actual piece of paper with the little seal on it. It's just a small example of how change happens, because ultimately the Maryland branch will also be run by people who scan their documents, and people will start to ask why

We spent very few resources comparatively thinking about what the next 50 years of American life and global life was going to look like, and how you go about retooling society to meet those challenges.

it is that we have a government that still operates this way.

So everything about the way we conduct our politics and our government, both day-to-day management and our mindset for how we look at issues and events, is going to change. Another example that I think is important on a totally different level is abortion. We've had the same entrenched argument on abortion that we had 25 years ago, and this hasn't changed since I was in college. But the technologies of childbirth have changed drastically. Everybody now who's had a child in the past ten years or so, at 12 weeks of a pregnancy, is able to see a fetus moving around waving fingers and toes, waving back at you on a full color monitor in high resolution. That changes your attitude towards abortion. I don't think we're a country that's anti-choice, but I do think we are quickly becoming a country with the consensus that abortion is not a desirable outcome and should never be a first resort. And abortion on demand is losing its resonance just as I think that the pro-life argument is losing its resonance, because I actually think we're becoming a much more individualistic society. So I think we're closer to reaching consensus towards the middle of this issue, as a new generation of Americans, than the politicians are.

CV

So the binaries in the political debates are losing out, and we're beginning to embrace complexity a little more, you would say.

MB

I think that's a by-product of technology. I think it makes us more individualized and customized in our outlook. We customize everything in our lives. We customize the way we get a mortgage, the way we buy a car, the way we date online. You build your computer and your car on a website. So I think first of all it makes our generation much more free agents, which makes us much less likely to accept a dogmatic plank of positions. I think technology leads to complexity because it shows things in much greater detail and instantaneously. Certainly, if you look at the blogs, you could think that all that it does is make politics excessively argumentative and partisan and simplistic, but I don't think that's true. I think that, as in the case of abortion, a lot of the way in which technology empowers citizens enables them to learn more about different issues and to come away with a more flexible outlook with a better understanding of different perspectives. I just think we talk to each other in ways that we weren't able to talk to each other 20 years ago, and all of this is going to create a much different approach to our politics, and that's not about any generation being better than the next, it's about the things that define your worldview. For every generation, those things that define your worldview are different.

There was another encounter that stunned me the other day – having a phone book dropped off at my new house. Who's using a phone book? My wife recently got a new job, and I went to get her a gift, a new leather binder, and they're selling hundreds of these File-a-fax daily planners. Who's buying these things? I guess people over 50 are still buying these planners, but I don't know a single person who keeps a written daily planner. Everybody I know calendars electronically. I mean, these are the things that actually divide generations, and we are in a generational moment where they're still selling File-a-faxes and dropping phone books at your door. That won't be the case in ten years, and I don't think that it will be the case in five years where they're still dropping phone books at your front door. Like everything else that happens in life, this will bleed slowly into politics. Politics is generally the last institution to adapt and modernize. It's a very representative institution, but it's

not an institution on the cutting edge. So Washington is always last, and California is always first. So maybe it's directional.

CV
I look at the new generations as becoming shorter and shorter and shorter, and so I see my sister, who is 16, and can't even speak to her about certain things. I've just been forced onto Twitter as a necessity of my work, but otherwise I wouldn't even look at it.

MB
And she thinks Facebook is for old people!

CV
So it makes you wonder, if you concede that at a certain point generations start to define themselves in opposition to one another, if they start to look at their bigger brothers even as old and defunct, then how quickly will that translate into a haze of multiplicity, where we have ten generations in the span of 20 years.

MB
Well I really think you're on to something; all cycles in American life are shrinking. And this is something that we need to get our heads around in politics. We're not going to see the Rooseveltian realignment any more – we're not going to see the great 50-year realignment because all the cycles continue to get shorter. It's part of the technology transformation. Voters are going to change their minds every five years and, as a generation, you're not going to get power for 40 years. I believe I said that the day after the 2008 election. I spoke on a panel at Columbia, and everybody was talking about the great realignment, and I said I just don't think we're living in that era any more.

TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

REPORTING AND ADVOCACY IN SYRIA

DUNCAN PICKARD

Duncan Pickard, an Institute for Global Leadership Synaptic Scholar and a 2010 Tufts graduate, is a master's candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School, where he studies international affairs. He researches human rights and U.S. foreign policy, with particular emphasis on the Arab world. In summer 2009, he interned at the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, Syria, and in summer 2010, he worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in Washington. He is from Oak Bluffs, Mass., on the island of Martha's Vineyard.

In December 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton spoke at Georgetown University about the importance of human rights in American foreign policy, responding to criticism that the Obama administration had not adequately addressed domestic and international human rights violations. Clinton argued that it was the United States' duty to promote human rights, saying that, as a democracy, we must "commit ourselves to action" and "work for lasting peace through a principled human rights agenda and a practical strategy to implement it."[1]To this end, the United States has strengthened its role in multilateral human rights organizations, sent envoys to discuss human rights practices with foreign leaders, and empowered embassies to write annual human rights reports. In each role, American diplomats navigate – with varying degrees of success – the tensions between U.S. policy, international human rights doctrine, and local concepts of rights. This essay will focus these challenges by concentrating on human rights reporting and advocacy at the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, Syria.

Human rights standards are outlined in a variety of international treaties and agreements, but are still interpreted and enforced by national governments. Thus, as a result of varied socio-cultural context, the impact of human rights legislation in public policy varies enormously around the world. Human rights reform is an American priority, particularly in Arab states. A 2008 Amnesty International study of 716 Arab youths in Cairo, Riyadh, Dubai, and Amman gauged support for individual rights, including imprisonment without torture, fair trials, and free speech. Eighty-six percent of respondents said they supported one or more of these rights, but 72 percent dismissed the framework of human rights as a façade used to advance U.S. foreign policy. It is a challenge for the U.S. that Arab youth, a potentially progressive force in the Middle East and representing 60 percent of the workforce, are skeptical of American policies that they otherwise support in another context[2].[3]

Syria in particular is emblematic of the difficulties that the United States faces in fostering human rights overseas, especially as an increasingly important player in the politics of the Middle East; Robert Pelletreay, former U.S. assistant secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, has called Syria a "perpetual spoiler" of regional peace.[4] Despite Syria's importance, the workings of the government of President Bashar al-Asad can be difficult to discern, along with America's real impact on Syrian society. Hoping to repair a troubled relationship, since coming to office, President Obama has relaxed economic sanctions on Syria and announced the return of the American ambassador to the country. How will these diplomatic initiatives impact or influence human rights in Syria?

Abdullahi Ahmed an-Na'im, professor at Emory University School of Law and director of the university's Religion and Human Rights program, distinguishes between human rights approaches of dominant and dominated people, a helpful frame for the U.S.–Syrian relationship. Within a society, he argues, dominant groups support rights that establish their values and support their interests, while dominated groups or classes are open to different perspectives that promote equality. A goal of U.S. foreign policy in Syria is to emphasize, like Na'im, a cross-cultural approach to the "legitimacy" of rights.[5] But many Syrians believe that "human rights" are tools of Western post-colonial control, and that the American government, perceived as dominant, is imposing a value system on a politically and economically dominated Syria. The Syrian government claims to reject international pushes for human rights primarily because of the existing perception of them as a means towards western hegemony, and not because they would be an ineffective frame of cross-cultural dialogue. Due to differing definitions and perceptions, the human rights debate becomes politicized and is seen by the government as a threat to Syria's domestic sovereignty.

> "We give up human rights, but look at our national security. We are one of the safest countries in the world. I hope the dissidents (munshaqun) who undermine the government feel afraid."

In many nations, external government and non-governmental organizations advocate human rights to protect citizens against abusive state power.[6] In Syria, however, the government outlaws international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) that lead advocacy and reporting efforts in many other countries, leaving Western diplomats as the sole advocates for international human rights work.

Recently, scholars have debated how human rights are politicized in different contexts[7]. Harri Englund, a researcher on human rights in Africa, writes that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights removes abuses of state power from the political structures that created them, empowering, for example, Malawi's poor to report rights violations to NGOs. In this way, human rights are seen as "individual freedoms that represent the natural grounds for making claims"[8]. While Englund describes how human rights can depoliticize conflicts by removing structures of power, Mahmood Mamdani, professor of Government at Columbia University, argues that, in Sudan, this process obscures political reality. He argues that human rights activists have reduced the Darfur conflict to a case of "Arabs" persecuting "Africans" to flatten the issue into a simplistic struggle of good versus evil, obscuring "both the fact that the violence was not one-sided" as well as that the contest was precisely over who did and did not "belong in Sudan's political community".[9]

Diplomats working at Western embassies in Damascus have created a transnational network of human rights professionals that often conflicts with local discourse and meaning systems, depoliticizing rights violations in a way similar to Mamdani's Darfur.[10] In Syria, however, diplomats also work in a space usually occupied by NGOs in other nations. Politicization, in this context refers to the condition in which human rights become a debate between international entities, instead of between state and populace.

According to the U.S. State Department, the Asad regime has one of the Arab world's worst human rights records, with documented instances of arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, and special courts holding unfair trials. The government strictly controls freedom of speech, press, and association, and systematically discriminates against Kurds as an ethnic minority. U.S. foreign policy focuses on promoting a more liberal human rights regime in Syria, including the release of key political prisoners and the closure of clandestine courts.[11] Fundamentally, it appears that the United States and Syria differ on the relationship between human rights and national security. Syrian officials assert that human rights challenge state sovereignty, and that many Syrians believe human rights compromise state security.[12]

One Syrian official told me, "We give up human rights, but look at our national security. We are one of the safest countries in the world. I hope the dissidents (munshaqun) who undermine the government feel afraid." Several human rights activists, when asked, said they felt "scared" when they passed Syrian police on the street. On the other hand, a number of politically inactive Syrians felt safe on seeing security forces on the street. One shopkeeper, said, "I feel safe when I see the police on every corner, because I know there is always some place I can turn. You feel safe in Damascus, right?"[13]

Lisa Wedeen, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, questions the sincerity and choice of some sources that find comfort in police presence. She identifies a "politics of acting" in Syria ruled by the "cult of Asad," referring to Hafez al-Asad, the former president and Bashar al-Asad's father[14].[15] Wedeen argues that the government derives power from compliance rather than legitimacy, and it produces compliance through rituals and symbols that compel citizens to act "as if" they revere their leader.[16] This argument brings into question the shopkeeper's claims to appreciate surveillance; is he merely conditioned to believe that the security really does make him

safer? Wedeen's argument does not apply to activists who question the politics of acting like Kamal Labwani and Muhannad al-Hasani, two important figures in the field of Syrian human rights. Labwani founded the Liberal Democratic Union and was Syria's leading activist until his arrest in 2007. Hasani, a lawyer who has defended Labwani and several others, was chair of the Syrian Human Rights Organization, a group that reports human rights abuses. Both groups are illegal under Syrian law. Hasani met regularly with American officials and collaborated with Human Rights Watch until he was arrested on charges related to these activities in August of 2009.

Labwani, Hasani, and many other Syrians began their activism between the summer of 2000 and fall of 2001 during the transfer of power from Hafez al-Asad to his son Bashar. This period, known as the Damascus Spring, marked a change in government policy under the new president in which limited civil dissent was tolerated. Among other changes, the government permitted a series of *muntadat*; public forums on the future of government and society and released a number of political prisoners. Ninety-nine intellectuals, including Labwani and Hasani, formed an advocacy group called the Damascus Declaration to demand repeal of the Emergency Law, the release of all prisoners of conscience, the closure of secret courts, and the granting of rights to form civil society organizations.[17] Little more than a year later, however, the activism of the Damascus Declaration, proliferation of the *muntadat*, and small demonstrations began to threaten the regime and it returned to its past repressive tactics. The government arrested the leaders of the Damascus Declaration and closed all the *muntadat* but one, the Jamal al-Atassi National Dialogue Forum, which was closed in 2005 after a member read a statement from the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. The yearlong reprieve from government restrictions was the impetus for the emergence of leading human rights activists today. Many of these activists are now the most important informants for the United States government on the inner workings of Syrian politics and repression.[18] The government ban on international human rights NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, has meant that an increasingly large role in human rights reporting is played by the Western diplomatic community, notably the United States, Canada, Norway, and the member states of the European Union, collectively called "like-minded" countries.[19] In this way, diplomats, not human rights activists, define human rights work, politicizing human rights in a way that is unique to Syria.[20]

If human rights work is so difficult in Syria, why is it an American priority in the first place? Erin Kelly, professor of philosophy at Tufts, argues that there are ethical underpinnings to foreign policy called International Responsibility for Human Rights, "according to which widespread human rights abuses require an international response." She writes that justice has no borders, and that "the goal of protecting human rights should be shared globally"[21].

Another challenge facing US human rights efforts in Syria is recognizing how local human rights activists need to be supported in their efforts to reform their own society. Currently, these efforts appear to be at cross-purposes. This creates a fundamental rift in the priorities of foreign diplomats – motivated by their own national imperatives – and the local human rights activists – fighting for personal freedom from political oppression – they are working to support. Local activists and NGOs working in other Arab countries have goals that extend into a more nuanced collection of rights than human rights writ broadly.

Activists and diplomats often disagree over the best methods by which to pursue human rights advocacy in Syria. Several Syrian dissidents, for example, have petitioned the U.S. government to ask for the release of political prisoners as a precondition for talks with senior American envoys, a step the US has not supported yet. Second, the difficulties of the American diplomatic relationship with Syria can obscure American knowledge about the workings of the Syrian apparatus in suppressing rights. Without personal relationships with Syrian bureaucrats, it is difficult for American diplomats to understand how the Syrian government mobilizes its bureaucracy to oppress or undermine the rights of its citizens.

Al-Hasani's arrest and trial exemplify these challenges within the Syrian legal system. Several days after his arrest, a case was filed against him at the Damascus Bar Association that, if upheld, would revoke his license to practice law.[22] President Asad's image are found throughout the association's offices, including under a banner stating, "We are all with you" (*kul-na ma'ak*). Despite the professed legal separation between the association and the government, this was clearly state space. In his hour-long hearing, Hasani was disbarred, and while doing that, the association crippled the availability of legal aid to political detainees.

The Syrian government's enshrouded practices empower the state to manipulate American reporting. While US diplomats in Syria make an effort to attend and observe political trials in Syria, the most serious cases are tried before clandestine courts. While trials of lesser political figures are handled publicly, cases like those of Hasani are held at the State Supreme Security Court (SSSC), the most clandestine of the Damascus courts.[23] At the SSC, al-Hasani was sentenced to three years in prison. Hasani's advocacy, arrest, and detention highlight the omnipotent authoritarianism of the Syrian state, which can deploy three different courts and the bar association to punish dissidents differently and avoid scrutiny by the diplomatic community.

To work around the Syrian government, the embassies have developed a complex network of sources to collect information on human rights abuses. Diplomats follow blogs and email lists from activists and first-hand reports from interns who visit courts daily to see if a trial is in session. While criminal court schedules were officially announced, interns and embassy employees are continually forced to be creative in order to try and understand the workings of the more clandestine State Supreme Security Court.

Diplomats compile this data in the U.S. State Department's annual Country Reports on Human Rights. Among other places, Congress and the Treasury Department use the country report to justify economic sanctions against Syria, often also citing connections to "terrorist organizations."[24] The country report is released every February for the previous year, and it lists the specific human rights abuses in as much detail as possible, organized by components of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[25] According to the State Department's notes on their preparation of the reports, the agency favors objectivity, credibility, comprehensiveness, and uniformity.[26] The formal presentation of the reports, endorsed by the American government, masks the process of checking cell doors and blogs that American officials followed to gather the data. More importantly, the country reports remove references to the structures of power in Syria that make these violations possible[27].

In the State Department, it is important what is designated as "a human rights issue" and what is not, because the term can trigger the way information is passed back to Washington and processed[28]. Human rights reports are labeled for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), which has three functions: to publish the annual human rights report, to write human rights policy, and to monitor and fund programs that support human rights around the world. The DRL does not fund humanitarian aid or to coordinate refugee resettlement. The Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP), which is separate from the DRL, publishes an annual trafficking in persons report for each country and operates a fund to support trafficking shelters around the world.

These definitions of human rights also affect Syrian perceptions of what the U.S. government considers human rights issues. When American officials talk about human rights with Syrian officials and activists, they generally refer to political prisoners, from a Syrian perspective undermining state sovereignty and national security. In these discussions, human rights do not encompass other important issues that the United States and Syria both care about and could collaborate on. This makes government (rather than NGO) efforts towards human rights polarizing and political.

Many activists in Syria, including Muhannad al-Hasani, prefer the term "civil society" to "human rights." One activist mentioned that it is more encompassing of the kinds of changes he and his peers want to see, emphasizing community rather than political clashes with the government. This rhetoric attempts to reframe activists' work in terms of the community instead of the state. The distinction is deep, considering the growing number of scholars who have addressed the relationship between civil society – networks of community-based organiza-

tions – and the prospects for nonviolent political reforms under authoritarian regimes.[29] James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta can help us understand this distinction. They identify two images of the state: verticality and encompassment. Verticality refers to the idea of the state as an "institution somehow 'above' civil society, community, and family." In encompassment, the state is "located within an ever widening series of circles" that begins with the local community and ends with the system of nation-states. These two images work in tandem to form an image of the state that sits above society at local, national, and transnational levels[30]. The politicization of human rights in Syria tilts advocacy toward the model of vertical encompassment, making it just another layer of state control. Syrian activists work to reclaim vertical encompassment and align the interests of state and civil society.

The preference for civil society over human rights has implications on Syrian activists' work. One activist believes that the rhetorical debate over human rights in the model of vertical encompassment has not been effective because activists have not mobilized young people to get involved in their communities. To address this, he organizes trash pickup drives and other volunteer opportunities, attracting dozens of young people in communities around Damascus, to "help the youth invest time in their communities." He believes in the value of participation and civic engagement to inspire more effective arguments for human rights and allow the community to take advantage of more liberal rights when they finally come.

Labwani also believes in creating structures now that will socialize Syrians to accept democratic reform when it comes. The charter of the Liberal Democratic Union includes guidelines for a bicameral legislation and voting rights for all members. In a 2004 interview with Syria Comment, a blog from University of Oklahoma professor Joshua Landis, Labwani said he wrote this to prepare "for the day when the regime falls. We're letting them know that we're thinking past their collapse and planning for the future. It's a type of psychological warfare."[31]

The street cleanup campaigns are among but a few responses to Labwani's call to inspire civil society activism among more than a few elite Syrians. Many diplomats meet only with activists in cafés near their homes in Abu Rummaneh and Malki, the most expensive neighborhoods in Damascus[32]. Activists must have the financial means to work without pay, both to devote time to their advocacy and because most cannot find jobs with criminal records of political subversion. The kind of community engagement that civil society advocates seek is impossible without broader support across socioeconomic classes in Syria.[33]

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This rhetoric of civic engagement is common in Syria. Syrian Kurds, unlike their counterparts in Iraq, are not separatists despite the ethnic discrimination they face; they advocate using rhetoric of human rights for all Syrians so they can speak against ethnic discrimination. One Kurdish activist said,

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I have been to Iraq, and they have it wrong. Who will listen to them if they say they don't want to be part of Iraq at all? That will get them nowhere. We accept that we will be a minority, but we need to have our voice in government. Right now, no one has a voice, so we're all together.
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Other, less confrontational civic engagement work has received more support. For example, government leaders have founded entrepreneurship initiatives to promote youth engagement in the business community. The flagship Syrian youth entrepreneurship program is called Strategy Highlighting and Building Abilities for Business or SHABAB, which means "youth" in Arabic.[34] It is a program under the umbrella organization the Syria Trust for Development, a hybrid of traditional community-based organizations but under the authority of the government. The Syria Trust is the only community-based organization permitted by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, and all NGOs must work underneath this umbrella. Asma al-Asad, the First Lady of Syria, chairs the Syria Trust.[35]

SHABAB runs several youth entrepreneurship programs, including business clinics in major cities that offer help to youth searching for jobs, writing resumes, and preparing for interviews. SHABAB has also piloted the country's first entrepreneurship curriculum, which is required in all Syrian high schools. SHABAB's mission states,

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The project is a national movement of local community action. One of the distinctive features of SHABAB is that it offers different segments of society the opportunity to participate in the implementation of its programs and hence, play an active role within their local community. Its strongest working relationships are with local business communities, government and civil society.
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SHABAB's emphasis on civil society extends from this mission statement to their offices and classrooms, where it underpins all the work they do. SHABAB also publishes a weekly column in the new English-language magazine *Forward* that teaches basic business skills and tries to reverse long-standing cultural assumptions that the only respectable fields are those of medicine and engineering. SHABAB officials hope they can build civil society by encouraging young people to pursue a wider range of professions. SHABAB's emphasis on civil society is similar to the rhetoric of human rights activists and Kurdish dissidents, except that it is sanctioned by the government. Civil society, unlike human rights, has a positive connotation in Syria, a fact which human rights advocates might be able to use to their advantage.

From the American perspective, there are several common assumptions that obfuscate this similarity in rhetoric. One is that NGOs representing civil society operate independently of the state. In Syria, however, where the government ironically sponsors what it calls an NGO, the separation between civil society and the state is not so clear. If the American government wants to foster a more robust civil society, which it claims as a goal, then its policies should specify how NGOs are to work in relation to the government and the people. This understanding could lead to an important new partnership with state-sanctioned civil society work in Syria, like SHABAB, that could discreetly complement the work of human rights activists. [36]

Another avenue to explore more fully is the Internet. Even though the Syrian government's surveillance extends to email and social networking sites, the Internet has nonetheless become a powerful tool for civil society activists. Face-

book is banned in Syria, but there is a well-known workaround to access the site and many Syrians including President Asad, have profiles online.[37] Community activists have also begun using Facebook to organize. In August 2009, four men in Aleppo gang-raped a four-year-old girl and left her for dead. Supporters created a group on Facebook that encouraged members to send money or other support to the family as they struggle to recover from the attack. The family updates the page regularly with news, video, and photos, and the group has nearly 6,000 members.

In the past several years, Amnesty International has begun to gather information and advocate for human rights through Facebook in countries in which governments ban their work. Many of the videos that sparked international outrage at the 2009 Iranian presidential elections were leaked through cracks in state censorship of the media, some of which Amnesty International and other international rights organizations helped open. Social networking could be the next frontier of activism, if it can float above the borders the government seeks to enforce. Bashar al-Asad has now led Syria during three American presidencies, and his relationship with current one seems to be the best so far. Asad has authorized a land grant for a new American embassy compound, permitting the American Language Center to reopen, and he even invited the Obamas to Damascus. Will a closer bilateral relationship affect human rights reporting? It could allow for more visible American support for civil society activists, but could also influence American officials to better respect the diplomatic relationship and tone down the rhetoric of their human rights work. The question remains how closely human rights are linked to other political and economic priorities of the United States in Syria.



Children play soccer after Friday prayers at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, Syria.

Notes

[1] The United States rejoined the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights in 2009, and the State Department is, for the first time, participating in the commission's Universal Periodic Review. Michael Posner, assistant secretary of state for human rights, a former lawyer and activist, has visited dozens of countries since taking office, notably Egypt in January 2010.

[2] Pratt, Nicole. "Human Rights NGOs and the 'Foreign Funding Debate' in Egypt." InHuman Rights in the Arab World, edited by Anthony Chase and Amr Hamzawy, 114–126. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006.

[3] According to the United Nations, over sixty percent of the workforce in the Arab world is under the age of twenty-five. The report is available online at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/documents/arabyouthmdgs.pdf, accessed November 12, 2009.

[4] Lecture by Robert H. Pelletreau, "How is President Obama Doing in the Middle East?," Tufts University, November 4, 2009. A video of the lecture is available at http://media.web.tufts.edu:81/asxgen/edmedia/2009/FaresFall2009/Pelletreau.wmv.

[5] an-Na'im, Abdullahi Ahmed. "Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights." In Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives, edited by Abdullahi Ahmed an-Na'im, 19–43. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992, p.20-22

[6] Elyachar, Julia. Markets of Dispossession. Durham: Duke University Press, 2005.

[7] Ishay, Micheline. The History of Human Rights. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008

[8] Englund, Harri. Prisoners of Freedom. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006

[9] Mamdani, Mahmood. The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency. London Review of Books, 2007.

[10] Bourdieu, Pierre. "The Berber House." In The Anthropology of Space and Place, edited by Setha Low and Denise Lawrence-Zúñiga, 131–141. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2003.

[11] The government justifies its surveillance by citing the perceived ever-present military threat of Israel. Syria's Ba'athist constitution is quite liberal; it embraces political freedoms and establishes checks and balances in the government. Since 1963, however, the government has ruled under an Emergency Law that overrides the constitution. Article 285 of the Emergency Law punishes dissidents for "weakening national sentiments" during a "time of war."

[12] Some scholars have suggested that human rights are fundamentally incompatible with Islam, which is why U.S. human rights policy is ineffective in Muslim-majority countries like Syria (Renteln 1990; Pollis 1998). While this paper focuses on a political debate between the secular governments of the United States and Syria, it is important to debunk the idea of incompatibilities between Islam and human rights. A survey of literature on Islamic humanism shows the religion is nuanced, changing, contextual, and capable of outlining compatibilities between Muslim-majority societies and human rights. Mahmoud Muhammad Taha, for example, has proposed more humanistic Qur'anic verses should replace those that currently unpin most shari'a law. See the lecture by Ali A. Allawi, "An Alternative Perspective: An Ethical Reading of Human Rights in Islam," John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, November 17, 2009. A video of the lecture is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qp3Srkh1u1c. See also Anthony Chase, "Islam and Human Rights, Clashing Normative Orders?" (Ph.D. diss., Tufts University, 2000).

[13] I conducted fieldwork in Damascus for three months from June to August 2009 while working as an intern at the American embassy. I cleared portions of my research with embassy officials to protect both the U.S. government and my informants.

[14] Wedeen, Lisa. Ambiguities of Domination. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.

[15] To my knowledge, no scholars have suggested that Wedeen's analysis of Hafez al-Asad's political control is irrelevant to the new regime, and I have no evidence to suggest otherwise.

[16] Wedeen writes that Syrians say they believe in "incredible powers" of their president, demonstrating how they embody the power of the Asad cult. One government report, for example, heralds Asad as the country's "leading pharmacist," though he has no background in the field.

[17] Moubayed, Sami. Damascus between Democracy and Dictatorship. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2000.

[18] Arabic literature scholar miriam cooke describes artistic criticism of the Hafez al-Asad regime, by which the government would commission poetry, sculpture, film, and other art to criticize the state, to create "an official and paradoxical project to create a democratic façade" (cooke 2007, 72). This criticism, which falls under the category of what Wedeen calls permitted or licensed, is no longer a reality in the Bashar al-Asad regime. Authentic criticism creates the same democratic façade without government involvement.

[19] Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are not permitted to work in Syria by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, which must approve the function of NGOs. Human Rights Watch operates a field office in Beirut and has sources in Damascus who contribute reporting.

[20] I do no meant to imply that the human rights situation in Egypt is dramatically better than it is in Syria. There is a large body of scholarship on the role of NGOs in Egypt, including Julia Elyachar.

[21] Kelly, Erin. "Human Rights as Foreign Policy Imperatives." In Ethics of Assistance, edited by Deen Chatterjee, 177–192. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

[22] Ironically, Hasani's father founded the bar association as a community for lawyers independent of the government.

[23] The Human Rights Watch report on the SSSC, called "Far From Justice," is available at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/80952/.

[24] See in particular two resolutions introduced March 9, 2005, in the House of Representatives: H. Con. Res. 18 and H. Con. Res. 32, collectively titled "Expressing the Grave Concern of Congress Regarding the Violations of the Syrian and Lebanese People by the Syrian Arab Republic; and the Occupation of the Republic of Lebanon by the Syrian Arab Republic."

[25] The 2008 report appears at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119127.htm, accessed November 15, 2009. The first report covered the year 1976, issued in 1977.

[26] A statement on methods is available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/appendices/119178.htm, accessed November 15, 2009.

[27] Mamdani, Mahmood. The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency. London Review of Books, 2007.

[28] Weber, Max. "Bureaucracy." In The Anthropology of the State, edited by Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, 49–70. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.

[29] Schwedler, Jillian, ed. Toward a Civil Society of the Middle East. Boulder: Rienner, 1995.

30 Ferguson, James. The Anti-Politics Machine. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994.

[31] The full interview is available at http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/L/Joshua.M.Landis-1/syriablog/2005/09/kamal-al-labwani-interview-by-joe-pace.htm, accessed November 5, 2009.

[32] Salamandra, Christa. A New Old Damascus. Indianapolis: University of Indiana Press, 2004.

[33] It is possible that there are other Syrian activists working in lower social strata. If they exist, there could be several reasons why their work is invisible to the diplomatic community: prominent activists could be protecting their grassroots counterparts, the embassy might be unable to foster strong ties with Syrian society, or organizers might believe the American embassy would detract from their work.

[34] There is no acronym in Arabic.

[35] The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MSAL) denied NGO status to a women's shelter in the Old City of Damascus; the Ministry of Information, however, approved the women's group's advertising campaign on state-run television, and the MSAL has cited the shelter in its official reports on domestic violence in Syria as an example of the resources available to women in danger. The competing interests of the government to appear like it can provide for its people while also restricting civil society work to the private sphere, especially around women's issues, results in this patchwork of government approval and disapproval of a women's shelter and exemplifies the challenges of NGO work in Syria. The authoritarian state determines who can work in what sector of society.

[36] This partnership could raise other questions about Syrians' receptiveness to foreign support for local programs. A Syrian law requires up to three years in prison for accepting money from a foreign government without approval of the regime, which is rarely given, so there is little data available for an analysis. Labwani, speaking hypothetically, said it would "not make sense to call me a traitor" if he accepted foreign money since he has lived in Syria his entire life. For comparison, there is an important debate among NGOs and international funders in Egypt about the efficacy of foreign funding (Pratt 2006).

[37] To access Facebook in Syria, users only need to include the letter "s" after "http" in the Web address, as in https://www.facebook.com/. This establishes a secure connection outside the reach of government servers.

POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF 9/11 NARRATIVES IN SECONDARY

SCHOOL HISTORY TEXTBOOKS IN SOUTH ASIA

AN EXTRACT FROM AN HONORS THESIS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ELIZABETH D. HERMAN

Elizabeth Herman recently graduated from Tufts University with a B.A. in Political Science and Economics. She was a student in the 2007-08 EPIIC Colloquium on Global Poverty and Inequality. She is currently a Fulbright Fellow in Bangladesh, where she is researching the political influences on the development of national history curricula. Her interest in this project arose from her senior honors thesis in Political Science at Tufts, which focused on the examination of emerging representations of September 11th, 2001 in secondary school social studies textbooks worldwide. Elizabeth has been photographing since she was in high school, when she spent countless hours tucked away in the darkroom. During her time at Tufts, she has been able to intertwine her studies with her passion for photography through [EXPOSURE], the Institute for Global Leadership's student-led documentary studies group. Her experiences with [EXPOSURE] have enabled her to investigate issues of education and human rights through the camera's lens. During her time in Bangladesh, she hopes to similarly blend photography and her history education research.

He who controls the present, controls the past. He who controls the past, controls the future.[1]

In his famous novel, *1984*, George Orwell creates the world of Oceania, a true totalitarian state in which the Party attempts to maintain complete control over all thoughts and actions of its citizens. The main character, Winston Smith, works at the Ministry of Truth (Minitrue) where history is continually edited and re-edited to suit the needs of the Party. In this fictional world, Orwell touches upon a critical and defining struggle of the modern era, namely, "the mutability of the past"[2].

Since the invention of the printing press, books have permitted the streamlining and communication of histories in an entirely new way. This has had a profound impact on education, for with mass printing came mass schooling in the form of the textbook. Since this development, textbooks have played a central role in classrooms around the world. The importance of the textbook has been examined in depth; as A. Graham Down of the Council for Basic Education states:

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Textbooks, for better or worse, dominate what students learn. They set the curriculum, and often the facts learned, in most subjects. For many students, textbooks are their first and sometimes only exposure to books and reading. The public regards textbooks as authoritative, accurate, and necessary.

The politically powerful have recognized the power that lies in textbooks, with their ability to reach a significant portion of the population at a young and arguably more impressionable age.[3]

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In most countries, the contents, and often the production, of textbooks are controlled or monitored by government bodies. Political battles are waged over what makes it into the pages of the texts. Discussions over revisions become heated debates. As textbooks provide a dominant version of history that is directly conveyed to the next generation, control of these histories helps to determine what information is passed on to the next generation.

Thus, the statement that "the public regards textbooks as authoritative, accurate, and necessary" deserves critical examination. The notion that textbooks provide authoritative and unbiased narratives is especially troublesome, particularly in the realm of social studies education. A view of textbooks as "neutral, disinterested, and objective" communicators of knowledge fails to acknowledge the forces and circumstances that shape these narratives.[4] The fact is that textbooks, formed by decisions and negotiations in a specific time and place, are far from neutral. Therefore, even while some may disagree about the importance of textbooks within the classroom, the significance of textbooks *in and of themselves* must be acknowledged, as they "signify – through their content and form – particular constructions of reality, particular ways of selecting and organizing that vast universe of possible knowledge"[5].

Through selective inclusions, omissions, emphases, and de-emphases, narratives of the past can be molded to directly reflect and reinforce current political agendas and aims.

This article examines how narratives of the past are influenced by present political agendas and addresses the question: What are the political forces and motivations that have shaped narratives of the events of September 11, 2001 in secondary school history textbooks in Pakistan and India? By conducting a thorough qualitative content analysis, I seek to reveal the political dimensions of these narratives, examining the ways that social studies curricula are fashioned to suit current political priorities.

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The minds of children are usually shut inside prison houses, so that they become incapable of understanding people who have different languages and customs. This causes us to grope after each other in darkness, to hurt each other in ignorance, to suffer from the worst form of blindness…They make this permanent in their textbooks, and poison the minds of children.[6]

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Since the partition of the South Asian subcontinent in 1947, Pakistan and India have each been striving to define their own unique national identity. Yet, for two countries with histories so interwoven, this is not an easy task. Textbooks have served a key role in defining these identities, providing a venue for an official narrative, one that reflects the priorities and ideologies of the state in a cohesive fashion. In light of the widespread knowledge and impact of 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the associated themes and tensions, countries use this event to construct narratives that emphasize specific topics and priorities, such as ethnic conflict, terrorism, or US hegemony. Through selective inclusions, omissions, emphases, and de-emphases, narratives of the past can be molded to directly reflect and reinforce current political agendas and aims.

Pakistan

The ideological goals of Pakistan's educational system are more strongly and explicitly stated than they are for other countries. Yvette Rossery, who wrote her dissertation, "Curriculum as Destiny: Forging National Identity in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh," notes, "Ideology is integral to the ultimate purpose of a social studies curriculum. Historical narratives usually reflect the views of the dominant culture and report events through a lens with a narrow focus"[7].

I reviewed two books, both with the same title. *Pakistan Studies*, edited by Dr. Abdu Qadir Khan and published in 2009 with 195 pages — the narrative relevant to this analysis on pages 173 to 195. The book is a thin paperback, includes no images or illustrations and has an image of a train at Landi Kotal on the cover. The other text surveyed, also entitled *Pakistan Studies*, is edited by Prof. Bashir Ahmad and contains 142 pages, with the narrative analyzed in this survey found on pages 122 to 130. Both textbooks are issued by state publishing apparatuses, which are directly controlled by the provincial Ministries of Education.

These two *Pakistan Studies* textbooks are remarkably similar, with far more commonalities in their narratives than differences. The extent of their similarity illustrates the high degree of centralization in textbook generation and publishing in Pakistan, and how well the texts conform to the standards delineated by the government through the Ministry of Education. As the government essentially dictates the textbook contents, they can truly be seen as "official narratives" of the nation. They present a very limited view of 9/11 and the associated events, with the account shaped to suit the current political priorities and characteristics of the state.

What is omitted is of particular note; as Barnard (2003) states, "Behind any text there is another range of poten-

tial texts that could have been produced"[8]. A comparison of the narratives in each *Pakistan Studies* textbook to those in the United States texts reveals some obvious omissions. The identities of the attackers are emphasized in the US textbooks, but omitted from the Pakistani narratives. For both the US and Pakistan, the narratives constitute 'acceptable knowledge,' or what the authority that define the texts has "recognized as legitimate and truthful"[9]. For Pakistan, a nation formed to provide a homeland for the Muslims of South Asia, portraying Islam in a negative light would be a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the nation. Conversely, with the identification of the perpetrators as "Islamic terrorists," the US textbooks abdicate their responsibility to examine more deeply the motivations for the attack. As Martha Crenshaw, "a scholar at Stanford who wrote her first essay wrestling with the definition of terrorism in 1972," states, "The use of the term terrorism delegitimizes the opponent…it's not just the tactics that are discredited, it's the cause, as well". For both texts, the choices to include or exclude specific words or phrases constitute "particular constructions of reality, particular ways of selecting and organizing that vast universe of possible knowledge"[10].

Thus, one aspect of the 9/11 narrative is fashioned to reflect the perspective of the nation, the dominant, acceptable beliefs, in turn reinforcing these values for the next generation. As discussed in the introduction, Pakistan's national identity is "manufactured." Even the choice to use the word "terrorist" is not a given; as will be seen in the upcoming analysis, the Indian textbook *Contemporary World Politics* identifies the perpetrators as "hijackers," never referring to "terrorism" within the description of the events of 9/11, except in reference to how other nations have referred to the event. Pakistan's identity has been superimposed on a diverse ethnic and religious heritage since the formation of the nation in 1947. As a result, it is inherently insecure and defensive, as it requires constant definition and reinforcement.

Textbooks play a critical role in accomplishing this task by helping to form and reinforce these beliefs and ideas. As K.K. Aziz, one of the foremost scholars on Pakistani historiography, states, "In Pakistan it [the textbook] is the only instrument of imparting education on all levels, because the teacher and the lecturer don't teach or lecture but repeat what it contains and the student is encouraged or simply ordered to memorize its contents." Thus, textbooks in Pakistan inculcate this official ideology into the next generation[11]. Textbooks do not simply describe history; they construct it.

India

In India, the government has primary control over the production of textbooks, which "remain the principal instructional material in the classroom, often the only reading material available," with limited involvement from the private sector[12]. In most Indian states, it is The State Council for Education and Research Training (SCERT) that is responsible for textbook development, with a Textbook Corporation or a Textbook Bureau that actually publishes them[13]. The private sector is only involved in printing and distribution; the state government bodies oversee curriculum development. The National Council for Education and Research Training (NCERT), the national-level curricular body, produces curricula and textbooks that can be – and commonly are – used by schools throughout the nation.

History textbooks in India have received significant attention in recent years, with much of the debate surrounding the "saffronization" of textbooks, a process that has sought to advocate Hindu nationalism within the narratives of the texts. The Hindutva nationalist movement, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has worked to achieve "saffronization" by both emphasizing the Hindu facets of India's past and deemphasizing or demonizing its Muslim histories. The process of editing the nation's textbooks began in 1998, when the BJP displaced the Indian National Congress from the majority in parliament, and continued until 2004, when the BJP was voted out of office by a large margin. At present, the Indian National Congress has resumed the power of the majority and has made a concerted effort to reverse the revisions instituted by the BJP.

This practice of editing and re-editing has garnered considerable interest over the past decade, with much of the

Textbooks do not simply describe history; they construct it.

"officially initiated discussions regarding textbooks or curriculum…hotly discussed in the popular media."[14] Revision procedures have been met with open criticism, from Indians and foreigners alike, in journals, the media, and government bodies. As Yvette Rossery explains:

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There have been heated debates in the Parliament with MPs walking out over historiography. Lawsuits were filed to prevent the publication of new textbooks. There were political rallies opposing "saffron history", notifications about numerous seminars, anthologies, and editorials on the topic, including on-line petitions protesting the "rewriting of history in India". The debate is highly polarized, very dramatic, and hotly contested.[15]
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Thus, the highly polarized nature of social studies textbooks in India has attracted notice and led to a great deal of research. The majority of this literature focuses, however, on the historiography of ancient history, dealing with how the narratives of the ancient Indian subcontinent are written into textbooks. As my study focuses on narratives of current events, it fills a gap in the literature on Indian textbooks and provides a number of additional avenues for future studies.

History textbooks in India do not cover topics in the twenty-first century, and therefore do not include accounts of September 11. Rather, these issues are included in Political Science, an elective course taken in students' twelfth year. I have obtained *Contemporary Political Science*, the sole relevant textbook for the course published by the NCERT in 2007. The 150-page paperback text represents the national-level curriculum relevant to the Political Science course taught in India.

While *Contemporary World Politics* was developed and approved in accordance with the nationwide curriculum, state bodies, as stated above, may also develop and produce their own curricula and textbooks. *Political Science: Higher Secondary Std. XII* was produced in the state of Maharashtra, India's richest state, the second largest by population, and the location of India's most populous city, Mumbai. The narrative in this text only briefly mentions 9/11 at the beginning of Unit (Chapter) 8, "Terrorism,"[16] with the sentence, "The attack on twin towers of the World Trade Centre, New York, U.S.A. on 11-9-2001 bears testimony to this fact [of the spread of global terrorism]. Transcending national boundaries, terrorism has become a global menace".[17] In the lead up to this statement, the narrative describes, "The emergence of terrorism is the gravest danger which mankind faces

in the twenty-first century," emphasizing, "The situation has worsened during the last two decades when several groups have been found indulging in using terrorism as a means to pursue their self-interests in the international domain"[18]. This broad description provides no background for 9/11, nor are any motivations for the grievances of the perpetrators provided. The use of the phrase "self-interests" suggests the illegitimacy of the actors' motivations.

The focus on terrorism within *Political Science* strongly contrasts with the narrative in *Contemporary World Politics*, which places *no* emphasis on the threat of terrorism. In fact, it does not refer to 9/11 as an act of terrorism, and instead refers to it solely as an "attack," and identifies the perpetrators as "hijackers" rather than terrorists. Rather, *Contemporary World Politics* devotes the majority of its attention to US hegemony. In this way, these two narratives reveal how 9/11 can be conveyed in very different ways to illustrate particular political points. Mumbai, Maharashtra has been the target of a number of violent attacks over the past two decades; as a September 6, 2008 article in the Indian magazine, *Mainstream Weekly*, reported: The growing menace of urban terrorism in Maharashtra started after the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts. Thereafter, a continuous spell of terrorist strikes took place following some interval of time starting from 1997, 1998, 2002, 2003 to 2006. The trend has spread across Maharastra within the last 13 years.[19]

Furthermore, Maharashtra, and Mumbai in particular, is a stronghold of the Hindutva movement. Shiv Sena, a far-right political party that is aligned with the BJP, emerged out of Mumbai in 1966 (then Bombay) and has had significant influence in the city since then. Similar to the United States, Shiv Sena and the BJP have adopted very strong anti-terrorism rhetoric, and the "threat of terrorism" has topped the Maharashtran security agenda for a long time. These political dynamics may account for the emphasis on terrorism in the state-generated text, and why 9/11 is used to stress the rising threat of terrorism. Of the two Indian textbooks reviewed, the Maharashtran text is the most similar to US texts, a fact that can be explained by the aforementioned similarity in political agendas regarding terrorism; both have experienced recent terrorist attacks and both have spent considerable political capital on anti-terrorist measures. As a result, their narratives depict 9/11 as a reflection of the threat of terrorism, and the critical need to respond to it.

Why does the national level text not display the same emphasis? Since displacing the BJP and returning to power at the national level, the Indian National Congress (INC) has made a concerted effort to restore pluralist themes to textbook narratives and to delete the Hindu-right biases that were added during the period BJP-dominant rule. The varied perspectives and numerous prompts for critical thought in the NCERT's *Contemporary World Politics* illustrate this effort, as does its minimization of the perpetrators' identities and motivations. In the discussion of a correspondence with Gail Minault, Professor of Asian Studies at University of Texas at Austin, Rossery articulates the pedagogical approach adopted by national textbook writers appointed by the INC that has guided curriculum formation during period of INC rule since partition in 1947.

It would be impossible to write history from the perspectives of all the hundreds of minority groups in India. [Minault] wrote, in comment to an earlier version of this analysis, "The point is to open up the interpretation to more than one perspective and have a debate with the text — which by its very retelling is a packaging of 'facts'." The construction of knowledge and its reproduction in textbooks and the methods of pedagogy reveal the impact of educational imperatives and pedagogical methods inherited from the colonial model that were transcribed into the form and substance of education in post- independence India.[20] This goal of to "open up the interpretation to more than one perspective" is clearly evident in *Contemporary World Politics*, with its numerous prompts for critical thought and provision of multiple viewpoints. While I was unable to collect additional books from India, my results, which strongly support the idea that narratives vary *dependent on the political priorities of the bodies that produced them*, indicate an opportunity for additional research on textbooks produced by various Indian states.

Today, when sustained success requires global cooperation and transnational alliances, textbooks that foster internationalization rather than divisions are not simply an ideal, but an imperative.

Regional Conclusions, South Asia

Textbooks in India and Pakistan are key tools in the creation and propagation of national identities. The countries of South Asia have the difficult task of constructing new national identities from a long, shared history, and textbooks have become a primary means of constructing such histories for transmittal to the next generation. All textbooks reviewed strongly reflect the political priorities of the bodies that produced them. Through selected emphases and omissions, official narratives are generated that reflect these political priorities. Since government bodies determine the content of both Pakistani and Indian textbooks, these narratives can literally be viewed as official.

One particularly significant aspect of these two sets of textbooks is that while Pakistan's texts focus exclusively on the war in Afghanistan, India's *Contemporary World Politics* devotes a majority of its narrative to the war in Iraq. This difference demonstrates how nations select specific events to emphasize key political issues and ideologies. Pakistan's focus on the Afghanistan war provides a venue to highlight its relationship with the United States and its role in the military and strategic operations of the war. Conversely, India's attention to the Iraq war allows it to underscore the dangerous and reckless nature of the United States' unilateral use of force, and the need for a change in the structure of world politics.

It is instructive to systematically examine the range of ways that these narratives convey and manipulate the same story. In some instances, the facts are unmistakably misrepresented – such as in the exaggeration of a death toll – but more often, the narrative is modified through omission and/or over-emphasis. The selective inclusion and exclusion of specific facts allows countries to craft a narrative that corresponds with and reinforces their foreign and domestic policy aims.

While the substitution of a single word – *incident* for *attack*, *grievous* rather than *horrific* – may not seem significant, the impact on the narrative is substantial. All of the choices made in the creation of a narrative – the space devoted to the event, the phrases, the images, and the sentence constructions– combine to produce a distinct viewpoint and message. Analysis of these individual components and the tone they generate allows for comparison of the messages from distinct narratives, as well as insight into how they can lead to different interpretations of the same events. By choosing to focus on specific aspects of an account, the narrative engenders *selective learning*, creating a distinct dominant narrative, a pattern seen repeatedly throughout this survey.

This form of narrative manipulation is not new; it has been used in curriculum construction to establish and reinforce national identity since the invention of the nation-state.[21] A "stable past" is necessary to "validate tradition, to confirm our own identity, and to make sense of the present"[22]. To create this distinct identity, however, nations have often had to define an out-group – the "them" – in order to establish a cohesive ingroup – the "us." While textbooks have the ability to "convey a global understanding of history and of the rules of society as well as norms of living with other people," a comparison of these narratives reveals that current textbooks are not building bridges, but are rather creating boundaries by emphasizing individual political aims[23]. Today, when sustained success requires global cooperation and transnational alliances, textbooks that foster internationalization rather than divisions are not simply an ideal, but an imperative.

Although texts describe the past, they are "really messages to and about the future," articulating the realm of acceptable knowledge within a society and providing a lens through which the next generation will perceive the world[24]. Consequently, the findings of this analysis should be considered carefully for insights they provide regarding their policy implications for the United States.

Firstly, they can serve as indicators of dominant attitudes toward the US internationally. This analysis has indicated how narratives reflect political beliefs, and therefore should be a call for additional studies of this kind, incorporating a larger sample of countries. Second, textbooks can and should be used to foster understanding. The negative depiction of US bravado and unilateralism in textbook after textbook should serve as a warning to the US, illustrating the need for increased communication and exchange of ideas. Increased efforts to develop international textbooks, with narratives formulated by multiple countries, would be one way to achieve this goal. Such narratives would incorporate multiple perspectives, providing students with the opportunity to synthesize various interpretations and reach their own conclusions. The establishment of historiography courses would assist in this process, helping students learn how to question and analyze the formation of and motivations behind narratives.

Teaching students to think critically and to read between the lines, thereby empowering them to view events from multiple perspectives, is central to fostering the "global understanding of history" articulated above[25]. Cross-national textbooks and curricula represent important tools of diplomacy that have been significantly underexplored. It is my hope that this and future similar studies will help to reveal the ways that textbook narratives are currently shaped, to encourage the reevaluation of these methods, and to promote a transformation in the way we teach and view the role of history.

Notes

[1] Orwell, George. 1984. New York: Signet Classic, 1949. 37.

[2] Ibid 213

[3] Apple, Michael W., and Linda K. Christian-Smith. The Politics of the Textbook. New York: Routledge, 1991.

[4] Barnard, Christopher. Language, ideology and Japanese history textbooks. New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003. 20.

[5] Apple and Christian-Smith ibid.

[6] Tagore, Rathindranath. A Tagore Reader. New York: Beacon Paperback, 1971.

[7] Rossery, Yvette "Curriculum as Destiny: Forging National Identity in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh." PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2003. 3.

[8] Barnard Ibid

[9] Apple and Christian-Smith ibid.

[10] Ibid

[11] Aziz, K.K. The Murder of History in Pakistan. Lahore: Vanguard, 1993.

[12] World Data on Education. Geneva: International Bureau of Education (IBE) of UNESCO, 2007

[13] Ibid

[14] Rossery Ibid. 9.

[15] Ibid. 272.

[16] Jain, Ashok V. Political Science: Higher Secondary Std. XII. Pune: Neelkanth Books, 2008. ii.

[17] Ibid 225.

[18] Ibid

[19] Sahay, Ashok Kumar and Kshirod Chandra Patra. "Urban Terrorism on Maharastra." Mainstream Weekly XLVI, no. 38 (September 10, 2008), http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article910.html.

[20] Rossery Ibid

[21] Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London and New York: Verso, 1991.

[22] Lowenthal, David. The Past is a Foreign Country. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

[23] Schissler, Hanna "Limitations and Priorities for 'International Social Studies Textbook Research." International Journal of Social Education 4 (1989-1990): 81-89.

[24] Apple and Christian-Smith Ibid

[25] Schissler Ibid.

MOVING TOWARD PEACE IN NEPAL: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

INTERVIEW WITH
IAN MARTIN

CODY VALDES
JOSHUA GROSS

Interview with Ian Martin, former Special Representative to the Secretary General for the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN).

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Ian Martin is Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Nepal for Support to the Peace Process. He was previously Representative in Nepal of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, May 2005-August 2006. He has worked for the United Nations in several other capacities, including as Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Timor-Leste (2006), Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the East Timor Popular Consultation (1999), Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (2000-01), Special Adviser to the High Commissioner for Human Rights (1998), Chief of the UN Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (1995-96), and Director for Human Rights of the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (1993 and 1994-95). He also served in the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina as Deputy High Representative for Human Rights (1998-99). He was Secretary General of Amnesty International (1986-92) and Vice President of the International Center for Transitional Justice (2002-05). His writings include *Self-Determination in East Timor: the United Nations, the Ballot, and International Intervention*. Ian Martin is a recipient of the Institute for Global Leadership's Dr. Jean Mayer Global Citizenship Award and was a participant in the 2010 Norris and Margery Benedetson EPIIC Symposium on "South Asia: Conflict, Culture, Complexity and Change."

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Cody Valdes is a student, writer, and social entrepreneur from Vancouver, Canada. As an Institute for Global Leadership EMPOWER Fellow and Synaptic Scholar at Tufts University, he has conducted research internationally in over half a dozen countries, recently publishing work on the intersection of foreign aid, elite oligarchies, and mass poverty in the Philippines and the impact of the Olympic Games on impoverished urban communities in Vancouver. He has co-founded social initiatives currently underway in Rwanda, Kenya, and the Israeli-Gaza border. Most recently, he was co-founder of Sisi ni Amani, a project that is developing SMS-based conflict response mechanisms in violence-prone communities in Kenya in preparation for its 2012 elections. He has been invited to speak at and participate in conferences by Engineers Without Borders International, the Human Freedom Forum, the World Bank, and the Clinton Global Initiative University in Cyprus, Norway, South Africa, and within the continental United States, and participated on planning committees for the Institute for Global Leadership's 2009 International Symposium on Global Cities and 2010 International Symposium on South Asia. As an Institute Synaptic Scholar, he is presently completing his undergraduate degree in Political Science and International Relations, where his primary interests include next-generation technologies, the affairs of nations, elite state-capture, the cognitive sciences, and social philosophy.

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What are the issues that have driven the conflict between the Maoists and the Royalists in Nepal over the past ten years?

I think Nepal has to be seen as a country that emerged very late from isolation. Until 1950 it was virtually closed to the outside world. Nepal was a feudal kingdom run by heredi-

One of the big unanswered questions is whether the Maoists have made a real lasting strategic choice to operate within a multi-party framework or whether that is a tactical stage on the way to revolution.

tary Prime Ministers who excluded the majority of the population from education. As a result, socio-economic development and democratic evolution began extremely late in the country. It went through a democracy movement in 1990 that led to the resumption of parliamentary democracy – really it was the first time there was parliamentary democracy. The political parties, however, were immature; their experience in office was one of political instability. During that period, the Maoists, some of whom had been elected to the parliament after the democracy movement, first posed their demands and then launched an insurgency. Initially, nobody took them terribly seriously, but in time the Maoists dominated many rural parts of Nepal. I think that the insurgency had its roots in the marginalization of major groups of the population of Nepal. Nepal was always dominated by a caste elite that represented only a small minority of the population, and all other groups were almost wholly excluded from political power, as well as from any representation in the bureaucracy or the army. It's not easy to understand exactly why the form that the revolt took was a Maoist ideological form, but it's not too hard to understand what the roots of that insurgency were.

You came to Nepal in 2005; how has your perception of the conflict evolved in the last five years?

I originally went to Nepal because the UN deployed a human rights mission, and I was chosen to establish and lead it. So I arrived not in a political mediation role, but initially to try to mitigate the human rights consequences of the armed conflict. Also, King Gyanendra had taken absolute power and democratic rights were being severely restricted. Fortunately, the mandate of our human rights office included engaging with non-state actors as well as with the government, so the government couldn't and wouldn't object to our contact with the Maoist leadership. That was when I began to hear their perspective from them. I sought to apply pressure on them to at least conduct their conflict with respect for international humanitarian law. Even to this day, it's still not easy to understand the internal dynamics of the Maoists completely, although by now I and my UN colleagues know them very well. We know not only their senior leadership but are interacting with them at the local level and of course with their military commanders, because of our role in monitoring the Maoists cantonments. One of the big unanswered questions is whether the Maoists have made a real lasting strategic choice to operate within a multi-party framework or whether that is a tactical stage on the way to revolution. That's a question yet to be answered.

The new Nepali constitution was due in May 2010. What were some of the major obstacles to the resolution of the process envisioned by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement? How has the presence of the UNMIN influenced these obstacles? Which parties have been most harmful to the peace building process?

The first thing to say is that reaching a sufficient consensus on this new constitution is an extraordinarily difficult challenge. There are disagreements amongst the parties over the very basic forms of government that they want. The Maoists want an elected executive president; the Ne-

pali Congress party wants a parliamentary form of government with a Prime Minister and a ceremonial President. Those issues perhaps can and will be resolved, but the most fundamental issue is federalism. The parties committed themselves, in the interim constitution, to making the new constitution a federal constitution, but there was no real agreement as to what that would mean. Now ethnic groups are jockeying to take more control over the government of their own regions. But Nepal is so diverse that it doesn't easily divide up into ethnic provinces, and there is great potential for conflict amongst ethnic groups. The extent of future conflict will depend on how the boundaries of provinces of the new federation will be drawn. There is also a backlash from the caste groups that traditionally maintain control in Katmandu and now feel threatened, so that's a very difficult and divisive issue.

The constituent assembly is a very unwieldy body to attempt to address that. It's a 601-member body. Due to the many political crises in Nepal, there hasn't been a great deal of debate or focus on the constitution. During this peace process, agreements are generally reached between a very small group of political leaders, all of them men, and all of them from the higher castes, including the Maoist leadership. However, that system is not really good enough for agreeing on a new constitution. They've had some public consultation, but the time for the last stage of public consultation has now been drastically cut down because they're behind schedule. So the constitution making process is in trouble and there's a debate about whether they can give themselves more time. The interim constitution says they can take another six months if there's a state of emergency, and some people who would really like to see a state of emergency say that if there's no constitution there has to be a state of emergency. In fact they've amended the interim constitution to change a number of deadlines and they could again change the deadline for the constitution. But it's a very difficult process they've committed themselves to. It is not just divisive amongst the political parties, it is divisive amongst different ethnic groups as well.

Are there other factors to the reconciliation that are being overlooked, that are equally important as getting the structural framework of the new government back to the people?

The biggest unresolved issue of the conflict is the future of those who fought the conflict, the two armies. There were very different perceptions on the two sides of the conflict. The Maoist view was that there were two armies and that for a new Nepal, a new army should be formed out of elements of each of those two armies on an equal basis. The Nepal Army's view, and also that of India and of the parliamentary parties, was that the Nepal Army was the only legitimate state army — perhaps a small number of Maoist fighters might be absorbed into it, but institutionally it would not be a fundamentally different institution. This major issue was fudged in the negotiation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It kicked the issue on the head by defining a process whereby it would be negotiated later on, and they're still far apart on that issue. It is also linked to the constitution, because the other political parties are saying that the constitution shouldn't be adopted until the Maoist army has been integrated or disbanded and rehabilitated. Whereas the Maoists are saying that they will only complete the process of integration and rehabilitation of their army once they know that a constitution is being satisfactorily adopted. So there's a linkage there as well. That along with the constitution is the other biggest issue that is being faced. Beyond federalism, there is the whole question of socio-economic transformation. The reason that the Maoists emerged as the largest party is not because the people who voted for them are ideologically Maoist, but because they wanted change and saw the Maoists as the only party that offered that. The most successful Maoist slogan in the election was, "You've seen the others, now give us a chance." The armed conflict itself obviously impeded economic development. There's been no peace dividend yet as a result of the end of the armed conflict, and the biggest question really is when real socio-economic development is going to take off in Nepal.

The reason that the Maoists emerged as the largest party is not because the people who voted for them are ideologically Maoist, but because they wanted change and saw the Maoists as the only party that offered that. The most successful Maoist slogan in the election was, "You've seen the others, now give us a chance."

What incentives and disincentives was UNMIN able to use to encourage the Maoists, the military, and the political parties towards some sort of political consensus?

First, we should be clear that the peace process was not an internationally mediated or facilitated process in general terms; the process was conducted by the political parties themselves. In a way it was King Gyanendra—by refusing to negotiate himself with the political parties or the Maoists—who drove them into each other's arms. However, international encouragement was very important – the fact that India was so fed up with King Gyanendra that it was prepared to encourage that negotiation and allow the final negotiation to take place in Delhi was important.

UN encouragement was important as well. The UN was the only realistic candidate to play the role of observing the two armies. Everybody wanted a significant international presence during the constituent assembly election to try to improve its fairness. So the Nepalis were open to a UN role in implementation. Even before the end of the armed conflict, when I was Representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, I found that we really did have considerable leverage with both sides. One of the reasons that we had leverage with the then Royal Nepalese Army was that they are one of the oldest peacekeeping armies, and one where the highest percentage of the officers had taken part in UN peacekeeping operations. They weren't particularly happy that Nepal became a client of UN peace support when they were used to supporting peace abroad. But nonetheless, they valued their reputation with the UN and that meant that they were sensitive to UN criticism of their human rights violations. The Maoists at that stage were at a point where they had made their own analysis and decided that they wanted to enter a peace process. They wanted international respectability and so they were quite responsive to UN criticism of their conduct from the beginning. Nepal is a very pro-UN country because it's a small country with giant neighbors. It values its membership of the United Nations as a separate sovereign member state, as a symbol of its sovereignty. For whatever reason, it's a country where the UN does have a good reputation and therefore considerable leverage.

Nepal's political dynamics changed in the aftermath of the elections. Do the same diplomatic tools still work? Are they in need of some sort of adjustment?

The situation has become much more difficult for the UN, because until the election – despite the tensions and difficulties between the political parties – there was a fundamental consensus and agreement that the Maoists and the parliamentary parties were cooperating. They didn't have a proper implementation mechanism, but they were in a seven-party alliance which – at least at key moments of danger to the process – came together and talked issues through. That consensus broke down as a result of the election, with the decision of the Nepali Congress that they would not join a Maoist-led government. The decision was very much influenced by the fact that the Maoists did not accept the President of the Nepali Congress as the candidate for first President of the new republic. Now that the parties have become more partisan in their attacks on each other, the degree of consensus around the peace process has broken down. For the UN, it becomes harder and harder to be an objective arbitrator, and the UN becomes much more vulnerable to criticism from one side or the

other. They're accusing it of being too sympathetic to one side and not hard enough on the other — and the UN has had that criticism. It's had it particularly not from the Maoists, but from the non-Maoist side. I think that's because the UN's responsibility is to remind everybody of the peace agreement. The UN role is there on the basis of the peace agreement, and although there are many ways the Maoists themselves have not acted fully in accord with the letter and the spirit of the peace agreement, it is in some respects the non-Maoist side that has challenged some of the fundamentals of the peace process, particularly the commitment to integrate at least some of the Maoist army into the Nepal Army, as well as the commitment to socioeconomic change.

The other issue that is difficult for the UN is that is that its clearest and most visible role is the monitoring of arms and armies. This was intended to be a short-term measure that was just supposed to happen for six months or so, until elections were held and the issue of the armies was resolved. It's now gone on for over three years and in fact, both armies have been extraordinarily disciplined. You would be hard pressed to find any other international examples where armies have remained apart under that degree of discipline for so long. But there are some respects in which the armies are restless.

The UN operation – by request of the parties – was a very light monitoring operation, it wasn't an enforcement operation, but the political parties now tend to blame the UN for things that, in my opinion, are their own fault, especially their failure to address the real issues of the future of the armies. When there is some breach of the agreement, then UNMIN is criticized for not being a totally effective monitor. In this respect, the UN role has become much more difficult.

What do you think were UNMIN's greatest strength and greatest weakness – do you feel that the limited mandate was advantageous or, now with hindsight, was it a disadvantage? Do you feel that the UN would have been more effective playing a more formalized role as a mediator in the conflict?

I don't think that there was any way that the UN could have said, "Yes we're willing to help, but we'll only help if you give us a larger role." Although India saw the need for the UN in arms monitoring and wanted the UN to support the election, India was not at all anxious to see third party involvement of any kind in the peace process. Nepal is in India's neighborhood and it influences the Nepali actors very strongly in that way. So,

Although India saw the need for the UN in arms monitoring and wanted the UN to support the election, India was not at all anxious to see third party involvement of any kind in the peace process.

though I do think it would have been good for the peace process if the UN had had a stronger role, I don't think the UN itself could have achieved that. That is not to say that I think it would have been better if the UN had been a central mediator of the entire process. I do think that it was one of the strong points of the process that is was a Nepali-owned, but I think greater UN support to implementation of commitments that the parties had negotiated themselves would have benefited the process and would have avoided some of the charges and counter charges that have jeopardized the process. To take one very obvious example, the UN is sometimes criticized from within the Nepali Congress for not having criticized the Maoists more strongly for not returning property. Actually we have consistently reported the fact that they've failed to return property but you don't just wave a wand at the end of an armed conflict to see property returned, especially if other people have been settled on it and the title of the property may have been disputed in the first place. It is a very complicated situation. We kept saying that the UN would have always been willing to assist with a kind of mechanism to negotiate the return of property over time. That's the kind of issue where the process would have benefited if the Nepalis had asked us to support the implementation of the peace process.

Would you say that your experience in Nepal holds lessons for other insurgencies in South Asia: the Indian Naxalites, the Balochis in Pakistan, the LTTE in Sri Lanka, or the Taliban in Afghanistan? In your experience is political reconciliation the endgame for all insurgencies? Would you be able to draw linkages between the insurgencies that are in the region?

Well, I don't believe that reconciliation is always possible. I think a different leadership of Tamils in Sri Lanka could have secured a peace agreement that would have been much more in the interests of the Tamil population than the outcome of the conflict. The failure of Sri Lanka's peace process can be attributed to both sides – not just the intransigence of the LTTE but also the way in which over the years, it had eliminated moderate Tamil voices and turned itself into a highly undemocratic force. So you can't say that it's always possible to reach agreement and reconciliation with any insurgency, it depends on the wisdom of the insurgency as well as on the state party. I think Nepal is a positive example in both the willingness of the Maoists to change strategy and reflect upon failures, and of the fact that their armed struggle would not eventually succeed. It is also a positive example of the wisdom of some political parties who saw that political reconciliation was in the interest of the country as a whole.

Can an insurgency be considered to be "finished" without a peace process?

An insurgency may be defeated, but that doesn't mean that the conflict has ended. I think it still remains to be seen in Sri Lanka how far there's a political leadership that is willing to address some of the original causes of conflict in Sri Lanka. And equally I hope Nepal is not going to slip back into armed conflict, and I certainly don't think it's going to slip back into the same kind of armed conflict as has happened over ten years with the

I think the continued labeling of the Maoists as a terrorist organization, even after they had entered the peace process, entered an interim government, participated in an election and emerged as the largest party, is really counter-productive.

Maoist insurgency. But the conflicts from which that insurgency emerged, the social conflicts in Nepal, are very sharp and unresolved. It goes back to the question of whether they can be contained in a federal constitution that commands a certain degree of consensus and whether one can ensure that conflicts don't take other violent forms in future. So it's not just a question of "Do the Maoists go back to war?" It's a question of "Do the fundamental social conflicts take violent form in the future?" It's going to take a great deal of skill and political leadership on the part of the Nepalis to avoid that completely, because there are real risks of ethnic conflicts turning violent in Nepal.

You mention that UN representatives have formed relationships with the Maoist leadership over the last few years, and that these relationships have been helpful. How have these relationships enabled the UN to play a constructive role in the wider process? On the other side of that coin, how did the U.S.'s decision to label the Maoists a terrorist group influence the process?

If you have a violent insurgency that is committing human rights abuses, you want to firstly persuade it to end those abuses and respect the principles of humanitarian law, even if it's going to go on fighting. Ultimately, you want to persuade it to enter a peaceful democratic path. Now, engagement is an important way of doing that and in the case of Nepal, the Maoists were open to that engagement. When I arrived in Nepal as Representative of High Commissioner of Human Rights, I established contact with the Maoist leadership. They were eager to meet and talk. I began systematically sharing information that we had of abuses committed by their cadres. This dialogue progressed into a political one once my responsibilities broadened. In fact, even before I became the political representative of the UN, the colleague who was the political representative of the UN was in communication with the Maoist leadership, from 2003 onwards. I think if you can move that relationship in the right way, you can possibly have an influence on the thinking of the leadership of an insurgent movement.

Again, this is not always the case. I've talked about human rights with the leadership of the LTTE as a human rights advisor for the Sri Lanka peace process. I don't think there was anything like the same responsiveness there as there was on the part of Nepal's Maoist leadership. Even if you get to the point where a leadership is convinced that they want their movement to transform itself, it's not an easy task. When one criticizes the Maoists now for abuses that their cadres commit, they say – "Well you know, it's not easy, we told these people for ten years that the right course was armed conflict, now we're telling them that the right course is the peaceful path — it's going to take time" – okay, there's some truth in that. But again, the engagement of internationals at different levels can be helpful, and the UN in Nepal has engaged with the Maoists more than any other actors had the opportunity to, particularly because of our monitoring role of the Maoist army. Now if you say this is a terrorist organization, and we therefore can't deal with it and dealing with it is illegal, you deny yourself the opportunity for that engagement. I'm a human rights person, I don't say this to excuse any acts of terror — that's not my language. My language would be violations of international humanitarian human rights law. And the Maoists committed appalling acts of terror. But if you want to see a movement like that

transform itself, then engagement is a big part of it, and I think the U.S. has denied itself of some of the opportunities in Nepal, not just of the U.S. government directly, but even U.S.-funded organizations. For example, during the constituent assembly election, NDI [National Democratic Institute], which was doing civic education for political parties, could not extend that to the Maoists. The Maoists probably needed that more than any of the groups – they are the ones that most need to be exposed to principles of general democratic practice. I think the continued labeling of the Maoists as a terrorist organization, even after they had entered the peace process, entered an interim government, participated in an election and emerged as the largest party, is really counter-productive.

Would you say that the terrorist label allows the U.S. to play "bad cop" to the UN's "good cop"? Advocates of the terrorist label argue that the U.S. holds a certain standard up to which the Maoists still need to aspire, through disarmament and through various commitments to non-violence.

I don't want to confuse criticizing maintaining the terrorist label with being soft on the Maoists in terms of maximum pressure against those kinds of abuses. Of course I'm in favor of the U.S. or anybody else using leverage with the Maoists to improve their conduct, get the Young Communist League under control, take action against officers in their ranks who have committed violations and so on. But it's hard to imagine the terrorist label being applied in the same situation if it occurred today. If you had a movement in another place, with violence at the same level as that of Nepal's Maoists, you would quite rightly criticize them and apply leverage to stop their bad behavior, but the group would hardly reach the threshold of deserving the "terrorist organization" label. Instead, you would say it is a political party that's carrying out continued acts of violence and extortion. There's a difference. If the situation can be looked at as one of Nepal alone, then there would probably not be any strong argument for maintaining the label. I think the problem is that the terrorist label is part of a much more generalized U.S. policy, so in the interest of consistency, certain steps have to be followed – when and how you take people off particular lists. However, not all that many groups have been taken off lists – it's easier to get on them.

You think it's just a matter of time?

It's not a discussion that I'm close to, but I closely followed the recent visit of the Assistant Secretary of State to Katmandu, which has been the most recent high level discussion of the issue. I think it's fairly clear that the U.S. wants to move towards lifting the terrorist label, but indeed still wants more from the Maoists in achieving that.

What is the trade off between justice and peace in Nepal? How do Nepali citizens pursue reconciliation in the shadow of human rights violations?

While most of the right things were said during the peace process and written into the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and other agreements, I don't think one can attribute sincerity to them, because almost nothing has happened to implement them. From the very first ceasefire agreement there was a commitment to investigate disappearances, and the commitment has been made over and over and over again, and still as of today, there has been no serious investigation into disappearances. It would certainly be uncomfortable for firstly the Nepal Army, because they are responsible for the largest number of disappearances; to some extent for the leadership of the parliamentary parties who were in office at the time when those disappearances occurred; and for the Maoists who were responsible for a lesser number of disappearances but nonetheless also have responsibility. It would be uncomfortable, but I don't believe it would jeopardize the peace process. The lack of action is inexcusable, not only investigations of disappearances but the lack of any prosecution, even in the most visible cases. In many cases where the responsibility is extremely clear, few of the perpetrators have been brought into court; the political parties and the Army protect people from court proceedings rather than supporting prosecution. This even occurs in high-profile international cases, like that of Maina Sunuwar, a 15-year-old girl who was disappeared by the Nepal Army.

I have a slightly different view in relation to a truth commission. As far as investigating disappearances is concerned, there is an obligation to the families who've lost loved ones. The truth commission serves a much broader purpose, and I don't believe that the political conditions for a truth commission for the purpose of reconciliation currently exist in Nepal. Nepal would be better advised to set up a truth commission once the new constitution is adopted, another round of elections has been held, and the situation has stabilized further, rather than in the high-conflict situation that exists now. If it occurred today, I think the victims would still have very reasonable fears about testifying to a truth commission, for fear of reprisals from the Army or the Maoists.

Is there any way for the international community to marshal resources to erode this culture of impunity in Nepal?

The international community has tried to exert pressure, perhaps the most significant now are the conditions attached to assistance to the Nepal Army by the U.S. Congress. But so far, despite all the pressure, it hasn't resulted in the cooperation that ought to take place.

In this issue of *Discourse* we are looking at how social structures and human networks are affected by revolution; social capital for instance. Could you comment on how society and human interaction has been affected by not only the ten-year insurgency, but also by the peace process?

Nepal is a country going through an extraordinary social revolution and going through it at a speed that very few societies have had to do, precisely because it was frozen for so long in feudalism. One of the consequences of that is you have kids in Kathmandu who are on the internet and cell phones, as globalized as anybody, and you have people in the villages who are still operating in a way that you can really only call feudal. Now, the Maoist insurgency I think had a big effect on social relations. It very obviously did in relation to gender. Maoists went out to recruit young women to their army as cadres. That's not the ideal form of women's liberation, but it certainly had an impact on gender relations in Nepal. They recruited Dalits from the very bottom of the caste system. It's not only the Maoist insurgency, a lot of other things have been happening at the same time, including work by many excellent peaceful NGOs and civil society organizations, so one must be careful not to credit the Maoist insurgency with all social change. But nonetheless it's been a significant factor for social change. And in that respect, the genie is out of the bottle, that can't be turned back. The composition of the constituent assembly really is revolutionary. We watched the first session of the constituent assembly and saw these younger people with faces that reflected the different ethnicities of Nepal. However, such an extraordinary social revolution is extremely hard to manage, especially in trying to reach consensus on federalism and a future governance arrangement. So whether it's a Maoist revolution or not in Nepal, it's certainly a social revolution.

DO REVOLUTIONS DESTROY OR GENERATE SOCIAL CAPITAL?

CHLOÉ ROUSSEAU

Chloé Rousseau was born in Paris, moved to the United States at age six, and now lives in North Carolina. At Tufts, Chloé is majoring in Community Health and Spanish. During her time at Tufts, Chloé has been very involved with the student-led BUILD Guatemala program. Chloé is interested in global health and policy, including studying practical solutions to health problems in the developing world, and is considering a possible career in law and health policy. Last spring, while studying abroad in Madrid, Spain, Chloé began studying the works of Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss as part of her research internship with the International Resilience Program under Professor Astier Almedom's guidance. She is currently interning with the Harvard "Family Van", a mobile health clinic that provides free screenings, counseling and health education to under-served communities in the Boston area. The IRP is a program of the Institute for Global Leadership and Dr. Almedom is an Institute Fellow.

Introduction

Conflict and turmoil produce mental distress and disruption, often upsetting relationships and changing social structures. Internal conflicts make up more than 90 percent of the world's modern conflicts[1], and revolution has been a common and brutal source of turmoil, especially in developing nations, setting them into a dangerous cycle of building and destroying.

Emile Durkheim defined anomie as a lack of clear societal or moral norms and his influence is seen in many works that seek to examine the role of revolution on social capital (SK) and mental health, emphasizing the disturbing and negative effects of a tumultuous upset on the individual. As a result, however, until recently very little attention has been paid to the possible positive outcomes of such conflicts. This essay does not assert that conflict or violent change is beneficial or positive. War and conflict, though catalysts for change, are based on largely indiscriminate destruction and result in death, suffering, fear and loss. However, if conflict is an inevitable part of human nature and interaction, it is imperative that we begin to look at what positive effects can be generated by conflict, especially to execute post-war efforts in a more effective manner. This can be especially helpful in the cases of revolution and insurgency, where internal dissatisfaction has led to violent change, and focusing on returning to "pre-conflict" society may not only be difficult but also undesirable.

With the emergence of the study of resilience, post-conflict analysis has shifted to include a salutogenic interpretation – one based on healing, recovery and response – of human response. Looking at resilience as an individual and community attribute, and at social capital as an important factor in resilience, we must begin to ask whether and how social capital is generated and strengthened by revolution. War and conflict are inevitable, so we must learn to build out of conflict, looking forward rather than returning to a stagnant, generic, or even fabricated "ideal."

Dr. Astier Almedom's diagram of the "Adaptive Cycle" [Figure 1] provides a framework for understanding the constant dissolution and regeneration of societies and their structures. The model highlights the cyclic and dynamic nature of all "living" and evolving systems. Just as governments and established social orders grow out of political, economic and social climates, they just as easily dissolve with changing circumstances, only to re-emerge in new and better-adapted forms. For this reason, the generation and destruction of government can be seen as a "dynamic steady-state," based along a continuum of death and rebirth. In this light, we can begin to contextualize the tragedy of conflict and violence within the very natural and inevitable cycle of societal systems, as dynamic entities.

This paper seeks to examine the possibility that revolution may in fact be a generative as well as destructive force, through the following guiding questions: Rather than viewing conflict as a purely destructive force, is there any type of social capital that is actually generated by or during conflict, specifically revolution? What aspects of revolution build social capital? Finally, what implication does this hold for development efforts in post-revolutionary societies?



FIGURE 1
DR. ASTIER ALMEDOM'S "ADAPTIVE CYCLE"[2]

I. Social Capital is a crucial part of building and sustaining revolutionary movements.

Social Capital (SK) provides channels of communication and exchange, through which movements are organized and carried out and also serves as a source of motivation and inspiration, pushing revolutionary efforts forward. According to Fuhrmann (2006), during the Tulip Revolution of Kyrgyzstan in 2005 – when the populace ousted the authoritarian government of Askar Alyev – SK was not merely a primary, but an *essential* factor in the organization and success of the revolution. Furhmann makes an interesting distinction between "Imported" and "Indigenous" social capital, claiming that both were vital to the movement. "Imported" SK, he argues, consists of NGOs and other formal organizations of a "western" nature. These organizations succeeded in spreading western democratic ideals, providing information on current events and encouraging public discourse of these happenings, coordinating factions, and explaining the examples of other countries that had undergone revolutions, such as Georgia and the Ukraine. "Indigenous" SK played a role in fostering social trust, which lead to collective action. It also provided a forum for discourse, led citizens to expect more from their government, allowed information to spread more easily, unified competing factions and motivated citizens to participate out of a sense of social obligation.[3]

This idea of "duty" as a product of SK and a motivating factor for revolution can be seen in other examples, such as the American Civil War. Costa and Kahn (2009) describe the appalling conditions of soldiers, attributing low desertion rates in these conditions to the high presence of SK and the sense of group loyalty. In fact, the more homogeneous the

battle groups, the more loyal the soldiers and the less likely they were to desert.[4] Greene (1999) also discusses the phenomenon of SK itself as a motive for the American Revolution, as men fought to preserve the blossoming social capital of their infant society.[5]

In general, Furhmann argues that SK in Kyrgyzstan was essential to the revolution in that it lowered the transaction costs by coordinating between the north and the south, cultivated civic skills, unified the voices of divergent groups and established a sense of communal identity, fostering trust in "people power" and the "we" instead of the "I."[6]

II. The presence of social capital in a society is a determining factor of violence levels in revolutionary action.

A study from Nepal, conducted by Alok, Mitchell and Nepal (2006), describes the impact of higher SK and levels of democracy on violence. In short, "the higher the amount of social capital, the lower the level of government and insurgent violence."[7] Thus, violence on *both* sides seems to be tempered by a higher level of SK. Lower levels of insurgent violence were attributed to the fact that insurgents are less likely to be active in areas with high levels of political participation. Likewise, lower levels of counterinsurgent violence were attributed to the fact that higher SK leads to social cooperation in restraining officials from abuse of power and maintaining respect for the rule of law.[8]

In Kyrgyzstan, high levels of both "indigenous" and "imported" social capital resulted in an extremely peaceful revolution. This sense of community, argues Fuhrmann, steered revolutionaries away from violent outbursts to more peaceful demonstrations, as individuals acting with a sense of social duty were less likely to act in ways detrimental to society.[9]

III. The presence of Social Capital is also an important factor in community resilience to the stressors of conflict and instability.

Kawachi and Berkman's (2001) explanation of the two models for SK in relation to mental health include the main-effect model, where the presence of SK directly benefits mental health, and the buffering-effect model, where an individual's relationships and support systems lessen the detrimental effects of stressors.[10] Several studies show the buffering effects of SK on people experiencing the effects of revolution. Roe's (1992) study of displaced Palestinian women showed that these women saw events as less stressful when they were perceived as collective experiences.[11] Similarly, Gervais and Denov's (2007) study examining girls' resilience in the Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front concluded that young girls found comfort in their bonds with other girls. These relationships were, "instrumental to their psychological and emotional well-being during armed conflict"[12] according to Gervais and Denov, Pederson et al. (2008) also found similar results in their study in the Peruvian highlands, as the correlation between exposure to violence and the experience of trauma-related symptoms depended, in large part, on the nature of social support networks.[13]

IV. Revolution is characterized by destruction.

As revolution leads to instability and insecurity, social capital is eroded. According to Goodhand et al. (2000), insecure environments foment this erosion because people feeling insecure will be less willing to invest in their future, be it politically, economically, mentally or emotionally.[14] Weede and Muller (2009), in their paper about revolution, begin their definition of this concept with, "Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society's state..."[15] The idea of *transformation* is essential when examining the role of destruction in revolutionary movements. Though revolution generally leads to a waste of life, reduction in productivity and destruction of social capital,[16] it must be noted that, referring back to Almedom's adaptive cycle, destruction is an inevitable precursor to regeneration and an inevitable part of transformation and revolutionary change.

Revolution, in transforming, can also generate SK. According to Diani's report (1997), social movements such as revolution are not only dependent upon SK to grow and thrive, they also reproduce SK and, often, create new forms of it.[17] Returning to the adaptive cycle, we can see a very cyclic pat-



FIGURE 2
ADAPTIVE CYCLE OF SK AND REVOLUTION
(ADAPTED FROM DR.ALMEDOM'S ADAPTIVE CYCLE)

tern in which SK arises from a new social order, leading to a climate conducive to collective action and social change. With this change comes the concomitant disruption of social order and norms, breaking down SK and resulting in the establishment of new social structures, which, in turn, feed into a new social order.

A study was conducted by Booth and Richard (2006) on the lasting impacts of the Nicaraguan revolution on participation and civil society engagement. Their findings state that revolution leads to higher civil society engagement, more communal organizations and unions, and, consequently, elevated electoral engagement.[18] Combining these findings with Furhmann's observations in Kyrgyzstan, we can construct a model in which SK feeds into *and* is generated along each step of Booth and Richard's proposed progression. Another important factor in the relationship between revolution and social capital is the presence of a motivating goal or ideology. These ideologies must grow out of an enabling climate of SK (a certain set of social norms conducive to the adoption of this view) but can also be a regenerating source of SK.[19]

Apart from fostering the growth of SK through the mobilization of collective resources, SK is also generated from the vulnerable state of disrupted social norms. Roe's study in Palestine found that although conflict overturns and destroys social norms, doing so provides the necessity for people, especially those who are displaced, to assume new roles and establish new norms. This proved especially significant for displaced women, who



FIGURE 3
THE EFFECTS OF REVOLUTION ON GENERATING
SK AND VICE VERSA (DIAGRAM ADAPTED FROM
MODEL PROPOSED BY BOOTH AND RICHARD, 2006)

were assigned much more active community roles. This obviously has its own implications for the empowerment of women, but also provides a valuable basis for the generation of new SK as new communities are established based on new norms, often leading to collective action. This collective action is not only often a response to perceived injustice, but can also be, in itself, another source of social capital. Overall, displaced women forced to rebuild and establish new communities found new solidarity in collective action.[20]

Social Capital is also both employed and generated during periods of stress and insecurity as a coping mechanism. As seen above with the idea of "stress-buffering," relationships and social networks are important when investigating SK as a source of resilience in revolution. In this way, SK affects the way in which individuals and communities are *affected* by revolution. SK is also, however, *generated* by groups as a natural response. Girls in the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone could not rely solely on pre-existing SK as a source of comfort (though they did often seek out girls from the same or neighboring villages). For the most part, girls formed new bonds and networks as a strategy for coping with the violence, abuse and insecurity of revolution.[21] Goodhand et al. describe this 'defense mechanism' in the context of bonding and bridging social capital, as times of insecurity cause people to turn towards homogeneous institutions such as religious groups, family and caste, resulting in deepened bonding social capital, sometimes at the expense of bridging social capital.[22]

Both "bonding" and "bridging" social capital are essential to the growth and progression of movements, as well as community resilience to the effects of war. As defined by Robert Putnam in Simon Szreter and Michael Woolcock's paper "Health by association? Social capital, social theory, and the political economy of public health," "bonding" social capital refers to trusting and cooperative relations between members of a network who perceive themselves as similar in terms of shared social identity. In contrast, "bridging" social capital refers to relations of respect and mutuality between people who know they are not alike in some way relating

A predominant focus on returning to "pre-conflict" ideals is often neither practical nor desirable, as this is essentially a loop back to the same circumstances that spur these movements.

to social identity.[23] It is important to recognize, in dividing, labeling and analyzing these types of SK in a revolutionary context, that both types are essential and dynamic, depending on the stage, nature and location of the movement. Furhmann's descriptions of Kyrgyzstan's "Tulip Revolution" provides clear examples of the successes of 'bridging' SK between the north and the south, mobilizing resources, information and man-power. This revolution was also an extremely peaceful one.[24] Looking at Goodhand et al.'s example from Sri Lanka, however, provides valuable insight into the dynamics and interactions between bonding and bridging. Bonding social capital, claim Goodhand et al., is generated by revolution, at the expense of bridging social capital. This is especially true in the case of small, tight-knit and united insurgent groups, especially when these consist mostly of individuals from one caste or religious affiliation. Goodhand et al. employ the term "anti-social" capital to describe these, whereby strong bonding within a group creates a hatred of those not associated with the bonded group. Thus, bonding SK is generated at the expense of bridging SK. This is more pronounced where a specific, identified enemy is established, and may break down in the absence of such an opposing force.

According to Diani's theories on mobilization, movements with the greatest impact are those that have the highest levels of bonding SK generated during conflict, when measured immediately after a wave of collective action. Similarly, the most successful movements are those which manage to form bridging SK not only with other active groups, elite circles and political leaders, but also with members of influential social circles, such as mass media.[25] Bonding serves to solidify and unite collective action by mobilizing resources and facilitating the spread of ideas and information within active agents of the movement. Bridging, also essential, acts to connect smaller branches of a movement to each other and to connect the movement with its external environment, especially cultural and political elite. The former is also sometimes referred to as "linking" social capital.

Lasting effects and implications for development

Beyond the destruction and regeneration of SK during, and immediately after, revolution, there has been little research on the lasting effects of these transformations. Two works found addressing this issue were of conflicting views. Booth and Richard's study in Nicaragua found that, without the fervor and passion of the war, changes rapidly decayed and voluntary involvement in organizations dropped.[26] Despite massive demobilization, Nicaraguan participation still remains higher than before, especially surrounding unions and schools, showing that the revolution did, indeed, have a huge impact on levels and types of social capital.[27] Diani, in his reflections on social movements, claims that the collective action of movements such as revolution sets up new networks that usually remain in place even after the revolution ends.[28] He also claims that these new "solidarities" and new forms of SK succeed in establishing a favourable basis for future insurgency.[29]

If social capital is an essential component in the rise and progression of revolutionary movement, not only built-upon and destroyed, but also created and transformed, then it should be acknowledged as a critically influential factor in post-war efforts. Many non-western cultures view post-conflict healing as a very collective experience.[30] Pain and suffering is also often viewed as something that is shared.[31] Social capital thus becomes a critical method of recovery and a way in which communities make themselves resilient to the effects of war-related

stresses. Pederson describes this as a collective effort to make meaning of past experiences and translate it into a 'fresh start', creating order out of the disorder of conflict.[32] Pederson concludes that social reconstruction must be the primary goal of any post-revolutionary effort, emphasizing the need for an examination of indigenous coping methods and social structures.[33] Goodhand et al call for a less direct approach, claiming that instead of trying to establish and impose forms of social capital, efforts should be focused on the creation of an "enabling" environment, in which SK can naturally build and develop. At the same time, social capital is not always put to positive uses and outcomes, even after conflict is over. For this reason, Goodhand et al. propose this type of enabling environment, in which sustainable and appropriate SK will grow organically. Their proposed plan in Sri Lanka involves increasing good governance, rather than simply attempting to reduce the power of the state; providing support for an educational system based upon bridging, rather than highlighting ethnic and language divides; and promoting the spread of civil society organizations also spanning these divides.

Up until now, western post-conflict mental health efforts have focused predominantly on the identification and treatment of post traumatic stress disorder or other illnesses, resulting in a very vertical and disintegrated approach.[34] Just as revolution grows out of societal factors and existing forms of SK, so must post-war efforts. A predominant focus on returning to "pre-conflict" ideals is often neither practical nor desirable, as this is essentially a loop back to the same circumstances that spur these movements. Examining the quantity and quality of social ties and networks post-conflict is an essential part of analyzing the current climate for effective and sustainable change.

Conclusions

More analysis of the ways in which SK is formed and transformed during revolutionary conflict is needed, especially as we see a shift towards internal conflict. Until now, social capital literature has targeted violent conflict as a destroyer of social capital, labeling zones of conflict as "defective" in SK. According to Goodhand et al. this may be inaccurate, as this notion lacks both evidence and support. One reason for this shortage may be that, generally, SK literature focuses on "conflict" as a "lack-of-trust" or "lack of accountability", treating the idea of actual armed conflict as a completely separate entity.[35] This view of conflict as its own external agent is not only false, but also detrimental to our understanding of revolution and resilience. Conflict, especially internal conflict, is a product of society, and is therefore embedded within it. Looking at internal conflicts, specifically, enables us to view these transformations within a closed system, examining the rise and fall of revolution within a complex and ever-shifting climate of social capital. The fact that SK has proven to be such a significant influence not only upon the growth of movements and the way they play out, but also on the ability and extent to which individuals and communities experience and heal from conflict, makes it a valuable phenomenon to investigate.

The implications of understanding the influence of SK are vast, especially in finding ways to manipulate SK and different forms of it. Though existing literature establishes a clear relationship between revolutionary movements, SK and mental health, more research is needed to examine revolution, specifically, as its own distinct type of conflict. Looking at revolution as a potentially constructive, rather than a purely destructive, force is an essential part of exploring this relationship. Only by examining the SK structures of revolutionary movements can we begin to understand the complex socio-political climates that lead to this type of turmoil. In order to move forward, we must begin to examine the constant dynamic transformation of SK using the existing strongest networks as a foundation for growth in the aftermath of tragedy.

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INFUSING A MORAL IMAGINATION IN US POLICIES

AMB JONATHAN MOORE

Ambassador Jonathan Moore has worked in government, politics, academia and the United Nations for more than 40 years. He served as U.S. Coordinator for Refugees and Ambassador-at-Large and as Director of the Refugee Programs Bureau in the U.S. Department of State, and as a U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Previously, he was Director of the Institute of Politics and Lecturer in Public Policy at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, for twelve years. Amb Moore has been on the Institute for Global Leadership's External Advisory Board since its inception and is a recipient of the Institute's Dr. Jean Mayer Global Citizenship Award. In accepting the award, he reflected on the formative experiences in his career in public service, as well as lessons learned.

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Before being fully aware of it, I think, I was fascinated by international affairs and cross-cultural experiences and vaguely thought I wanted to find some way of tapping into them. I was romantic and idealistic, characteristics not uncommon in young people, but which I can't say I've quite gotten over. I was drawn to the idea of public service. Later, it seemed I was set to be a generalist — not having detected any indication of specialized competence in myself, the broadly superficial seeming to be safer to hide in, and unappreciative of the dangers of dilettantism, which I've been trying rationalize ever since. In any event, I wanted adventure, excitement, and if not to make the world a better place, to understand it better and see what I might learn about human nature and behavior. Little did I know. And what I might know now thankfully strengthens an awareness of all that I still don't. I've been extraordinarily fortunate over the years following my very first job as apprentice to the shellfish constable in my hometown on Cape Cod. Privilege and dumb luck.

There are a few discoveries I made along the way among such people and activity which have stuck with me and which I'll try to share.

I remember pledging that I should try continuously to seek the connections of things and people, of communities and sectors. I left an early start in the Foreign Service to work in the U.S. Senate because I thought I'd better know something about domestic politics, and when leaving there I sought to find a job in the Pentagon because I'd better know something about the military. Get the broader context, know what others are doing. Connect. Both decisions proved their value. The same with academia: Okay, how do scholarship and theory apply to policy and action and how can the two realms reinforce each other? A work still in progress; A subsequent and still ongoing struggle for me in trying to connect security and development in poor and conflicted countries — a symbiotic relationship out of synch.

An example is the current U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, which assumes a capacity on the part of the Afghans, which they do not have, and a capacity to do our part, which we cannot sustain.

I have become increasingly plagued by a number of persistent, deeply embedded shortcomings, or "gaps", in the evolving efforts of the "international community", individually and collectively, to deal with the clashes of our interdependent, globalizing world. Together they reveal serious anthropological weaknesses in our human ability to cope, let alone lead.

There is the gap between the denial and the perception of reality; we are very good at denial, because the truth doesn't fit into what we are willing to tolerate or what is consistent with our own immediate interests. This is related to the "keep things simple/engage complexity gap" in which we stubbornly insist upon the simple because the complex is scary and impenetrable and because our political process does not reward confronting it.

Next, there is the "capacity gap," which involves our not having the capacity to actually deliver on our policies and plans. In the case of various "humanitarian interventions" around the world – by the U.N., "coalitions of the willing", the U.S. – the challenge involved is invariably defined at the level at which we are willing to invest in it. This is distinct from how huge it actually is and its much greater true proportions — Appalachia vs. the Himalayas. This is illusory and causes response strategies to be distorted and ineffective from the start. An example is the current U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, which assumes a capacity on the part of the Afghans, which they do not have, and a capacity to do our part, which we cannot sustain.

The misunderstanding of the factor of time produces another gap between a "can do" and "quick fix" mentality and the ruthlessness of long-term requirements for progress. The problems of poverty, conflict, and low development require an open-ended commitment to generations of shared effort rather than near-term exit strategies.

The cumulative impact of these is foreboding, but the biggest of all is the "rich/poor" gap — the earth's fundamental moral inequity and dysfunction, which is widening and affects everything else. There are a number of huge, converging forces in our globalizing world, which radically threaten our interests and challenge our ability to survive. They include climate change, nuclear proliferation, the linkages of economies globally, ocean-crossing diseases, expanding ethnic and religious conflict, and international terrorism. They ignore geographical and political boundaries, are gaining momentum simultaneously, and although still subject to our influence, they are beyond our control. In addition to its own horrific properties, the rich-poor gap infects and exacerbates every one of these forces.

I think new values as well as new strategies are needed to meet these forces and to close

We now resemble a non-egalitarian society with dysfunctional politics moving towards isolationism. I fear that we may be too buried by our own problems to give the world enlightened attention, increasingly unprepared domestically to deal internationally.

the gaps. American foreign policy should be radically reconstructed by integrating a true grasp of reality and complexity with a perpetual infusion of moral imagination. One model for attempting this would be a priority commitment in every dispute, for every challenge to achieve the maximum benefit for the highest number of parties. This would encompass strategies to close the rich-poor gap and form the core framework of our efforts internationally to achieve peace and security. We would define our own interests within the multiplicity of human need, rather than pitting them against others and forgetting about the rest. We would have to compromise in ways we haven't thought of in order to achieve something closer to the common good, while protecting enough of our national needs to assure our own continuing progress. This path would be extremely difficult, the perseverance and balancing of factors would be prodigious, the time needed unending. But it would recognize that our own long-term security depends upon the security of others, and that we cannot survive in a world of apartheid. And it would embody moral authority and generate moral energy, valuable assets for transcending the challenges ahead.

We all know that no foreign policy can be pursued successfully without strong and sustained public backing at home. The kind of international strategy I'm suggesting for the U.S. would, in particular, place extreme stress on the polity's understanding, generosity, and nerve. The prospects are forlorn. Conceivably, one might have thought that a combination of unprecedented and intensifying global forces threatening the long-term quality of our lives, plus the arrival of a new President with a vision of the world and its future and an inclusive leadership style, might have encouraged a more expansive appreciation of our stakes in the world and the coherent behavior required to advance them. Not so. Amidst anxiety, deprivation, and impatience, we are too selfish, negative, divided and exploitative. We are separating, not connecting. We behave as if the President has the exclusive responsibility for solving our problems. The rest of us –tribes, sectors, institutions, the general citizenry, the political parties and Congress, ostensibly the self-governing agents of our political system – fail our role of affirmative political engagement to generate support and consensus. We now resemble a non-egalitarian society with dysfunctional politics moving towards isolationism. I fear that we may be too buried by our own problems to give the world enlightened attention, increasingly unprepared domestically to deal internationally.

Public service is an exalted calling. You can do it anywhere, and at any level. Its inherent devotion generates energy and carries the spirit. Most of the time it requires some inherent modesty because most public servants play supporting roles, behind or below the scenes, virtually anonymously. They are not famous, they do not seek celebrity, but the satisfaction, again, is in the service. The bonuses come in the opportunities for political and moral battle, even small skirmishes, and for redeeming power, even barely. Humility is also needed, and the strength of character to suffer mistakes, disappointment, and lack of progress. Lasting accomplishments come sparingly, real breakthroughs are seldom. Certainly, in my own case, I've got little to show for it. A willingness to keep on slogging, wearing away at the wall, is paramount. Mostly what I've had to hold on to, as a proxy for accomplishment, is "Don't quit, keep on trying", because so little headway was being made against deprivation or injustice or just plain bad policy. This mantra may be a worthy, probably essential, stopgap, but ultimately it's not acceptable by itself. The yearning and the perseverance for true well-being for all must eventually take hold.

EXPORT AGRICULTURE AND ITS ROLE IN THE ESCALATING

NUTRITION CRISIS OF GUATEMALA

NITHYAA VENKATARAMANI

Nithyaa Venkataramani is a sophomore at Tufts University majoring in International Relations and Biology. Nithyaa has been a part of the BUILD Program for Sustainable Development since 2009 and now serves as the co-director of the BUILD program's work in Tamil Nadu, India. BUILD is a student-led initiative of the Institute for Global Leadership.

For the Guatemalan farmer, the workday begins with the first sun's rays hitting the sides of the houses neatly lined up in rows. Santa Anita La Unión, a coffee cooperative of 32 families in the Quetzaltenango province of the western highlands region, gives us a glimpse of a place seeming like paradise, where the daily toil can often be overlooked in favor of idealizing the agricultural lifestyle. Life here may move more slowly than in the bustling cities of New York or Boston, yet there is much to be done between sunrise and sunset – much of which is hard physical labor that community members have been doing for years, day in and day out.

The growing and harvesting of coffee, a staple of Guatemalan agriculture, is a long and tenuous process, from which a small seedling plant transforms and produces the colorful green and red beans, the quantity of which actively determines the quality of life of the cultivator. The same is true for all export crops grown in Guatemala – they are labor-intensive and dependent on foreign markets. "It is well known that as Guatemalans, we drink the worst coffee," says a representative of FUNDAP, a Guatemalan NGO that works to promote activities that support people and communities with scarce economic resources. "All of the best products of this economy are exported out.[1]" And it is true – look at where your organic and high quality food products come from, and you will realize that most come from places where labor is cheap and land is seemingly plentiful.

In Guatemala, the agricultural economy has been tied to foreign markets since its conquest by the Spanish *conquistadores* in the 16th century. Export agriculture evolved throughout the centuries from traditional corn and bean crops to many non-traditional crops exclusively produced for the global market, the most prominent being coffee, cacao, bananas, sugar, and more recently broccoli and snow peas. These crops, not traditionally a part of the Guatemalan diet or culture, have defined the farmer's experience and quality of life, especially for the indigenous population in Guatemala. Less access among the indigenous people compared to the *ladino* class has a distinct and direct correlation to the overarching history of land distribution and ownership throughout the country.

In conjunction with the development of agriculture in this country, a widespread domestic food crisis has slowly escalated over the last century. According to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Guatemala today has the highest rate of chronic malnutrition in Latin America, and the fourth highest rate in the world. When the problem of malnutrition was first recognized, foreign aid programs were quick to propose a solution. The World Bank, in the 1970s, sought to address the link between poverty and income distribution with malnutrition.

Income, however, is not the ultimate goal... Income is simply the means to provide an education and other employment opportunities to the children of the farmers who have known nothing else.

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Malnutrition is largely a reflection of poverty: people do not have enough income for food...The most efficient long-term policies are those that raise the incomes of the poor, and those that raise food production per person. Other relevant policies include food subsidies, nutrition education, and increasing emphasis on producing foods typically consumed by the poor.[2]
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Forty years later, the situation has only gotten worse. Part of the problem of efficiency and clear progress may be that food security cannot be looked at through a purely economic lens, as there are many other factors that come into play. These include existing cultural values, the production and availability of food for consumers, and longstanding racial and social inequalities. The history of the country has shaped its dependency on exporting, which itself is a major factor in the escalating nutrition situation. Unfortunately, food security and assistance often focuses solely on how much a family can buy – their purchasing power – rather than existing problems with food production itself.[3]

There are many more risks associated with being involved in the global market trade, because tying farmers to foreign markets leaves them incredibly vulnerable to exploitation and upheaval. Some of these vulnerabilities include participating in an outside market for which they do not have any information like price fluctuations, and being dependent on *coyotes*, or middlemen, to settle exporting deals. According to dependency theory formulated by social scientists Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Faletto Enzo, the way in which impoverished developing countries are integrated into the world system often profit the developed countries the most at the expense of the resource-filled former.[4] This theory applies in particular to the regions of Latin America, which have been highly involved in the global market for centuries, but have yet to see the type of growth and progress of developed nations.

However, it is wrong to think that globalism is a root evil cause and to take a paternalistic view of the Mayan farmers who want to demand more. Dr. Edward Fischer points out that the Mayan farmers that he worked alongside explained that they did know the risks, but that simple core values like keeping the family together during harvest season and working together were not compromised by shifting from *milpa* farming to export farming. To keep up with the rest of the world, the Guatemalan farmer believes that this is the way to a better and more stable economic future, no matter how much information imbalance there exists. The positive implications of having an export-oriented economy are that communities experience economic growth that they would not have achieved through subsistence production. Globalization has also led to a sense of pride for Guatemalan farmers who know that they are competing alongside other countries for foreign consumers. In a way, cultivators believe that economic prosperity may provide a way for the new generation to move into the professions and lifestyles they desire.

Income, however, is not the ultimate goal. The cultural ties to community, as to land, are the mechanisms that farmers try to keep in perspective. Income is simply the means to provide an education and other employment opportunities to the children of the farmers who have known nothing else. Guatemalan farmers are in search of something that writer Dr. Edward Fischer defines as "*algo màs*," or "something better."[5]

There have been negative results from the dependency on export crops though. Widespread analysis shows that the rise of export cropping has brought about negative shifts in the availability of products for the domestic market, and at the same time, malnutrition rates continue to increase, despite 30 years of foreign aid efforts. In light of the European Union's recent support of a new aid program put forth by President Alvaro Colom's government, two important questions come to the fore: Is the vulnerability of export cropping perpetuating malnutrition, or providing the economic means to end it? What are the most sustainable options for change to combat the spread of chronic undernourishment among the people in need?

Yet the colonists' system of export-based profit quickly made Guatemala dependent on this trade and created structural imbalances that would impede sustainable and long-term development of both industry and the agricultural economy.

The Story of Land and Poverty in Guatemala's Development

A clear racial division defines the social hierarchy existing in Guatemala. *Ladinos*, the people of Spanish descent, comprise most of the middle-class that oversee the production and economy of the country. Within this *ladino* class, another division exists, which separates the middle class from the most elite — a group that comprises an oligarchy that has overreaching influence on market control and distribution of goods. The oligarchy's network impedes the equality of benefits provided by public and governmental policy, a structure that is detailed by author Marta Casuas Arzu in *Linaje y Racismo.*

The indigenous Mayan people form the base of the hierarchical pyramid, representing the lower class that has always been linked to agriculture, particularly corn. Even in the era before the conquest, the underclass of people was made up of peasants who worked the land. Mayan beliefs and cultural traditions gave special spiritual importance to the cultivation of the land, as well as the belief that land was a special resource that should be a common resource to all people, as written about in the *Popul Vuh*, a sacred book of the Mayan people.

The advent of the Spanish conquest over the Mayan people changed the relationship to the land. Through the *encomienda* system approved by the Spanish crown, the *conquistadores* forced the indigenous people to labor in the fields they lived on to produce new crops that had no cultural significance or tradition in the country.[6] *Encomienda* provided indentured Mayan people to the Spanish colonists. The Mayas would grow crops for their new landowner's benefit, and the new crops that they grew, primarily coffee and cacao, became inextricably tied to the imperialist era and the first notions of globalization.

The *conquistadores* also claimed ownership of the land, since the Mayas had never legally acquired land for ownership due to their religious beliefs. The approval of the Spanish crown facilitated the takeover of land, allowing new colonists to force the indigenous natives to relocate together into small villages, called *reducciones*.[7] The indigenous people could no longer access the best farmland to produce food for themselves, instead they had to work as forced labor. When the rulers of Spain later required the Mayans to be paid for their labor on the colonists' fields, the *encomienda* system was replaced at the beginning of the 17th century with the *repartimiento* draft system, which was highly abused despite the promise of a minimum wage salary and the ability of workers to return to their homes at night.[8] More Mayas were forced into labor and mistreated. Disease and malnutrition became rampant among the indigenous population.[9] The newly enacted systems of labor, coupled with the Mayan people's lack of a centralized and unifying political system and desire to keep the fertile land ownerless, allowed the Spanish to wield heavy influence and take over the entire systems of government and agriculture.

The Spanish colonizers recognized the potential to profit from the underdevelopment of Latin America, especially through export agriculture, and saw no reason to pay for labor. Moral obligation was not a factor, since oppressive racial hierarchies had already been firmly developed between the *conquistadores* and the indigenous people. Yet the colonists' system of export-based profit quickly made

Guatemala dependent on this trade and created structural imbalances that would impede sustainable and long-term development of both industry and the agricultural economy. According to anthropologist Carol A. Smith's analysis of dependency theory's context in the age of Spanish conquest of the region:

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Developing this comparative advantage (the export of primary goods) through the use of coerced labor, rather than a wage-earning workforce and machinery, at the expense of capitalizing local industry (thus also creating a need for the import of industrial goods) promoted the fortunes of a few profit-seeking investors in Latin America in the short run – and it was they rather than feudal barons who determined the economic practices of their countries. In the long run, however, this orientation was to drain Latin American countries of their surplus while maintaining their highly specialized dependence on the volatile economic and political policies of the industrial centers of world capitalism…The industrial centers of world capitalism were able to use the market for their own advantage… thus they were able to determine all the prices in the world marketing system.[10]
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Farming for subsistence was being replaced by farming for international export. Imposition on the Mayan people and their system of agriculture peaked in the late 19th century. This time period was characterized by a great increase in global demand for coffee. In response to increased demand, the transitioning government wanted to allow coffee cultivation to expand markedly. *La Reforma Liberal* of the 1870s was a program put into place by President Justo Rufio Barrios, as a means of establishing Guatemala in the global export market. As President and an established member of the elite, Barrios believed in Auguste Comte's philosophy of Positivism — the ideology that "'the elite must take charge of the conduct of society' on the assumption that the individual material gains of successful businessmen would influence and benefit the rest of society."[11] According to David McCreery, a historian and scholar on liberal development, "Barrios committed Guatemala to the world market system and the international division of labor implied by free trade…Guatemala's role in the world system was that of producer of agricultural raw materials for export, particularly coffee, in which the republic enjoyed an apparent comparative advantage."[12] Allowing elite interest to shape economic policy created greater dependence on exportation.

The new governmental mandates allowed the elite of the developing coffee industry to bypass the Mayan tradition of leaving land ownerless, giving them the power to purchase and use fertile lands for private, commercial farming purposes. Though the focus was supposed to be on "vacant and public lands, and those owned by religious bodies,"[13] land acquisition for coffee farming progressed further into all existing lands that the Mayan people had farmed for centuries – even before the time of the *encomienda* and *reducciones* systems. In this way, land transferred from the power of the indigenous farmers to the *ladino* administration. Today, Guatemala has the highest existing land inequality in all of Latin America.

Those interested in entering the global market generally characterized the ideologies of the indigenous people as concentrated on maintaining culture and tradition. These views were in distinct opposition to *ladino* ideologies. Demands for labor were increasing as coffee production rose to meet global demand, yet local indigenous farmers did not want to work for the new *ladino* farm owners. "Their lifestyle [was] worlds removed from the modern and capitalistic western world, characterized by a reverence for entrepreneurial ambition and a focus on international markets"[14]

Land acquisition and use for capitalistic foreign trade was expanded to the extent that even farming and small-scale production were no longer possible. The goals of the government were to be competitive in the foreign market, leaving farmers with little to no influence to increase production independently. The Maya had become a commodity themselves – the labor force behind the capitalistic dreams of the governmental administration, itself working under the structure imposed by the participating developed countries.

Consequences of Export Dependency for the Guatemalan

Farmer

All of the agricultural shifts that have taken place have led to a decrease in family plots for *milpa* farming, or production of corn and beans, which are staples of the Guatemalan diet. Basic food crops accounted for 58 percent of used agricultural area before 1979, compared to 37.4 percent in 1979.[15] There was also a downward trend in per capita staple food production of -0.3 percent per year.[16] With domestic food production stagnating as exports took over more and more agricultural land, this small-scale *milpa* farming is now a monoculture tradition on the most infertile land in the higher altitudes of the western highlands. The most fertile land is used to farm the labor-intensive export crops, largely introduced in Guatemala by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Latin American Agribusiness Corporation S.A. (LAAD).[17] Added to that is that the global market is in control of production and pricing.

The rural farmers of Guatemala, who lack access to market information, cannot foresee fluctuations in the external market. These farmers do not know their consumers, and rather than being able to set prices in the domestic sector are entirely dependent on fluctuating produce prices in foreign markets. As for the United States and other foreign consumers, most remain unaware of the consequences of their consumption trends.

Production of export goods makes Mayan farmers much more vulnerable to crop failure, a devastating outcome due to the labor-intensity of these non-traditional crops, as well as rejection from packing plants that demand a higher cosmetic quality of products. Fischer notes that the Mayas are exploited by the *coyotes* for economic gain and involvement in the capitalist global market and suffer the most when the market takes a hit, because they are already living in poverty.[18]

And when the market takes a hit, it takes a large hit. In 2001 a severe drought in eastern Guatemala wiped out a large percentage of coffee production. Most coffee production in Guatemala is on gigantic mono-crop plantations, where farmers depend solely on the "cash crop" for their income. Due to production losses, nearly 190,000 farmers lost their jobs between 2000 and 2001, according to ANACAFE, Guatemala's National Coffee Association.[19] In this time frame, coffee prices dropped to all-time lows, from $90.60 per quintal to $56.80.[20] Total Guatemalan revenue coming from coffee dropped by nearly half between 2000 and 2001.[21] Even small experimental farms the size of Santa Anita La Unión, which have successfully cut out many of the export middlemen, suffered greatly. Poor economic conditions coupled with water scarcity and low access to food brought about a disaster. According to USAID, in 2002 over half of the country's children were estimated to have stunted growth and high levels of malnutrition.[22] In addition, the indigenous Mayan population had twice the rates of malnutrition of the non-Indigenous *ladino* population. According to writer Samuel Loewenberg, "It is often said that Guatemala is really two countries in one, divided between the few rich and the many poor."[23]

In addition to the power imbalances within the country and in the international trade

According to USAID, in 2002 over half of the country's children were estimated to have stunted growth and high levels of malnutrition. In addition, the indigenous Mayan population had twice the rates of malnutrition of the non-Indigenous ladino population.

market, Guatemalan farmers must also contend with slow reconstruction efforts after the devastating, 36-year civil war (1960-1996). The war mutilated not only the agricultural terrain, but also the spirit of the war-stricken people of Guatemala. In the aftermath, the faltering nature of the peace accords along with the existing structure of export agriculture have contributed to both little socioeconomic development and continuing inequality for the indigenous producers. Even worse, many of the risk factors faced by these farmers leave them without the necessary access to and money for food. Aid efforts to date have not been able to change this structure. And more efforts need to be redirected to providing a buffer for farmers against the fluctuations in the international market and environmental conditions.

On September 9, 2009, President Álvaro Colom declared Guatemala in a "state of calamity," submitting his plea for international assistance. Environmental effects, especially climate change, were stated as a major factor of the drastic increase in the number of malnourished Guatemalans. The summer of 2009 marked a period of extreme drought that caused subsistence and export farmers alike to lose crop yields and thereby lose all food and goods to sell in the market.

However, chronic and widespread malnutrition has deep roots in the country and has been a publicly recognized problem of inequality for decades.

Malnutrition and its Roots in Guatemala

One cause of chronic malnutrition, like the challenge facing Guatemala, was outlined as a cycle between malnutrition and infection by researchers Scrimshaw, Taylor, and Gordon in their 1959 review paper in the *American Journal of Medical Sciences*. They offered evidence that malnutrition caused greater vulnerability to infection, and infection caused a lower nutritional status.[24] This ongoing cycle would eventually lead to kwashiorkor and marasmus, the two highly detectable forms of malnutrition existing in Guatemala. Those affected by kwashiorkor have severe protein deficiency, which causes the body to swell up because it retains liquids.[25] Marasmus is a combination of both severe protein and calorie deficiency, in which an affected person's bones are barely covered by skin.[26] If malnutrition at this level of severity is left untreated, it can result in death. On Septem-

ber 11, 2009, it was reported that 25 Guatemalan children had already died in the year from severe malnourishment.[27]

The Institute of Nutrition of Central American and Panama carried out an extensive research project on malnutrition and the influential effects of nutritional supplements in over 2,000 people in impoverished villages of Guatemala from 1969 to 1977. In the four villages chosen for the study, participants – children under the age of seven and pregnant women – in two of the villages received maize gruel highly supplemented with a protein called Atole, while the participants in the other two villages received Fresco, a sweet fruit-flavored drink lacking any additional protein.[28] The results over 30 years showed a clear correlation between higher cognitive development, lower mortality, and better growth in those children who received the high-protein supplement.

The study reveals much about malnutrition and the correlation to all aspects of life and development, especially in the context of children. Before the mid-20th century, malnutrition was seen as a one-track epidemic problem. Malnutrition in young children between conception and age two was seen as a problem for causing brain damage, which would decrease intellectual development, as this is the time period when the brain grows to roughly 80 percent of its adult size.[29] Despite the very harmful and inhibitory effects of brain damage in young children, these effects were found to be repairable if the child was properly nourished later in childhood. Many other effects of malnutrition, however, have since been uncovered, such as correlations to withdrawal from social interaction, a key factor in healthy child development.[30]

What Are People Eating? An Anthropological Context

In the era of the Mayas, before the Spanish, the two major crops consumed were maize and a cereal known as *amaranth*. The Spanish influence over agricultural patterns carried over into the food sector as well. Many Spanish foods became quite common throughout Latin America. These dishes included *enchiladas*, *guacamole*, *tamales* and *tortillas*.

Both traditional and non-traditional exports have caused a decrease in the availability of fruit and vegetables in the domestic Guatemalan market. Fruits and vegetables are novelties to the indigenous people because of their income as well as total availability. Global nutrition policy recommends the intake of fruits and vegetables every single day[31], yet the indigenous population continues to eat only what is readily available to them at a low cost — usually only tortillas made of mashed corn and water.

"Today, a majority of people know what they should and should not eat, but their economic situation presents a huge barrier...fruits and vegetables in the diet has become a luxury," says a community member of Santa Anita La Unión.

Tortillas and beans are also considered the staples of the Guatemalan diet. They are so essential to the diet that they "may not be considered as food but as medicine, because they are essential to health and life." In the domestic market, prices of meat turnovers, known as *empanadas*, and hot beef sandwiches are lower than fruits and vegetables as well. These foods are thought of as not only nutritionally but emotionally and symbolically significant to general well-being.

Sticky Solutions and the Future

Most of the headline news articles describing malnutrition in Guatemala have pitched starving children and their families, evoking pity and guilt in readers and asking for donations from those who care. World-renowned organizations take donated funds and use them to provide food for those in need. However, all of these aid efforts have yet to show sustainable improvements. A community member, passionate about the issue of sustainability, points out, "Emergency aid does not solve malnutrition. They will be able to hand out food baskets for one or two weeks."[32]

When President Colom requested international aid, the world responded. On November 19, 2009, USAID announced its plan to provide $15 million in emergency assistance, targeting the regions identified by the Guatemalan government requiring urgent attention: Chiquimula,

El Progreso, Jalapa, Jutiapa, and Zacapa. The assistance included "approximately 7,600 metric tons of food...distributed to a total of 41,050 families in 365 communities." USAID has provided Guatemala with food security assistance for over three decades, with an ongoing allocated budget of about $50 million per year for food security assistance.[33] Unfortunately, the combination of rising food prices throughout the world and the economic crisis have left the World Food Programme, another necessary support in Guatemala's food needs, scrambling for enough funds to continue their VitaCareTM program. At the end of 2009, they were short $5 million, which the media said could potentially "affect the nutrition of 100,000 children and 50,000 pregnant and lactating women".[34]

Domestic policy in this arena has always been hard to affect. Says a representative from FUNDAP:

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The problem is not only quantity of food remaining in the country. There is often a lot of food that is produced, but there is no structure in which it can be properly distributed for people to have the access they need.[35]
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A contributing factor may be that Barrios' prescription to the theory of Positivism, or the elite acting in the interest of all, is still in effect in Guatemala today. The negative consequences of these power structures and attitudes have given way to a system in which money in the country may not go towards a cause like treating malnutrition in Guatemala's poorest districts simply because these effects do not reach the upper class. Loewenburg writes:

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While the very rich reap the benefits of Guatemala's agricultural bounty (the top 20 percent of the population take two-thirds of the country's income), they give little back. Tax revenues in Guatemala are among the very lowest in Latin America, smaller even than its poorest neighbors.[36]
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Yet despite the structural problems inherent in the past and present of Guatemala, the international community must realize that these are situations that are almost impossible to reconcile. Fischer suggests that there needs to be a "dual consciousness in how we think of changing the world." This dual consciousness recognizes that the system has flaws, but that one cannot focus solely on these flaws and blame them for existing problems. Instead, one must be conscious of success cases and build off of them to affect real change. At the moment, Guatemala cannot depend heavily on international assistance, and needs to become domestically sustainable with its food production in order to fully alleviate the food crisis and reduce widespread chronic malnutrition.

It is in the international community's best interest to invest in policies that would aid in preventing developing cases of malnutrition altogether. The effects that malnutrition

can have on intellectual progress can prevent a child who is given the opportunity to go to school from learning or reaching their full potential:

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The U.S...invests billions of dollars in education [in Guatemala], yet much of this money goes to waste when children appear at the school door intellectually crippled from under-nutrition. The immediate expense of nutrition programs and broader interventions should be considered a critical investment in the future. Malnutrition alters the educational preparedness and, later, workforce productivity, making it an unacceptable risk for its victims as well as for a nation's strength and competitiveness.[37]

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When a problem is chronic, it takes more than concern at the most dire times to fix. Long-lasting impact is essential. As the European Union has decided to fund the Strategic Plan for Food Security and Nutrition (PESAN) from the end of 2009 to 2012, it should look to focus its efforts on addressing long-term problems, not just short-term emergencies.

The EU has pledged 33.8 million euros (about 400 million quetzales) to the three-year long program that will focus on the most vulnerable rural populations. It has been stressed that this is not a "blank check," and that progress will be monitored. The five pillars of the program are to:

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1. Improve food availability with emphasis on basic grain production to increase the country's food self-sufficiency.

2. Promote the population's access to the basic food basket.

3. Strengthen education, information and communication on food and nutrition to improve food consumption, promote exclusive breastfeeding and contribute to the reduction of chronic malnutrition.

4. Increase the coverage and quality of health services, water, sanitation, family and community hygiene, to reduce chronic malnutrition.

5. Strengthen the institutional capacities of the National Food and Nutrition Security – SINASAN – and Civil Society to reduce food insecurity and nutrition.[38]

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This initiative has only been reported on as of February 2010, and it will take time to see the real versus expected impact of the program. The EU states that it trusts the Guatemalan government and its partnership with all other organizations coming to aid the program and funding.

The Importance of Acting Locally and Hope for the Future

To access the nearest market to Santa Anita La Unión, it is necessary to hitch a ride on the back of a pickup truck and ride about 45 minutes into Colomba. People from all over the Quetzaltenango province must come here to buy their food. In Santa Anita, one community member is designated to buy for a large group because of the inconvenience of getting to market. The market in Colomba is comprehensive and very busy. People haggle over prices and settle on deals, and a multitude of foods are bought and sold. Many consumers gravitate towards the grain products – tortillas, *pan dulces* – and meat products, especially chicken.

As a community member who works on nutritional well-being in the geographic area states:

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The majority of people know what they should and should not eat, but their economic situation prevents them from making the right decisions. For example, often times fruits and vegetables are seen as luxuries over the staple foods (corn and beans), but this should not be the case. In meetings, we tell the parents to start encouraging the children to buy a fruit instead of chips – but when the children are used to these cheap snacks from childhood, they do not have the appetite for foods that may be healthier for them.[39]

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Acting locally and working with people's cultural knowledge may be the key to producing sustainable results to a well-endowed program for action. How do we teach children about the necessity and importance of eating well? Solutions may have to come from the older generation teaching the younger generation.

Exporting, for all the pain it has caused the Guatemalan people, has provided a bigger economic base. If each exporting farm were to allocate a portion of its land to growing food for sustenance in the community, it would allow a more diverse selection for people's diets, as well as a much easier way to access food when needed. A community member voiced his reservations with this as he said:

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We don't have many resources to allocate to have community members plant things other than coffee or the funds to raise for more nutritional produce here at this time... however, a small project implemented and funded could provide us a better quality of life. It's ironic, as in the fair trade market, only the highest quality crops are accepted. They take care of the health of the land as well as the health of the consumer. We don't consume the high quality food here in Guatemala because we must purchase whatever is cheapest. It is important to focus on bringing in different services that can benefit the people.[40]

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Sensitivity to cultural nuances must also be navigated in the ways in which nutritional aid is implemented as well. A community member in Santa Anita works with promoting Chispitas, a tasteless powder that can be added to any meal to provide essentials such as vitamin A, iron, zinc, vitamin C, and folic acid to food that is served in homes, especially to children. Though this sounds like an optimal solution, he cites problems with this approach in the implementation phase:

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Of 1,000 children of families that we have targeted in the area, we believe only 50 percent are using the Chispitas powder. Families come back to us and say that their kids said that the 'taste' was a problem for their children. However, since we know the powder is tasteless and unrecognizable in food, we believe that the simple addition of a strange powder to dinner may come off as unappetizing to a child who is watching, who will then refuse to eat. Personal involvement in bettering nutritional status needs to be seen as a widespread social initiative for things to change.[41]

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Sustainability promises the capacity to endure if the Guatemalan government and the world at large can promise this to the poorest Guatemalans. Those struggling to make ends meet can truly be helped. The history of Guatemala's incorporation into the exportation market offers us a lens to view the multitude of problems that we face today to combat chronic malnutrition. However, history is the past: It is now the time to set in motion the right kinds of efforts to create a better future.

Acting locally and working with people's cultural knowledge may be the key to producing sustainable results to a well-endowed program for action. How do we teach children about the necessity and importance of eating well? Solutions may have to come from the older generation teaching the younger generation.

1. The local market of Colomba boasts a variety of different fruits that are in season. The demand for these is not nearly as high as for staple foods: tortillas and beans. The price of these fruits is significantly higher than that of staples.

2. Coffee beans are put out in the sun to dry on the community grounds for long hours, after which they will go through a long cycle of processing to be shipped and sold to the international market.

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BETWEEN WESTERN AND I-94, CERMAK AND 16TH

JOSEPHINE HERMAN

Josephine Herman is a sophomore who plans on majoring in Art History and Political Science. She is a member of the Tufts Cross Country team and co-founder of the UnRandom Acts of Kindness club. Hailing from Evanston, IL, she spends her summers as a camp counselor in Michigan.

Every morning my mother woke up, got in her mini-van, and drove a few blocks down Asbury until it turned to Western at the Chicago border. She drove further and further, passing restaurants with signs promising food in multiple languages. There were the bright, fresh signs for upscale restaurants, and ones with blocky letters that usually meant cheap and delicious. She passed used car lots and parks with signs screaming "SAFE ZONE: Higher Penalties for Criminal Activities Here". She drove down the wide streets where the sun glinting off the warm brick buildings always gave a feeling of late afternoon sleepiness, no matter the time. She turned east towards the lake on Cermak and parked in front of the church that was her workplace. She worked with the women who lived in the neighborhood, helping them navigate a strange new place. A place with different weather, different language, different values. A place where all this different-ness was compounded by the fact that their existence in the United States was not known to the US government.

She taught them writing. Not English, but writing in Spanish, their native language. And mostly it was a place where they could drop off their kids, talk to their friends and get support and advice. They could compare how to dress their kids for the winter, and they could tell their stories of missing their homes, and the people that make it home. Their sisters and brothers, mothers and fathers, childhood friends. People they would not get to see for years because of the danger of going back and forth.

When lonely, it's mostly the magnification of little things and an abundance of time that cause pain. A lack of a call, a snub by someone who should have said hello, these things bounce through your head, reflecting off the inner surfaces of the skull and growing in power, the dreaded memory expanding like a swelling bruise until it fills the brain, covering everything in a layer of sickliness until all other memories and events are seen through this dark lens. When those that are closest to you are not around, and there is no one to ensure that yes, you are loved, people do care about you and want to be with you, the rest of the world's tiny actions explode into the main narrative of your life, the shallow joys of these micro-relationships no match for the deep ocean of desolation that you are treading in right now, waiting for the people you have yet to meet to come and rescue you or the ones you have known to step back in and pull you out.

The first Mexicans to immigrate to Chicago found work the only way they could: as strikebreakers. Scabs, the people who are too cowardly to make the sacrifices like the other strikers. Everyone was going without so that everyone's life would improve, but some people just couldn't be patient. They had to walk past the workers, get rocks thrown at them, get called awful names. They had to witness the pain they were causing others, people who just wanted better lives for themselves and their families. They had to live somehow. They were living at the cost of others, who were trying to help not only themselves, but the scabs as well.

In the end, it didn't matter. The strikes were broken and the Mexican workers were fired. Nothing changed for anyone else. For Mexicans, however, the discrimination simply grew. They weren't even allowed into the Catholic churches of the Eastern European groups. Denied even to worship their religion until they got dioceses of their own.

The clumsiness of speech spreads throughout the body, making every limb feel huge. Every movement is magnified and spotlit, as if the lack of words puts more pressure on everything else to communicate. Everyone else is sped up, you are slowed down. There are no ways for people to understand the real you. Your accent puts everything you say in a different light, and you are a different person in one language than in another. In one, you are considered smart, funny, someone people listen to. In another, your clumsy efforts are indulged until the listener's patience runs out. Is it even worth it? Soon you decide it isn't, and only speak when absolutely necessary.

I went to my mother's workplace once when I was thirteen. We made a day out of it, exploring the neighborhood around her. Pilsen was named after the Czech town of Plzeň because of the Czech immigrants who settled there. By the 70's, Mexican-American immigrants were the majority. Now the neighborhood is home to colorful murals on the walls of brick buildings and signs in Spanish, some

translated to English and some not. Men sit behind stands on the side of the road selling *elote*, corn on the cob that sits in its boiled water all day until it's mushy, then slathered in mayonnaise and lime juice and chili powder. The huge candy emporium sells Bubbaloo, gum with juice inside, lollipops in the colors of the Mexican flag, mango chili lollipops, which are spicy and sweet. We went to El Milagro for sopes, little corn cakes with beans, cheese, lettuce, salsa and chicken. We went to Bon Bon, a bakery that specializes in *tres leches*, my favorite milky cake.

After lunch, we went to Our Lady of Tepeyac. We walked into a room meant for Sunday School, toys put away in low shelves, drawn pictures of Bible stories covering the walls. We sat in tiny chairs at small tables. I met one of my mom's students. She talked about how she made the terrible journey to get to the US. My Spanish was not great, but I could understand the main points. She had to say goodbye to her friends, family, and homeland, all she'd ever known. She came with her husband and older child. She had to leave her baby behind. They paid a man, a coyote, to hide in his van. They were taken across the border. They lived in Texas for a while. She had to repeat the whole process in order to get her other child across. Finally she made her way to Chicago. Her husband works all day, literally from sunrise until sunset, or later. She stays with the kids. She said the worst part was the loneliness. Until she began the writing class, she knew no one. It was she and two small children, afraid to leave their small apartment. Isolated through language, through fear.

The gaps are the worst. Wrists, eyes, neck, the places where the fabric of two pieces of clothing don't quite meet and it comes and finds you. Scratching its teeth against your exposed skin, wind rubbing it raw. Finding its way inside your flesh, causing shivers all through your body. Large ones, not delicate little ah ah ah shivers, but deep and long lasting, more convulsions. It takes you by surprise every time you step outside. Spring feels like the reward for a hard-fought battle, a personal treasure that you alone deserve. The joy of putting your head down, pushing through the darkness, and finding your way to the other side. "As you float now, where I held you and let go, remember when fear cramps your heart what I told you: lie gently and wide to the light – year stars, lie back, and the sea will hold you." – First Lesson, Robert Booth

The gaps are the worst. Wrists, eyes, neck, the places where the fabric of two pieces of clothing don't quite meet and it comes and finds you. Scratching its teeth against your exposed skin, wind rubbing it raw.

HOUSTON, TEXAS

Nicholas Dynan is a multimedia journalist who joins this new medium with a background in photography. He is driven by a passion for human rights and social justice; not only a witness, he works with both a voice and an opinion. While aware of the technical craft, he seeks to engage issues critically, attune to the ethical implications and consequences of his work. Storytelling is essential and he aims to engage audience members through compelling video, images, sound, and text.

A senior at Tufts University, where he majors in sociology and minors in media and communications, he is a co-leader of EXPOSURE, the Institute for Global Leadership's student-led photojournalism and human rights initiative. He has been awarded grants for EXPOSURE workshops in Cambodia and Houston, and for photojournalism projects in Turkey. He has contributed to domestic and international news outlets including Global Post, *Hürriyet Daily News*, and NPR affiliates.

Currently, Nicholas Dynan is embarking on two projects. One project explores an eco-commune in Northern Virginia, examining the intersection of the farm-to-table movement with millennials seeking a place in American society. The other examines social inequality, gentrification, and community activism in a Puerto Rican enclave in the heart of Boston.

NICHOLAS DYNAN

A Search For Home

“As you float now, where I held you and let go, remember when fear cramps your heart what I told you: lie gently and wide to the light – year stars, lie back, and the sea will hold you." – First Lesson, Robert Booth

I came to Houston following six months photographing in Turkey. Covering a relentless news cycle, I found my heart racing at the possibility of danger; when police attacked protesters, and rioters lit fires. I imagined the recognition I would receive making an image in the heat of one of these moments. The next step for me would be combat photography; it would be another shot of adrenaline and another path to achievement.

Arriving in Houston for the EXPOSURE/Aftermath photojournalism workshop exploring issues of race in Houston's Third Ward, I threw myself into a project focusing on the lack of job opportunities in the Third Ward. Specifically, I followed residents who lived in the community, but worked beyond its borders. As the photographer, if my choice in focusing on a story about employment tells anything about me, it was of my desire - just like that of my subjects - to achieve. Yet, as my images emerged throughout the week, it became clear that they were not only about achievement, but also about how detached I felt.

I found myself making images in cars on endless asphalt highways, coming and going between the worlds of employment and home. It was the experience of transience; I was unsure of where my foundation lay.

Halfway through the workshop, I put my camera down. I spent hours in front of paintings at museums in Houston. I searched for what photography really meant to me. I was searching myself for my core - or for what others might call home.

Strangely enough, one place home became clearest was in the home of another - that of the Barnes family. I was graciously welcomed into the Barnes household and over the next three days, I created images of their family; their interactions, and the space they lived in.

The motivation for this work stems from a desire to create a dialogue regarding the perceived expectations of Black families living in the Third Ward. The images that I made during this time are not the same as I hoped to make in Turkey, they ask questions, provide little answers, and challenge viewers. At the same time, my desire to experience their emotions, maybe a longing for childhood and family, also drives this work. There, under their roof and in their presence, I was not motivated by recognition, danger or violence, but rather this family's tremendous love for each other.

I can only offer these images and my sincere thanks to, The Barnes, Matt, Anne, Benjamin, Olivia, and Ellie and, my instructors, Sara Terry and Jeff Jacobson.

1. In the Third Ward, a historically black neighborhood in Houston, Ellie Barnes, the youngest of three, eats a dinner of homemade pizzas.

2. Benjamin, Olivia, and Ellie Barnes, siblings, eat pasta with pesto sauce for dinner. The Third Ward community is well known for its past prosperity, particularly along Dowling Street, a center for black business and culture.

3. Ellie and Olivia Barnes wash dishes with their father Matt. While prosperous during the 60's, the Third Ward has since experienced decades of economic decline.

4. Olivia Barnes plays with a butterfly net. While some of the Third Ward remains crippled by a lack of resources, there has been an increased interest by affluent black families in the neighborhood.

5. Ellie and Olivia dress as a princess and a tiger in their room. The children attend a private school that supports a mixture of traditional and home schooling.

6. Matt smells Olivia's arms to check whether she has cleaned them after a bath. Matt is currently a grant officer at the Houston Endowment.

7. After reading with their children, the Barnes family prays together. The family plays an active part in a local church.

8. Anne and Matt share a hug in their kitchen after a long day at work and taking care of their children.

9. After dinner, Anne leads Ellie to her room to get ready for bed.

10. As they do every night, Anne, Ellie, and Olivia pray together before bed.

11. Anne and Matt prepare their children for bed.

12. Anne kisses Ellie after tucking her into bed.

AN ANALYSIS OF EDUCATION-BASED IMMIGRATION TO ZHENGZHOU,

CHINA UNDER HUKOU REFORM

XUHUI WANG
JUN ZHOU
XUEYI YANG

Xuhui Wang is a student at Peking University majoring in Ecology with a minor in International Studies. He is one of the international students who attended the EPIIC international symposium. Inspired by the conversations at symposium, he designed and initiated this research project on the Household Registration System (HRS) in China. He has also lead a local volunteer organization at Peking University. Outside of school, he is active in research and efforts concerning environment, cities and humanitarian issues in China.

Jun Zhou is a senior majoring in Urban Planning with a minor in Economics with a concentration on Urbanization at Peking University. As the core member of the HRS research project sponsored by the Institute for Global Leadership, she became involved in two series of fieldwork in China, analyzing a great deal of both first and second-hand data. She is currently engaged in researching urban sprawl and the impact of urban growth on the quality of life in China.

Xueyi Yang is a senior majoring in Urban-Rural Planning and Resources Management with a Double Major in economics at Peking University. Her research interests are urbanization and land policy. She presented the HRS proposal at the 2009 EPIIC symposium. With financial support from the IGL, she conducted two field studies in Zhengzhou and finished the final report in cooperation with her classmate, Jun Zhou. Her recent studies focus on the smart growth and land use pattern in developing countries.

Our research into the Household Registration System, or *hukou* system, in China, began in September 2009 and is an ongoing endeavor. The Household Registration System (HRS) was implemented in China in 1958, essentially preventing Chinese citizens from changing their city of residence without government permission or sanction. If citizens moved their residence without permission, they would be ineligible for a broad variety of benefits from housing to schooling in the city where they relocated.

Students from Peking University conducted two field studies in Zhengzhou, where a population explosion occurred in 2003 after the limitations on rural-urban migration were lifted under HRS reform. By picking Zhengzhou as a case study, the authors sought to gain a well rounded and in-depth understanding of this unique system used to regulate rural-urban migration in China.

A. General Description of Data Collected

As the chart (Figure 1) shows, immigration reached its peak in 2003, reflective of the loosened limitations on HRS in the same year.

According to government regulations, *Hukou* transfers are only allowed when an individual's immediate relative is a local resident. However, the data (Figure 2) clearly show that immigration by non-direct relatives, such as cousins, also exists. This phenomenon was most prevalent in 2003, when HRS was being reformed.



FIGURE 1
PERCENT INCREASE OF IMMIGRATION INTO ZHENGZHOU



FIGURE 2
PERCENTAGE OF MIGRANTS WITHOUT A DIRECT RELATIVE IN ZHENGZHOU

B.Relation Between HRS and Education

From our last visit to Zhengzhou, we are aware that the main motive behind immigration is education for children. Parents may do everything they can to transfer to big cities to obtain the chance of a better education for their children. Here, as quantitative evidence in the chart (Figure 3) shows, the proportion of migrants of school age (right) is much higher than those of the average age (left).

As expected, the proportion of immigrants in the group of school age children is much higher, indicating that the motive behind irregular immigration is higher than average especially when driven by a desire for education.

Since the data collected is limited to that from *Hukou* registration, we do not have access to information such as family income or parents' professions, strong factors that also often influence migrant behavior. However, another influential factor, the distance migrated, can be obtained by looking at the registered places of departure.

First, we collected information on the departure location of school-age immigrants and calculated the distance between these areas and Zhengzhou by Web GIS, as mapped here (Figure 4).

Then, we analyzed the relation between the immigration intensity of school-age children and the distance traveled to immigrate to Zhengzhou (Figure 5).

As expected, intensity decreases as the distance traveled increases. Two factors exert influence on this. The first is the cost of transfer. The second is the accessibility of transfer information. The former would increase and the latter would decrease as distance increases.

Although we could not specifically analyze other factors due to the accessibility of data, we could, after all, draw the conclusion that distance is one influential obstacle in education-related *Hukou* migration. Therefore, when discussing education-related emigrating behaviors, both attracting factors and hindering factors should be taken into consideration.



FIGURE 3
RELATION BETWEEN HRS AND EDUCATION



FIGURE 4
DEPARTURE LOCATION AND DISTANCE FROM ZHENGZHOU

PLACE OF DEPARTURE	DISTANCE	IMMIGRATION INTENSITY
KAIFENG	0.006905	5
XUCHANG	0.126177	4
XINXIANG	0	2
ANYANG	0.268675	2
LUOYANG	0.26742	2
ZHOUKOU	0.584432	2
PINGDINGSHAN	0.358443	1
FUYANG	0.66855	1



FIGURE 5
RELATION BETWEEN IMMIGRATION INTENSITY OF SCHOOL-AGE CHILDREN AND DISTANCE TRAVELED TO IMMIGRATE

EIN MANN

GEORGE KOLEV

George Kolev is a senior at Tufts University majoring in History. He was born in Sofia, Bulgaria and learned Russian on a trip to his mother's small hometown in the Western Urals when he was six. Back home, he was given some Pushkin and Lermontov to read and has been, since then, writing rhymes.

Эйн ман мне сказал однажды,
что в мире большом-голубом
трудно–не правда ль?–с кем-то
помолвить о том о сём.

“Ну, парень, коль жизнь такая,
(сказал я) давай, parl-ёвай,
мы оба, за чашкой чая–
чайничек, кстати, из Китая,
четырёхсотпятирублёвый–
ты давай, а я j’écoute:
вдвоём, как сказал Пушкин,
круто.”

“Ну, если уж–парень молвит–
давай. Вот, к примеру, Путин.
С какого такого чёрта
d’we find him so deeply soothing?
и кажется сладким этот
псевдо-политический пудинг,
нео-реваншистский блин?”

Спросил он, и я присел,
и, придвинувшись на аршин,
ответить как раз хотел,
что нам-то таких вот дел
нельзя, может быть, понять,
что всё там будет опять–
и стихи, и икра, и рать–
что смысла нет, брат, искать
some sense в этакую блядь,
и лучше бы наплевать,

но в кухне тогда вскипел
китайский чайник
и не успел.

Ein Mann told me once in earnest
that in this wide world of ours
it’s hard –ain’t it though? – with someone
to talk ‘bout this and that really.

“Well, mate, if the case be such, then
(I told said lad), go on a-talkin’:
we both, and a cup of tea–
brewed, by the way, in a Chinese kettle
worth four hundred and five rubles–
you go on, and I, j’écoute,
Being together, to quote Monsieur Pushkin,
is cute.”

“Well, aight – spake the lad – why don’t we?
Here, take, for instance, Putin:
for what goddamned pretty reason
d’we find him so deeply soothing
and our taste buds moan with sweetness
for this pseudo-political pudding,
for this neo-revanchist blin?”

He asked and I found my seat,
and (moving an inch and a half closer)
I wanted to tell him in earnest
that we–

–we can’t perhaps understand such matters, and that all
that stuff – the caviar, and wars, and poesie, will repeat
itself, and that mate there’s no sense looking for some
sense in this whole mess, and that the only comfy way is
to not give a damn,

and move to Dublin–

– but I didn’t. For right then I heard
in kitchen tones half-serious
and half-absurd
my Chinese kettle a-bubblin’.

PRAYER

Jimmy Pianka

Jimmy Pianka is a writer and musician who graduated from Tufts University in 2010 with a BA in Cognitive and Brain Science and Philosophy. He currently fights the good fight as the lead singer and lyricist of the rock band Arrow to the Sun. He wrote this poem during his semester abroad sitting right behind the Dalai Lama's temple in Dharamsala, India.

Life piles on life, teems inside of life,

compounding itself again and again

until whole worlds brim with mind.

This sphere is a nursery with words to name itself,

jeweled intellect laughing and tracing

shapes on the walls of caves,

each finger outlined in blue paint

to show just how pretty our hands are.

Voices pour from the Earth like heat,

all history projected in gold radio streams

to chatter in empty dust clouds & void,

the full range of our hearts on display.

May our presence be a bell

in silence of space.

DISCOURSE